SCOVT reverses, for inadequate findings, Labor Board ruling that predoctoral fellows and trainees are “employees” for purposes of the State Employees Labor Relations Act.

 In re United Auto Workers, Local 2322, 2025 VT 8 [filed 2/21/2025]

CARROLL, J. The University of Vermont appeals from a Vermont Labor Relations Board decision concluding that predoctoral fellows and trainees are employees for purposes of the State Employees Labor Relations Act (SELRA). We reverse and remand for further consideration of the issue. 

 

The term “employee” is broadly defined under the SELRA in relevant part as “any individual employed on a permanent or limited-status basis by . . . the University of Vermont” The Board, explaining that the term “employed” is not further defined in the statute, adopted the ordinary dictionary definition of employee, which it described as a person “who provide[s] work to someone for pay” or “any person who works for another in return for financial or other compensation.”

The Board concluded that graduate assistants are employees because they work for the University in exchange for compensation. The Board made no such findings with regard to predoctoral fellows and trainees. The Board’s decision fails to address its own findings that predoctoral fellows and trainees apparently have no obligations to the University beyond academic requirements, do not receive W-2s, or that the funding for predoctoral fellows is tied to the individual student. 

 

It is not clear that predoctoral fellows and trainees fall under the Board’s definition of employee based on the record and findings available to us in this appeal. Without such findings or more detailed reasoning supplied by the Board as to why differences between graduate assistants and predoctoral fellows and trainees are immaterial to the outcome, we can only “speculate” as to how the Board reached its decision. Page v.Smith-Gates Corp, 143 Vt. 280, 283 (1983).  Accordingly, the Board’s order with respect to the employee status of predoctoral fellows and trainees is reversed and the matter is remanded to the Board for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

SCOVT reverses E-Court ruling denying reimbursement from the Petroleum Cleanup Fund, holding the court’s findings were inadequate to show how the decision was reached.

 

In re Cote/Maquam Shore Market, 2025 VT 42 [Filed 7/25/2025]

EATON, J.   This appeal concerns a dispute over reimbursements from the Petroleum Cleanup Fund (PCF).  Appellant Janet Cote owns a property which was once the site of a gas station.  After the discovery of significant petroleum contamination in the soil on her property, she applied for and received reimbursement from the PCF.  The issues on appeal stem from the Agency of Natural Resources’ decision to deny further reimbursement for costs associated with a licensed engineer and with a “punch list” of additional items on Cote’s property.  The Environmental Division affirmed the Agency’s decision in part and reversed in part.  Cote now appeals the reimbursements she claimed which were denied by both the Agency and then the Environmental Division.  We reverse and remand. 

“The purpose of findings is to make a clear statement to the parties, and to this Court, if appeal is taken, of what was decided and how the decision was reached.”  New England Power Co.,. New England Power Co. v. Town of Barnet, 134 Vt. 498, 503,  (1976)  A trial court’s findings are “insufficient when [this Court is] left to speculate as to the basis of the trial court’s decision.”  Bonanno v. Bonanno, 148 Vt. 248, 251, 531 A.2d 602, 604 (1987). 

Here the court failed to provide an adequate basis for its conclusion that the Agency correctly denied reimbursement for the engineer Specifically, the court did not adequately explain why it considered the Agency’s denial of this expense to be reasonable.  The decision merely restates the Agency’s conclusory arguments that the cost was ineligible because all eligible work was complete and that the costs 8 were in excess of what was reasonable.  

In its findings of fact, the court listed the twenty items on the punch list that the Agency identified as ineligible for reimbursement. As above, the court did not explain why the Agency’s denial for each specific item was reasonable.  The court’s use of the terms “many” and “in general” when describing the punch list items forces us to speculate about whether and how each item is ineligible .The decision provides no analysis of the Agency’s reasoning for denying each vastly dissimilar punch list item request—merely restating the Agency’s generalized and conclusory arguments.

Without more findings or analysis of the Agency’s reasoning, “we are left to speculate as to the basis of the trial court’s decision” which we decline to do.  Bonanno, 148 Vt. at 251. We reverse and remand to allow the Environmental Division to make adequate factual findings and any additional conclusions as may be necessary on the disputed restitution claims.

 

 Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.