SCOVT affirms summary judgment dismissing premises liability claim brought on behalf of trespassing child, declining to adopt attractive nuisance doctrine recognized in the Restatement, holding protection of children was not “plain justification “ for overruling longstanding no-duty-to-trespasser precedent that has fostered certainty, stability, and predictability in Vermont’s landowner liability law.

   Premises Liability. Attractive Nuisance. Stare Decisis

Treadway v. Green Mountain Power Corporation, 2026 VT 20 [6/5/2026] 

EATON, J.   Plaintiff Ian Treadway appeals a civil division order granting summary judgment to defendant, Green Mountain Power (GMP).  Plaintiff’s suit stemmed from a severe injury incurred while trespassing at defendant’s electrical substation.  Consistent with Vermont’s common law, the civil division granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment concluding that defendant owed no duty to plaintiff, who was a trespasser.  On appeal, plaintiff does not contest that Vermont’s common law precludes recovery on his complaint.  However, plaintiff asks this Court to adopt the attractive-nuisance doctrine outlined in the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 339 (1965) and remand for a trial.  We decline to overrule our existing cases regarding the duty owed to trespassers and affirm. In Demag v. Better Power Equipment, Inc., we explained that when considering overruling precedent that has created “certainty, stability, and predictability” in our common law, this Court will only deviate from such precedent when “our community’s ever-evolving circumstances and experiences” create “plain justification” to do so.  2014 VT 78, ¶ 14. ¶ 14. For over 115 years, Vermont law has recognized that landowners, absent willful or wanton actions, are not liable to trespassers. We conclude that the common law on this issue has created certainty, stability, and predictability in the rule.   No “plain justification” exists to adopt the attractive-nuisance doctrine.  In Demag, we specified that the required “plain justification” must be derived from Vermont community standards and not those in existence in other states.  2014 VT 78, ¶ 14; see also Zeno-Ethridge v. Comcast Corp., 2024 VT 16, ¶¶ 9-15, 219 Vt. 121, 315 A.3d 978 (declining to modify Vermont’s common law for negligent-infliction-of-emotional-distress claims because Vermont’s community circumstances and experiences demonstrated policy reasons for common-law rule were still relevant in Vermont). We reject plaintiff’s argument that adoption of the attractive-nuisance doctrine in the majority of other states is “strong evidence that common standards have evolved” such that Vermont common law should also be modified. The current law—constitutional, legislative, and common law—surrounding public access to private land and correlated reductions in landowner liability demonstrates significant public-policy justification for maintaining the status quo.  Doing so provides predictability for landowners regarding liability to trespassers and also maintains the assumptions regarding owed duties that underpin the Legislature’s statutory scheme encouraging public access to private lands throughout the state.   This clear legislative and constitutional desire to support public access to private land in Vermont could not exist without protection against liability for land possessors who open their land to the public. Modification to our common-law rule regarding landowner liability to trespassers, children or otherwise, could have significant impact upon and drastically alter the deliberate balance established by the Legislature to support public access to private land developed in these statutes. Thus the protection for trespassing children too immature to appreciate and guard against dangerous does not rise to the level of “plain justification” required to overturn our longstanding precedent through judicial order. For over a century, our no-duty-to-trespassers law has harbored certainty, stability, and predictability within Vermont’s landowner liability law.  Given the doctrine’s integration into our Vermont community’s circumstances and experiences, and the complex and far-reaching policy considerations both supporting and opposing any change in Vermont, we decline to adopt the attractive-nuisance doctrine by judicial fiat. Accordingly, we reaffirm that under Vermont’s common law, absent willful or wanton conduct, “[o]ur rule is that the owner or occupant is under no obligation to [protect] a trespasser, whether adult or child,” from injury by reason of the claimed unsafe and dangerous condition of the premises.  Trudo, 116 Vt. at 223, 73 A.2d at 307.  Affirmed.