Calculation of prejudgment interest in contract case reversed so interest will begin to run no earlier than earliest date payment was due

Russell v. Hernon, 2017 VT 45  

SKOGLUND, J. Defendants appeal from a jury verdict in favor of plaintiff  in this breach-of-contract action. They challenge the jury instructions, the admission of certain evidence, and the court’s calculation of prejudgment interest. With the exception of prejudgment interest, we affirm the court’s judgment. The court’s prejudgment interest calculation is reversed and remanded for additional proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Plaintiff asked defendant to pay the sum in full by June 14, 2013. Defendants did not do so. We agree with defendants that June 14, 2013, appears to be the earliest date that prejudgment interest could begin to accrue. Because we cannot discern the basis for the court’s determination that interest began to accrue on May 1, 2013, we must reverse and remand the calculation of prejudgment interest for additional proceedings. See Sec’y, Vt. Agency Nat. Res. v. Irish, 169 Vt. 407, 419, 738 A.2d 571, 580 (1999) (reversing and remanding where trial court failed to make necessary findings). 

Affirmed, with the exception of the court’s calculation of prejudgment interest. The calculation of prejudgment interest is reversed and remanded for additional proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Twelve percent statutory interest passes federal constitutional muster.

Concord General Mutual Insurance Co. v. Gritman, 2016 Vt. 46 (filed April 22, 2016)

ROBINSON, J. Defendant Dylan Stinson appeals from a judgment finding him liable to plaintiffs for damage to their vacation home. Stinson contends that the pre and postjudgment interest rate awarded by the trial court was unconstitutional under the U.S. and Vermont Constitutions. We affirm.

Stinson argues that the trial court's award of statutory interest pursuant to 9 V.S.A. § 41a(a) (prejudgment interest) and 12 V.S.A. § 2903(c) (postjudgment interest) is unconstitutional, because it deprives him of property without due process of the law in violation of Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. 

Stinson also raises a constitutional challenge under Articles 1, 4, 9, and 18 of the Vermont Constitution; however, he fails to provide any analysis tying his challenge to the statutory interest rates to those provisions. He simply raises the provisions and never elaborates on these contentions other than to list the provisions. We will not address state constitutional claims where they are insufficiently raised and inadequately briefed.

All parties agree that the rational-basis test applies to Stinson's Federal constitutional claim. If there are any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the 12% rate, the statute must be upheld. Providing one contrary explanation does not in and of itself show that the 12% rate is not reasonably related to the statute's purpose. 

Although we acknowledge that the statutory rate is incongruous in the context of today's market conditions, we conclude that the 12% rate is reasonably related to making plaintiffs whole, and as a result, passes rational-basis review.