SCOVT affirms denial of post-conviction relief on the basis that plaintiff failed to prove ineffective assistance of counsel; trial court’s error in applying claim preclusion to bar claim was harmless

 Post-Conviction Relief. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

In re Bruyette, 2026 VT 18 [5/22/2026]

WAPLES, J.   Petitioner Joseph Bruyette sought post-conviction relief (PCR) on the ground of ineffective assistance of sentencing counsel.  The civil division denied the PCR petition on the merits and, in the alternative, held that the petition was barred by the doctrine of claim preclusion.  Petitioner appealed, arguing the court erroneously denied his claim on the merits, excluded admissible evidence at the final hearing, and applied the doctrine of claim preclusion in the context of a PCR proceeding.  We conclude that the court improperly applied claim preclusion but that the error does not require reversal because petitioner failed to prove his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.  We therefore affirm.  Petitioner failed to fulfill his heavy burden in overcoming the “strong presumption” that Attorney Kershaw’s conduct “fell within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.”  In re Grega, 2003 VT 77, ¶ 7. ¶ 2 We further conclude petitioner failed to demonstrate a reasonable probability that, but for Attorney Kershaw’s alleged errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.  Williams, 2014 VT 67, ¶ 29.  We agree with petitioner that the court erred in applying claim preclusion here.  As we have explained, the civil doctrine of claim preclusion does not apply to PCR cases.  In re Laws, 2007 VT 54, ¶ 14, 182 Vt. 66, 928 A.2d 1210 (explaining that while claim preclusion ordinarily precludes litigant “from raising a claim that was or could have been fully litigated in a prior judicial proceeding,” claim preclusion “has traditionally not been applied to habeas corpus relief”); see In re Chandler, 2013 VT 10, ¶ 16 n.4, 193 Vt. 246, 67 A.3d 261 However, he doctrine of successive petitions, like claim preclusion, “applies to ‘relitigation of claims actually raised and decided on the merits in an earlier PCR.’ ”    Vermont’s PCR statute, 13 V.S.A. § 7134, provides: “The court is not required to entertain a second or successive [PCR] for similar relief on behalf of the same prisoner.”  This suggests that the court has discretion in deciding whether to entertain a second or successive PCR.Because the State alleged that petitioner’s ineffective-assistance claim was litigated and decided in Bruyette 2019, the PCR court should have assessed the State’s motion under the doctrine of successive petitions rather than claim preclusion.  However, because we affirm the court’s decision that petitioner failed to demonstrate ineffective assistance of sentencing counsel, the error is not a basis for reversal.  Affirmed.

SCOVT affirms summary judgment that there was no ineffective assistance of counsel, largely because alleged professional errors did not prejudice result.

In Re Burke, 2019 VT 28 [4/26/2019]

SKOGLUND, J. Petitioner James Burke sought post-conviction relief (PCR) alleging that his trial counsel, Attorney Daniel Maguire, provided ineffective assistance because of a conflict of interest. The PCR court denied petitioner’s motion for summary judgment and granted the State’s motion for summary judgment based on the court’s determination that Attorney Maguire did not provide ineffective counsel. Petitioner appeals and, for the reasons below, we affirm.

For PCR petitions based on ineffective counsel, the trial court outlined the Strickland two-part standard where the petitioner must show: (1) "by a preponderance of the evidence that counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness informed by prevailing professional norms"; and (2) prejudice "by demonstrating a reasonable probability that, but for the counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.

 Although an expert opined that Attorney Maguire's failure to hire a forensic toxicologist fell below the prevailing professional norm, there was no evidence to support the "prejudice" prong of the test with any degree of specificity because "the results of forensic toxicological evaluation remain highly speculative at best.. Similarly even if Attorney Maguire had more effectively counseled and prepared petitioner for the competency examinations, testimony, and PSI interview, there is no evidence that demonstrates or predicts how petitioner would have done anything different.

PCR statute applies to juvenile delinquency proceedings.

In re D.C., Juvenile, 2016 VT 72 (filed June 24 2016)

DOOLEY, J. The Vermont Constitution provides, "The Writ of Habeas Corpus shall in no case be suspended. It shall be a writ issuable of right; and the General Assembly shall make provision to render it a speedy and effectual remedy in all cases proper therefor." VT Const. CH II, § 41.

Petitioner appeals the dismissal of a complaint for post-conviction relief (PCR) under 13 V.S.A. § 7131 alleging that the change-of-plea hearing that preceded his adjudication of juvenile delinquency was constitutionally inadequate. The superior court held that the PCR statute does not apply to juvenile delinquency proceedings and that the remedy available to petitioner under 33 V.S.A. § 5113 and Vermont Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), was foreclosed because petitioner’s claim was not timely raised. On appeal, petitioner argues the fact he is over the age of majority and no longer committed to state custody does not moot the case, and that the PCR statutes permit juveniles to collaterally attack their adjudications. We agree, reverse the superior court’s order dismissing petitioner’s PCR complaint, and remand for further proceedings.

The State -- as appellee -- can raise mootness for the first time on appeal. Town of Charlotte v. Richmond, 158 Vt. 354, 357-58, 609 A.2d 638, 640 (1992) .

In a criminal case “when a petitioner moves under § 7131 to challenge a conviction while still in custody for that challenged conviction, the trial court possesses jurisdiction to hear the claim and the expiration of the custodial term will not render the cause moot.” In re Chandler, 2013 VT 10, ¶ 6. Adverse collateral consequences of a criminal conviction are presumed and need not be proven in the individual case to avoid mootness. 2013 VT 10, ¶ 13. The Chandler rule applies here because juvenile delinquency proceedings have significant collateral consequences. We hold that petitioner’s PCR case is not moot under Chandler.

Accordingly, we proceed to the question of whether a juvenile can challenge a delinquency adjudication using the PCR statute to collaterally attack an unconstitutional delinquency conviction, or a delinquency conviction based on a guilty plea that did not comply with Criminal Procedure Rule 11, or whether the juvenile must rely exclusively on 33 V.S.A. § 5113 for any post-conviction review challenge.

In consideration of the history and significance of the Great Writ, the construction of the applicable statutes, and case law from Vermont and other jurisdictions, we conclude a person adjudicated a juvenile delinquent may bring a PCR petition to challenge an admission of guilt based on due process and Criminal Procedure Rule 11 and that the availability of PCR relief was not impliedly eliminated by the enactment of 33 V.S.A. § 5113 and Civil Procedure Rule 60.

Like other citizens of this state, juveniles have a constitutional right to petition for relief from unlawful restraint from the government, Vt. Const. ch. II, § 41, a right that does not evanesce simply due to “the condition of being a boy.” In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 28. See Shuttle v. Patrissi, 158 Vt. 127, 129-30, 605 A.2d 845, 847 (1992) (noting Vermont’s Constitution guarantees writ “ ‘shall in no case be suspended’ ” and that, while originally limited to situations resulting in immediate release from custody, habeas corpus today protects “broad range of liberty interests” (quoting Vt. Const. ch. II, § 41)); Shequin v. Smith, 129 Vt. 578, 581, 285 A.2d 708, 710 (1971) (“While a legislature may regulate the procedure with respect to habeas corpus, and to some extent, the purposes for which it may be used, the writ may not be abrogated or its efficiency curtailed by legislative action.”).

Reversed and remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.