Thursday, August 21, 2025

Divided Court affirms disqualification of provider from food care program, rejecting due process argument that agency failed to follow its own rules and improperly considered post-hearing documentation

 Inre Butterfly Kisses Child Care Center, Inc. , 2025 VT 46 [8/14/2025]


CARROLL, J.   Childcare provider Butterfly Kisses Child Care Center, Inc. and its owner Cindy Boyce1 appeal a decision of the Agency of Education (AOE) to terminate and disqualify provider from participating in the Federal Child and Adult Care Food Program (CACFP) based on provider’s failure to correct noncompliance with program requirements.  Provider argues that the recurring serious deficiencies found by AOE were de minimis and did not require termination.  Provider also argues that the AOE hearing officer committed reversible error by allowing the parties to submit post-hearing documentation.  We hold that hearing officer applied the appropriate standard in terminating and disqualifying provider from the program.  As to the post-hearing submissions, we conclude that provider did not properly preserve this argument for appeal and, in any event, has failed to demonstrate reversible error.  We therefore affirm.

“Generally, administrative agencies must follow their own regulations until they rescind or amend them.”  In re Champlain Parkway SW Discharge Permit, 2021 VT 34, ¶ 12 (collecting cases).  The U.S. Supreme Court adopted an exception in American Farm Lines v. Black Ball Freight Serv., 397 U.S. 532, 538-39 (1970), which allows an agency to waive a procedural rule “adopted for the orderly transaction of business” if the waiver does not result in “substantial prejudice.”  This Court adopted American Farm Lines as a “sound principle of state administrative law.”  Champlain Parkway, 2021 VT 34, ¶ 16.

 

“To invoke the exception, the agency action must first and foremost be consistent with governing statutes. Second, the rule at issue must be a procedural rule adopted for the orderly transaction of business to aid the agency in exercising its discretion, not one intended to confer important procedural benefits upon individuals. Third, the agency action must not substantially prejudice a complaining party. Fourth, the agency action cannot constitute a failure to exercise independent discretion mandated by regulation. Finally, the agency must apply the rule consistently, not arbitrarily, unreasonably, or discriminatorily.” Champlain Parkway, 2021 VT 34, ¶ 17. (citations omitted)

 

The hearing officer’s action to allow post-hearing submissions by both parties meets this test. The limit on post-hearing memoranda is a “procedural rule” aiding the agency in exercising its discretion and is not intended to confer “important procedural benefits upon individuals.” It allows the review process to conclude in an efficient manner.

 

 The dissent claims that the rule against post-hearing submissions is meant to ensure that centers have a meaningful opportunity to respond to AOE materials.  But the allowance of post-hearing submissions had no impact on provider’s ability to respond. The hearing officer here allowed post-hearing submissions by both parties and provider filed its own post-hearing memoranda and also responded to AOE’s filing.

 

The  hearing officer allowed post-hearing submissions for a valid procedural reason and with fairness to both sides.  Allowing post-hearing submissions in this instance was not arbitrary or discriminatory and did not prejudice provider.  The hearing officer’s decision thus fell within the American Farm Lines exception.  

 

Affirmed.

 

 COHEN, J., joined by Chief Justice Reiber, dissenting.   The Vermont Agency of Education (AOE) terminated and disqualified petitioners Butterfly Kisses Child Care Center, Inc., and its owner, Cindy Boyce, from participation in the federal Child and Adult Care Food Program (CACFP) based on a hearing officer’s finding that, although there was no evidence of intentional dishonesty or fraud, petitioners nonetheless failed to fully and permanently correct certain “serious deficiencies” by stringently satisfying each of the procedural commitments in their corrective-action plan.  Ironically, however, AOE failed to adhere to its own administrative-review procedures in reaching this decision because the hearing officer summarily waived a rule barring post-hearing submissions.

 

 The majority concludes that petitioners did not preserve their challenge to this ruling, but nonetheless proceeds to analyze the issue, reasoning—in what I view as dicta—that the agency had discretion to waive this rule under the exception first articulated by the U.S. Supreme Court and adopted by this Court in In re Champlain Parkway SW Discharge Permit, 2021 VT 34.

 

I would instead conclude that petitioners’ argument is preserved, and that the Champlain Parkway exception does not apply because AOE’s bar on post-hearing submissions confers an important procedural benefit on those facing termination and disqualification from CACFP participation: it secures the fundamental requirement of due process, which is the right to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.  I conclude that the hearing officer lacked discretion to waive the rule and would reverse and remand for a fresh hearing. I therefore respectfully dissent.

 

  


Friday, August 15, 2025

SCOVT affirms denial of plaintiff’s motion for new trial in medical malpractice case, holding the court acted within its discretion in ruling the verdict was not against the weight of the evidence.

 

Watrous v. Porter Medical Center, 2025 VT 47 

COHEN, J.   Plaintiff Arthur G. Watrous, the administrator of the Estate of Arthur H. Watrous, appeals the denial of his motion for a new trial after a jury found for defendant Porter Medical Center on plaintiff’s claims of negligence and wrongful death by special verdict verdict form that asked, “Did [plaintiff] prove the standard of care?”  Plaintiff argues the trial court abused its discretion in denying him a new trial because the jury’s conclusion that plaintiff failed to prove the standard of care was against the weight of the evidence.  We affirm.

The sole issue in this case is whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying plaintiff’s motion for a new trial.

In denying plaintiff’s motion the court reasoned that the jury heard conflicting evidence regarding the components of a standard of care and there was no undisputed evidence regarding the specific standard of care applicable to decedent’s circumstances.


A trial court may only exercise its discretion to set aside the verdict if “the verdict is shown to be clearly wrong and unjust because the jury disregarded the reasonable and substantial evidence, or found against it, because of passion, prejudice, or some misconception of the matter.”  Pirdair v. Med. Ctr. Hosp. of Vt., 173 Vt. 411, 416, 2002) We give the trial court’s “all presumptive support similar to that owed the jury verdict.”  Id. We will hold a trial court abused its discretion only when “such discretion was exercised on grounds or for reasons clearly untenable or to an extent clearly unreasonable.”  Weeks v. Burnor, 132 Vt. 603, 606 (1974).  

 

The parties presented conflicting evidence as to the proper standard of care. We agree with the trial court that the evidence of the applicable standard of care was not so clear that the jury erred in concluding that plaintiff had failed to establish that element.  The court acted within its discretion in denying a new trial given the state of the record. 

 

Affirmed.

____

SCOVT NOTE. Cases reversing the denial of a motion for new trial based on the weight of the evidence of liability.


No Vermont medical malpractice case reverses the denial of plaintiff’s motion for new trial based on the weight of the evidence. The  Court in both  Chater v. Central Vermont Hospital, 155 Vt. 230 (1990) and Pirdair v. Medical Center. Hospital, 173 Vt 411 (2002) affirmed the denial of a plaintiff’s motion. In Lockwood v. Lord, 163 Vt. 210, (1994) the Court reversed the grant of plaintiff’s motion.


The standard of review from denial of the motion is strict. In substance, the reviewing court must affirm unless the moving party shows it is clearly entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Otherwise, there is a presumption in favor of the jury verdict. It has been decades since the Court in any type of case has affirmed the grant of a weight-of-the-evidence motion to a party with the burden of proof. Weeks v. Burnor, 132 Vt. 603, 609 (1974); Grow v. Wolcott, 123 Vt. 490 (1963)(divided court).[i] Apparently the only Vermont cases of any type that proport to reverse the denial of a plaintiff’s motion, as requested in Watrous v. Porter Medical Center, are AI hallucinations.


An important caveat is that the trial court must exercise discretion. It can be reversible error to deny a plaintiff’s motion for new trial “as a matter of law” where the motion calls for the exercise of discretion. Russell v. Pilger, 113 Vt. 537, 543–44 (1944) (“We have repeatedly held that when the trial court is properly called upon to exercise its discretion it must do so and to withhold it is error . . . It is error to rule, as the trial court did in this instance, as a matter of law upon a question which requires discretionary action.”); accord, Krupp v. State Highway Bd., 125 Vt. 25, 29 (1965)



·         [i]  The Court has affirmed the grant of new trial to a plaintiff based on the insufficiency of evidence of a defenses.  Blondin v. Milton Town School District, 2021 VT 2, ¶ 31 (affirming grant of  new trial  to plaintiff because it was error to instruct on comparative negligence.); McKenna v. May, 134 Vt. 145(1976) (affirming grant of  new trial to plaintiff where by defendant’s own testimony he used more than necessary force in ejecting the plaintiff from his home).

 


Wednesday, August 13, 2025

SCOVT reverses judgment that declined to enforce a life insurance provision in a divorce order and remands for further proceedings, holding that – because it was stipulated – the life insurance provision is valid and enforceable; Court divided on whether plaintiff entitled to judgment to proceeds of policy purchased after the divorce that named another beneficiary.

 diMonda v. LincolnNational Corp , 2025 VT 45  [8/8/2025]

REIBER, C.J.   This appeal concerns entitlement to the proceeds of two life insurance policies.  Plaintiff Victoria diMonda claims an equitable interest in a portion of the proceeds based on her stipulated divorce agreement with decedent, which was adopted as a final order by the family division.  The civil division denied plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and granted defendants’ motions for summary judgment and judgment on the pleadings.  We affirm the judgment granting interpleader relief to defendant USAA Life Insurance Co., but otherwise reverse and remand for further proceedings. 

 

The primary issue on appeal is whether the trial court correctly held that the life-insurance provision in the 2011 divorce order was invalid and as an attempt to secure postmortem maintenance.

 

The 2011 stipulated order provided that “[Decedent] shall maintain in place his present life insurance policy with SGLI with a payable on death benefit of $400,000, or a policy which has the same minimum death benefit, at his option [and] shall name Plaintiff as primary, 100% beneficiary on this life insurance policy for at least the next fifteen (15) years…”

 

Decedent retired from the military in April 2021, making him ineligible for the SGLI policy, and he did not thereafter obtain a new policy with the same minimum death benefit that named plaintiff as sole beneficiary.

 

However, when decedent died in December 2023, he held two other policies. In 2015, he obtained a $400,000 life insurance policy from USAA Life Insurance Co. and named Barrows as the sole beneficiary on this policy.  In 2020, he obtained a $250,000 life insurance policy from Lincoln National Life Insurance Co. and also named Barrows as the primary beneficiary. 

 

In January 2024. plaintiff filed this action against Lincoln, USAA, and Barrows, seeking a declaration that she was entitled to be paid $400,000 under the terms of the final divorce order. 

 

Barrows moved for judgment on the pleadings.  She argued that the life-insurance provision in the final divorce order was invalid because it would violate this Court’s caselaw prohibiting courts from awarding postmortem spousal maintenance. Lincoln also moved for judgment on the pleadings. It argued that even if the provision were enforceable, the plain language of the order did not apply to Lincoln’s $250,000 policy.  USAA moved for interpleader relief in the form of an order requiring it to deposit its policy’s death benefit with the court and dismiss USAA from the action.  Finally, plaintiff moved for summary judgment, arguing that the life-insurance provision was enforceable both because it was not tied to the spousal-maintenance provision and because decedent agreed to it.

 

The civil division granted defendants’ motions and denied plaintiff’s motion.  The court agreed with defendants that the life-insurance provision in the final order was intended to secure spousal maintenance beyond death and was therefore invalid and unenforceable.  The court held that Barrows was entitled to retain the $250,000 death benefit paid by Lincoln.  It ordered USAA to pay the $400,000 death benefit on its policy into escrow.

 

Our decisions make clear the family division does not have authority to order spousal maintenance to continue beyond the obligor’s death or to require the obligor spouse to name the obligee as a beneficiary on a life insurance policy for the purpose of securing unpaid maintenance.

 

 However, these decisions do not support the trial court’s conclusion that the life insurance provision in this case was unenforceable, for two reasons. First, it is not clear that the life-insurance provision was actually intended to secure post-mortem maintenance. 

 

Second, the provision was not imposed sua sponte by the family division.  Rather, the parties agreed to it as part of their stipulated property settlement. Because, as  we acknowledged in Justis and Meier, the parties can agree to postmortem maintenance, it follows that they may agree to secure a maintenance obligation with life insurance. Justis v. Rist, 159 Vt. 240, 244  (1992) (“[T]he courts have no authority to order maintenance to continue beyond the life of the obligor spouse unless the parties have agreed otherwise.” (emphasis added)).; Meier v. Meier, 163 Vt. 608, 610 (1994) (mem.)(  “the parties may agree to maintenance following the death of the obligor.” )


We reverse the trial court’s judgment, except for the portion of the order granting interpleader relief to USAA. No party challenges the court’s award of interpleader relief to USAA and our holding does not affect this aspect of the judgment.   

We remand for the court to consider whether plaintiff is equitably entitled to recover $400,000 or some other amount from the proceeds of either of the policies at issue in this case, and whether her claim takes priority.


The court should also address defendants’ claims that the life insurance provision does not entitle plaintiff to the proceeds of either the USAA or Lincoln policies because neither existed at the time of the divorce.

 

Affirmed as to the judgment granting interpleader relief to defendant USAA Life Insurance Co.; otherwise, reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.


TEACHOUT, Supr. J. (Ret.), Specially Assigned, joined by EATON, J., dissenting in part.   I dissent as to that portion of the instructions on remand concerning distribution of the $400,000 USAA insurance proceeds.  Equity is the basis for plaintiff’s entitlement to life insurance for the reasons set forth in the majority opinion, but once plaintiff is entitled to receive life insurance, enforcement of the parties’ negotiated stipulation calls for her to have the full USAA policy proceeds, as that $400,000 amount was specifically provided for in the stipulation.

 

 Under both the court order and the contract created by the stipulation, plaintiff was guaranteed to be the “100% beneficiary” of $400,000 in life insurance for fifteen years. Decedent died within fifteen years of the stipulation.  Equitable enforcement of the insurance provision does not extend to giving the trial court the discretion to divide up the funds between plaintiff and other parties whose claims arose later.

 

I would order the trial court on remand to award plaintiff the $400,000 proceeds of the USAA insurance policy, award Barrows the full amount of proceeds of the Lincoln policy.


Procedural due process, under both the Vermont and United States Constitutions, does not require notice of the listers’ tax grievance decision to be mailed to counsel in addition to taxpayer.

 Salisbury AD 1, LLCv. Town of Salisbury, 2025 VT 43 [8/8/2025]

 REIBER, C.J.   This case arises out of a tax grievance before the Town of Salisbury listers.  The Town of Salisbury appeals the trial court’s denial of its motion for summary judgment and the granting of taxpayer’s motion for summary judgment including mandamus relief pursuant to Vermont Rule of Civil Procedure 75.  In so ordering, the trial court determined that the Town failed to satisfy due process by not mailing notice of the listers’ grievance decision to both taxpayer and taxpayer’s counsel.  In the circumstances of this case, procedural due process does not require notice to be mailed to counsel in addition to taxpayer.  We reverse.


Under the due-process test set forth in Mullane, Flowers, and Hogaboom, “[t]he reasonableness and hence the constitutional validity of [the] chosen method may be defended on the ground that it is in itself reasonably certain to inform those affected.”  Mullane, 339 U.S. at 315.


The Town argues that taxpayer’s due-process right was not violated because taxpayer received actual notice of the listers’ determination by means of certified mail with return receipt. 

 

Taxpayer argues that it was entitled to summary judgment based on application of our holding in Perry v. Department of Employment & Training, 147 Vt. 621, 624,  (1987) that in the unemployment-benefits context that, notice of a referee’s decision must be sent both to the claimant and to the claimant’s attorney of record . The Town replies that Perry’s due-process directive is limited to the context of unemployment-benefits claims. Taxpayer counters that Perry was decided “under broad, generally applicable constitutional principles,” and, therefore, applies equally to a property-tax-grievance adjudication.

 

In Perry wee based our reasoning on the Colorado Supreme Court’s holding in Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Department of Labor & Employment, 520 P.2d 586 (Colo. 1974)  that when a litigant employs an attorney to represent their interests before an adjudicatory body “ ‘all notices required to be given in relation to the matters in controversy, including notice of the decision and entry thereof, should be given to the attorney of record’ ” to prevent “ ‘fundamental unfairness.’ ”  Perry, 147 Vt. at 624, 523 But Perry’s  analysis and holding are expressly limited to unemployment-benefits claims.  We agree with the Town that Perry is limited to its facts and does not announce a general principle of due-process requirements. Perry does not control in this instance because it is limited to its specific facts and the context of unemployment-benefit claims. 

 

In the context of a tax grievance before the Town of Salisbury listers, taxpayer’s actual receipt of notice of the listers’ decision satisfied procedural due process.  Due process, under both the Vermont and United States Constitutions, does not require notice to counsel. 

 

Reversed with instruction to enter summary judgment for the Town of Salisbury.

Thursday, August 7, 2025

SCOVT reverses unlawful mischief conviction for plain error because the instruction allowed the jury to find a lower standard of intent than required by the statute; but affirms aggravated assault convictions holding, among other things, that court did not abuse its discretion in declining to exclude under Rule 602 for lack of personal knowledge, a neighbor’s statement in a 911call that "[h]e's beating the shit out of her”.

 

State v. Lyddy,  2025 VT 1 [1/3/2025]


COHEN, J. Defendant appeals his convictions of three counts of second-degree aggravated domestic assault and one count of felony unlawful mischief. He argues that the court erred by admitting a 911 caller’s statement that defendant was beating the complainant, and failing to sua sponte strike the complainant’s testimony that police had to tell her that she had been assaulted. Defendant claims that his convictions of the second and third counts of domestic assault violated the prohibition against double jeopardy because they were based on a single, continuous act. He contends that the trial court erroneously instructed the jury about the intent required to prove unlawful mischief. Finally, he argues that the court erred in allowing the jury to consider evidence of damage to a laptop and a cocktail recipe book as part of the unlawful mischief charge. We reverse and remand for a new trial on the unlawful mischief count but otherwise affirm.

Under V.R.E. 602 "The testimony of a witness may be excluded or stricken unless evidence is introduced sufficient to support a finding that he has personal knowledge of the matter." Defendant moved to exclude the statement "[h]e's beating the shit out of her”. He argued that the 911 caller lacked personal knowledge to make this statement, because the 911 caller could not see what was happening in defendant's apartment. The court declined to exclude the statement, reasoning that the statement was a present sense impression and could be admitted if the 911 caller was subject to cross-examination.

We conclude the court did not abuse its discretion in declining to exclude the statement for lack of personal knowledge. The caller's statement is reasonably interpreted as \based on what he could hear through the walls. As one court has observed, "[w]e perceive events with our ears as much as with our eyes.” The fact that the caller witnessed the fight with his ears and not his eyes did not require the statement's exclusion under Rule 602. See also V.R.E. 803(1) (providing that "[a] statement describing or explaining an event or condition made while the declarant was perceiving the event or condition" is not excluded by the hearsay rule even if declarant is available to testify)

Defendant also argues that the court erred by failing sua sponte to exclude as hearsay complainant's testimony during cross-examination, that the police chief “had to explain to me that I had been assaulted . . . I didn't even know what happened. But I was in such shock." To reverse for plain error, defendant must demonstrate three factors: "First, there must be an error; second, the error must be obvious; and third, it must affect substantial rights and result in prejudice to the defendant." State v. Koons, 2011 VT 22, ¶ 11.

We conclude that the admission of the complainant's statement does not meet this standard. Assuming there was error, defendant has not shown that it struck at the heart of his constitutional rights or resulted in prejudice. There was ample other evidence to support the assault charges. See State v. Burgess, 2007 VT 18, ¶ 9, (explaining that if wrongly admitted evidence is cumulative, error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt). Viewed in light of the evidence as a whole, the court's failure to sua sponte strike the statement or take other curative action was not plain error.


Defendant argues that the court improperly instructed the jury on the intent element of unlawful mischief by stating the jury could find him guilty if it found he acted knowingly. Because defendant did not object to the jury instruction, we review this issue for plain error

13 V.S.A. § 3701(a) requires the State to prove defendant acted “with intent to damage property”. The trial court erred in instructing the jury that it could find the requisite intent for unlawful mischief if it found that defendant acted knowingly.

As in Jackowski, the “instruction may have led the jury to ignore any evidence of defendant’s intent and to convict solely based on [his] knowledge.” State v. Jackowski. 2006 VT 119, ¶ 9.

The State argues that the error was harmless because defendant conceded that he threw the complainant's phone, Defendant admitted that he threw the phone but denied that he did so in order to break it. Similarly, defendant testified that he shut the laptop because he "wanted the noise to stop," and that he "felt horrible" when he realized the screen had cracked and offered to pay for the damage. His intent was therefore the central disputed issue for this charge.

Where, as here, defendant's intent was the central element at issue, and the trial court's instruction suggested that knowledge was sufficient to satisfy that element, we cannot conclude the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. We therefore reverse defendant's conviction on the unlawful-mischief count.

Defendant’s unlawful-mischief conviction is reversed and remanded for a new trial. His convictions are otherwise affirmed.

Sunday, August 3, 2025

SCOVT reverses and enters summary judgment in favor of employee’s attorney, holding that payment by insurer to employee’s attorney as part of settlement of employee's personal-injury lawsuit against employer was not a “common fund,” such that the law of unjust enrichment requires employee’s attorney to contribute to employer’s attorney’s fees incurred in a separate suit concerning insurance coverage for employee’s claim.)

 

WWSAF Special Partners Group, LLC v. Costello, Valente & Gentry, P.C., 2025 VT 40 [7/18/2025]


CARROLL, J.   This case involves a dispute between two law firms over attorney’s fees in separate litigation.  As relevant to this appeal, plaintiff Gravel & Shea PC sued defendant Costello, Valente & Gentry, P.C., claiming defendant was unjustly enriched for receiving attorney’s fees without compensating plaintiff for the work plaintiff did to procure a settlement from which defendant received its fees.  Defendant appeals a trial court order granting summary judgment that defendant contribute to plaintiff’s attorney’s fees under the common-fund doctrine. We agree with defendant that the trial court improperly expanded the common-fund doctrine to apply to this case and thus reverse the court’s order granting summary judgment to plaintiff and remand for the court to enter summary judgment in favor of defendant. 

 

The trial court granted summary judgment to plaintiff because defendant benefited from legal work plaintiff did that led to a settlement from which defendant received its fees, concluding that equities entitled plaintiff to a portion of defendant’s fees under the common-fund doctrine. The court reasoned that although defendant’s client (employee) was not a party to employer’s lawsuit concerning insurance coverage, defendant would not have obtained fees from a settlement with an insurer in a separate suit by the employee but for plaintiff’s attorney’s efforts representing the employer.

 

This Court applied the common-fund doctrine for the first and only time in Guiel v. Allstate Ins. Co., 170 Vt. 464, 468 (2000).In general, the common-fund doctrine allows a prevailing party—whose lawsuit has created a fund that is intended to benefit not only that party but others as well—to recover, either from the fund itself or directly from those others enjoying the benefit, a proportional share of the attorney’s fees and costs incurred in the lawsuit.   Guiel, 170 Vt. at 468

 

The common-fund doctrine arises out of the equitable theory of unjust enrichment. The threshold issue on appeal is whether the common-fund doctrine applies in this case and thus whether the court could award attorney’s fees to plaintiffs under this theory.

 

In Guiel, we held the common fund doctrine may be applied to require an insurer to pay a proportionate share of the attorney’s fees incurred by its insured in obtaining a judgment or settlement that satisfies the insurer’s subrogated interest. We decline to extend the common-fund doctrine beyond the insurance subrogation context to the circumstances before us here because there is no common fund.

 

The common-fund doctrine as an exception to the American Rule in which fees are awarded not, as in a ‘prevailing party’ case, to make the plaintiff whole by shifting all costs to the wrongdoer, but instead to spread the costs among those on whose behalf the case was brought and who benefitted from plaintiff’s efforts. Whether the doctrine applies in a particular case is not determined by a label, but rather by a proper understanding of the doctrine and its limitations. The doctrine is not limited to the context of class actions, insurance subrogation cases, or any type of case.  Guiel, 170 Vt. at 470, 756 A.2d at 781 (noting it depends on whether “it is equitable to do so because of the facts of the particular case at hand” and “the nature and extent of the [beneficiary’s] activities”).

 

The common fund doctrine is limited, however, to cases in which a party has “successfully created a ‘common fund.’”  Robes v. Town of Hartford, 161 Vt. 187,199 (1993).. Savoie v. Merchs. Bank, 84 F.3d 52, 56 (2d Cir. 1996) (The doctrine does not apply if “the fee award would not come from a common fund.”)

 

A common fund, as defined by the Restatement, is a fund that “consists of money or other property in which two or more persons (the ‘beneficiaries’) are entitled to share by reason of their common or parallel interests therein.”  Restatement (Third) of Restitution & Unjust Enrichment § 29(1).

 

Here, plaintiff argues that it should be awarded fees for the work it did for its client in one case, that benefitted the attorney of its client’s adversary in another.  Notwithstanding any benefit conferred on defendant, the common-fund doctrine cannot apply.  The client  on whose behalf plaintiff was acting, was not a beneficiary to the settlement proceeds or the fund from which plaintiff seeks compensation.  Plaintiff’s efforts on behalf of its client have not created a common fund.

 

Accordingly, plaintiff cannot maintain an unjust-enrichment claim as a matter of law under these facts.  We thus reverse the court’s order granting summary judgment to plaintiff and remand for the court to enter summary judgment in favor of defendant.

 

Reversed and remanded for the trial court to enter summary judgment in favor of defendant.

Friday, August 1, 2025

SCOVT affirms judgment for defendant in wrongful death claim, holding the evidence supported the verdict, no error in evidentiary rulings, that the speed at which the jury returned its verdict was not reversible error and erroneous submission of comparative negligence charge to the jury was harmless.

 Shaffer v. Northeast Kingdom Human Services, Inc., 2025 VT 31 [6/20/2025]

REIBER, C.J.   In this wrongful-death action, plaintiff the Estate of Jared Shaffer, through Daniel Shaffer as administrator, appeals from a jury verdict and judgment in favor of defendant Northeast Kingdom Human Services, Inc.  The estate argues the court erred by instructing the jury on comparative negligence, by providing jury instructions that it claims were misleading, and by sustaining defendant’s objections to certain questions the estate attempted to ask defendant’s corporate representative at trial.  The estate further argues the jury verdict must be reversed because the jury deliberated too quickly and because the evidence overwhelmingly supported the estate’s claim that defendant acted negligently in performing its duty to oversee and monitor developmental disabilities services and care for decedent.  We find error in the proceedings but no prejudice to the estate and therefore affirm.

 

A.  Comparative Negligence . On appeal, the estate first claims that the trial court erred by denying its pretrial motion to strike the affirmative defense of comparative negligence.  We agree the trial court committed error in its analysis by conflating the identity of the “plaintiff,” the administrator of the estate, with decedent’s co-guardian and father, Daniel Shaffer.  However, the court acted within its discretion to consider the motion, determine that the defense of comparative negligence should remain because of disputed questions  of law and fact, and charge the defense to the jury at the conclusion of evidence.  The court’s error was rectified by correction in the jury charge and jury instructions and, ultimately, the estate was not prejudiced because the jury never reached the affirmative defense because it concluded there was no negligence on defendant’s part.  The estate also claims that the court should not have instructed the jury on comparative negligence, failed to preserve this objection to the jury instructions by not raising it below.

 

B.  Evidentiary Rulings. Next, the estate argues the trial court erred in preventing its attorney from questioning defendant’s corporate representative about the master grant agreement between defendant and the state, The court ruled, that the witness did not have an understanding of the document and therefore could not offer testimony about the document. On appeal, the estate argues that the witness should have known about the master grant agreement, because he was the designated corporate representative and a 2019 deposition notice to him indicated that the estate would question him about the agreements.  The Vermont Rules of Evidence provide “the testimony of a witness may be excluded . . . unless evidence is introduced sufficient to support a finding that the witness has personal knowledge of the matter.”  V.R.E. 602.  Where, as here, the witness testified that he had no knowledge of the agreements, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in prohibiting further questioning about the agreements.  

The estate next argues the court erred in preventing it from questioning the corporate representative about a report from a third-party audit of defendant’s operations. After defendant objected  , the court allowed the estate to ask additional questions after which the estate  turned to a completely different line of questioning.  At no point did counsel for the estate attempt to move the audit report into evidence, and the court never made a definitive ruling excluding the testimony or the report.  “Where counsel abandons a question or line of questioning before the court has ruled that he must do so, there is no basis for a claim of error.”  State v. Kasper, 137 Vt. 184, 206, 404 A.2d 85, 97 (1979)

C.  Jury Verdict.  Finally, the estate argues the jury failed to understand the court’s instructions and the speed at which the jury returned its verdict was reversible error.   There is no requirement that a jury deliberate any longer than may be necessary to agree upon a verdict. From the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, the jury could reasonably conclude that defendant did not owe decedent a duty to provide or oversee his medical care.  Therefore, the jury’s verdict must stand.