SCOVT affirms dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction of a superior court complaint challenging PUC denial of request to submit interrogatories to commissioners concerning their deliberations, holding 3 V.S.A. § 809b allows review when an agency compels discovery – not when the agency denies discovery.

 Administrative Appeals. Discovery. Jurisdiction

1.      Otter Creek Solar LLC v. Vermont Public Utility Commission, 2026 VT 15 [May 8, 2026]

SCOVT affirms dismissal of declaratory judgment action for lack of jurisdiction because the claim seeking determination of applicability of short-term rental ordinance is not ripe.

 

1.    Jurisdiction. Declaratory Judgment; Ripeness. 

       32 Intervale, LLC v. City of Burlington, 2026 VT 9 [4/10/2026]

SCOVT affirms, as supported by the evidence, family division denial of petition to terminate parental rights and separate civil division dismissal of appeal from family division adoption ruling, holding civil division lacked appellate jurisdiction of adoption proceeding that was transferred from probate to family division and consolidated with the preexisting divorce action pursuant to 15A V.S.A. § 3-207

 

1.    Jurisdiction; Appeals from adoptions transferred to  Family Division. 

          In re K.P. , 2026 VT 4 [2/20/2026]

SCOVT reverses denial of joint motion to modify final property division order; such relief is authorized in limited circumstances under Rule 60

Sandra L. Penland (Warren) v. John W. Warren, Jr., 2018 VT 70 

REIBER, C.J. Husband appeals the trial court’s denial of husband and wife’s joint motion to modify their final divorce order. The issue in this case is whether the trial court has jurisdiction under Vermont Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6) to modify a property-division order based on the agreement of the parties after the divorce order has become absolute. We hold the court does have jurisdiction, and accordingly we reverse and remand.

The court declined to exercise its discretion because  it found, as a matter of law, that it lacked jurisdiction to modify the property division. Whether the court has authority to exercise its discretion is a legal issue that we review de novo.

Under Rule 60(b), “the court may relieve a party . . . from a final judgment, order, or proceeding” for several enumerated reasons, such as mistake, V.R.C.P. 60(b)(1), and fraud, V.R.C.P. 60(b)(3). Rule 60(b)(6) authorizes relief for “any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.” The subsection is available only where the other criteria under Rule 60(b) do not apply.

Rule 60(b)(6) is available and appropriately used to provide relief from a final property-division order where “extraordinary circumstances” justify relief “to prevent hardship or injustice.” Wilson v. Wilson, 2011 VT 133, ¶ 5, 191 Vt. 560, 38 A.3d 50 (mem.) (quotations omitted). This opportunity for relief applies to final property divisions in divorce orders as it does to other final orders and judgments. See id. ¶¶ 5-6 (affirming that court can modify divorce order under Rule 60(b)(6) only if there are “unusual circumstances” that “would warrant relief from a judgment generally” (quotations omitted))

In considering whether such circumstances exist here, the court should note that the parties have agreed to a stipulated modification. This is not a situation where one or both parties seek to continue litigation past its end. See Richwagen, 153 Vt. at 4, 568 A.2d at 421 (stating “the grounds for relief authorized under Rule 60(b)(6) are broad” but limited by need for “certainty and finality of judgments so that litigation can reach an end”). Rather, this situation is an attempt to respond in a mutually beneficial way to emerging circumstances. Although the court has discretion to decline to accept a stipulated modification, it is more likely that modification under Rule 60(b)(6) is appropriate where the parties have stipulated to an agreement.

SCOVT dismisses appeal seeking advisory opinion.

In re Investigation into Programmatic Adjustments to the Standard-Offer Program,2018 VT 52 [filed 5/11/2018

REIBER, C.J. Appellant Renewable Energy Vermont (REV) asks this Court to reverse and remand an order of the Vermont Public Utility Commission1 that altered technology allocations in the standard-offer program for renewable energy projects. We conclude that REV seeks an advisory opinion and therefore dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

“It is the tradition of constitutional common law that the establishment of legal doctrine derives from the decision of actual disputes, not from the giving of solicited legal advice in anticipation of issues.” Wood v. Wood, 135 Vt. 119, 121, 370 A.2d 191, 192 (1977). In other words, “ ‘courts are not instituted to render advisory opinions.’ ” Baker v. Town of Goshen, 169 Vt. 145, 151, 730 A.2d 592, 596 (1999) (quoting In 8 re Constitutionality of House Bill 88, 115 Vt. at 529, 64 A.2d at 172). The issues raised by REV are premature, and we therefore lack jurisdiction to consider them. See id. at 152, 730 A.2d at 597 (dismissing appeal that sought impermissible advisory opinion).

After Supreme Court affirms a decision trial court is without subject matter jurisdiction in the absence of an express remand.

John Moyers v. Sheun Lai Poon and Brenda Lee Poon, 2018 VT 27 [filed 3/9/2018]

EATON, J. Following a decision from a three-justice panel of this Court issued on June 26, 2017, * involving these parties and this litigation and affirming a final judgment order, the civil division attempted to conduct further hearings as if the matter had been remanded. The Poons challenged continuation of the litigation by the trial court, asserting that, in the absence of an express remand from the Supreme Court in the June 26th decision, the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to conduct further hearings. The trial court denied the motion and the Poons were granted permission by the Supreme Court to appeal the denial on an interlocutory basis. We reverse.

In the June 26th decision, this court affirmed the trial court’s decision in all respects except for the grant of injunctive relief, which was stricken. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.”). In the absence of a finding that the Poons had trespassed, we held there was no entitlement to an injunction. Id. at *5-6. The court did not remand the case to the trial court for determination of trespass. Id.

We have long recognized that unless a remand is ordered when the final judgment or decree is entered in the Supreme Court, the lower court is without jurisdiction to consider the case further. Turner v. Bragg, 114 Vt. 334, 336, 44 A.2d 548, 549 (1945). If Moyers felt a remand was necessary to consider the trespass claim, his remedy was to file for reargument seeking a remand to the trial court. He did not do so. To proceed as he did, by filing a motion in the trial court where there had been no remand, ignores the finality of Supreme Court decisions “It is the rule that a mandate or an order of remand is necessary to reinvest the lower court with jurisdiction to proceed with the case.” Sanders v. Loyd, 364 S.W.2d 369, 371 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1960). ¶ 10. trial court is without jurisdiction to consider the instant case further and the motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction should have been granted. The judgment rendered June 26th by this Court, which did not include a remand, was final.

Untimely appeal accepted under 4 V.S.A. § 2(b) as “necessary to the furtherance of justice,” due to failure of court to assign counsel.

In re M.T. , 2017 VT 104 ¶ 3   [filed November 3, 2017]

Parents arguments on appeal attack the court’s decision denying their July 12 Rule 60(b) motions for relief from judgment. In fact, parents did not appeal the denial of the Rule 60(b) motion; rather, parents filed a subsequent motion to reopen thirty days after the denial of the Rule 60(b) motion. The trial court dismissed this motion as untimely. See V.R.C.P. 59(e) (setting ten day deadline on filing motion to alter or amend). Because the second motion to reopen was untimely, it could not toll the appeal period. V.R.A.P. 4(b) (providing that timely post-judgment motions toll appeal period); see In re Beach Props., 2015 VT 130, ¶ 8, 200 Vt. 630, 133 A.3d 854 (explaining that untimely motion to reconsider did not toll appeal period and therefore Court lacked jurisdiction over appeal).

In very rare cases with analogous circumstances, we have exercised our authority to issue “orders that may be necessary to the furtherance of justice” under 4 V.S.A. § 2(b)[1] “to protect or create a right of appeal that would otherwise have been lost.” In re Babson, 2014 VT 105, ¶ 3, 197 Vt. 535, 107 A.3d 339 (reinstating petitioner’s appeal where a petitioner lost his ability to timely appeal due to the ineffective assistance of counsel, and identifying other cases in which this Court has done so); see also In re A.D.T., 174 Vt. 369, 375, 817 A.2d 20, 25 (2002) (invoking Court’s authority under 4 V.S.A. § 2(b) to review mother’s untimely appeal of judgment terminating her parental rights where mother asked her counsel to appeal and counsel missed the appeal deadline)

Parents’ procedural failings following the court’s denial of their request for counsel were shaped in substantial part by the court’s error in declining to assign them counsel. Competent counsel would have preserved parents’ appeal rights. Given the unique facts of this case, we assert our jurisdiction to review the June 12, 2017 denial of parents’ February 9 Rule 60(b) motion.


SCOVT NOTE: 4 VSA § 2, Supreme Court established; jurisdiction, provides:

(a) The Supreme Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction of appeals from judgments, rulings, and orders of the Superior Court, administrative agencies, boards, commissions, and officers unless otherwise provided by law.

(b) The Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction, concurrent with the Superior Court, of proceedings in certiorari, mandamus, prohibition and quo warranto and shall have jurisdiction to issue all writs, processes, and orders that may be necessary to the furtherance of justice and the regular execution of the law.

(Amended 1971, No. 185 (Adj. Sess.), § 5, eff. March 29, 1972; 1973, No. 193 (Adj. Sess.), § 3, eff. April 9, 1974; 2009, No. 154 (Adj. Sess.), § 2.)

SCOVT affirms denial of motion to set aside default judgment of foreclosure. Does not decide whether permission is required to appeal a judgments of foreclosure based on a judgment lien

Cramer v. Billado, 2017 VT 38

ROBINSON, J. Defendant James Billado appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion to set aside a default judgment of foreclosure on the grounds that the trial court erred in allowing service of the foreclosure complaint by tack order and in declining to set aside the default foreclosure judgment in light of his defenses. Plaintiff Laura Cramer argues that defendant’s appeal was untimely and we thus need not consider the merits of his appeal. We conclude that the trial court’s orders were within its discretion and accordingly affirm.

While this case was pending, this Court on its own initiative issued an order requesting defendant to show cause why his appeal should not be dismissed for failure to file a timely motion for permission to appeal pursuant to 12. V.S.A. § 4601 (requiring court permission for appeal of judgment "for the foreclosure of a mortgage") and Vermont Rule of Civil Procedure 80.1(m) (requiring that request for permission to appeal be filed within ten days of entry of judgment or order appealed from "[w]hen the judgment is for foreclosure of the mortgage"). Defendant argues that by their plain terms, the above requirements apply only to judgments foreclosing a mortgage, and not to judgments of foreclosure based on a judgment lien. Plaintiff argues that pursuant to 12 V.S.A. § 2903(d), the foreclosure of judgment liens is subject to the same requirements as the foreclosure of a mortgage. We decline to decide this jurisdictional question because we conclude that even if defendant's appeal was timely, his claims on appeal fail on the merits.

We review the trial court's denial of the motion to set aside the judgment for abuse of discretion. LaFrance Architect, 2013 VT 115, ¶ 9.  A trial court "should give substantial weight to a meritorious defense when determining whether to vacate a default judgment." Id. ¶ 11.

The trial court’s conclusion that defendant did not present meritorious defenses was within its discretion. Defendant does not deny that plaintiff had a judgment against him for $50,000 from 2007, that plaintiff duly perfected her judgment lien, or that he paid any amounts toward that judgment. Instead, he essentially argues that he was entitled to an offset of plaintiff’s judgment on account of her prior misappropriation of funds from his business. As the trial court noted, collateral estoppel and the statute of limitations are both obstacles to his set-off claims in response to plaintiff’s foreclosure action. Given these considerations, and the absence of any substantial defense to plaintiff’s action for foreclosure, the trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion to set aside the default judgment in this case was within the trial court’s discretion.


SCOVT NOTE: The statute of limitations does not bar a "setoff" claim, which "shall be allowed, to the extent of plaintiff's demand" if it arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of plaintiff's claim.

A cross-claim or counterclaim shall not be brought if an independent action upon the same claim would have been barred under the provisions of this chapter at the time of commencement of the plaintiff's action, except that a counterclaim arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of plaintiff's claim shall be allowed, to the extent of plaintiff's demand, at any time.

12 V.S.A. § 463 .

Rule 13(c), in permitting recovery exceeding the opposing claim, states what was previously the practice in set-off. See 12 V.S.A. § 5469 (now superseded); Franklin Co. Realty Corp. v. Cunnius, 127 Vt. 452, 252 A.2d 524 (1969). Previously, defendant could, in a contract action at law, set off an opposing contract claim, 12 V.S.A. §§ 5461-5478 (now superseded), but such set-off was not compulsory.  Thus, under former practice, at least, a default judgment did not preclude a party from bringing  a later suit for indebtedness which existed before rendition of  the default judgment, Hutchins v. George, 92 Vt. 371, 104 Atl. 108 (1918).

Now, the failure to plead setoff as an affirmative defense results in a waiver of this defense. Wursthaus, Inc. v. Cerreta  149 Vt. 54, 539 A.2d 534 (1987).  Whether the claim is compulsory is determined by Rule 13.

Mortgages. SCOVT has no jurisdiction over appeal from dismissal of collateral attack on final judgment of foreclosure.

Billewicz v. Estate of Fanelli, No. 2017-028 (Vt. Mar. 1, 2017) (mem.) 

Pursuant to stipulation, the superior court issued a judgment order and decree of foreclosure. More than one year after issuance of a writ of possession, plaintiff filed a complaint alleging that the defendant had fraudulently mispresented the fair market value of the property. The court entered summary judgment in favor of defendant, noting the foreclosure judgment was final, that plaintiff had failed to follow the procedures for appealing the judgment pursuant to V.R.C.P. 80.1(m), and that nothing in the complaint showed that plaintiff could not have challenged the earlier stipulated value during the foreclosure proceedings. We dismiss plaintiff’s appeal.

A request for relief pursuant to V.R.C.P. 60(b) cannot be used to circumvent the strong legislative policy favoring finality of foreclosure judgments. Woodbine Condo. Ass'n v. Lowe, 174 Vt. 457, 458 (2002) (mem.) Although structured as a collateral action, plaintiff's complaint is essentially a request for relief from the foreclosure judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b). Therefore the appeal must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

SCOVT NOTE. The strong legislative policy favoring the finality of foreclosure judgments: See V.R.C.P. 80.1(m). (a party seeking to appeal a foreclosure judgment must seek permission to appeal within ten days "of the date of the entry of the judgment or order to be appealed from."); Mortg. Lenders Network, USA v. Sensenich, 2004 VT 107, ¶ 7, 177 Vt. 592, 873 A.2d 892 (mem.).( a foreclosure decree is a final judgment even if a right to redeem exists, and even if further proceedings ancillary to the foreclosure itself are contemplated.);Woodbine Condo. Ass'n v. Lowe, 174 Vt. 457, 458, 806 A.2d 1001, 1003 (2002) (mem.) (Rule 60(b) cannot be used to circumvent requirement of seeking permission to appeal foreclosure decree);.Citibank, N.A. v. Groshens, 171 Vt. 639, 640, 768 A.2d 1272, 1273 (2000) (mem.) (dismissing appeal from court's denial of motion to reopen foreclosure judgment because of legislative policy promoting finality of foreclosure judgments).

Claim preclusion; subject matter jurisdiction. Gravel-extraction activities violated an Act 250 permit. Court had jurisdiction to enforce expired permit

Natural Resources Board Land Use Panel v. Dorr, 2015 VT 1(09-Jan-2015)

MORSE, J. (Ret.), Specially Assigned.  This is an appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court, Environmental Division affirming an administrative finding of the Natural Resources Board that respondents’ gravel-extraction activities violated an Act 250 residential-subdivision permit. Respondents contend the enforcement action and trial court judgment were based on an expired Act 250 permit, and therefore invalid. We affirm.

The claim that Act 250 permit had expired either by its terms or by operation of law—was one that could and should have been raised in earlier administrative and judicial proceedings between the parties. Accordingly, we conclude that the claim is barred.by principles of res judicata.

Respondents further assert that—res judicata notwithstanding—if the permit had expired then the courts were without subject matter jurisdiction over this Act 250 enforcement action, “Subject matter jurisdiction” refers to the fundamental “power of a court to hear and determine a general class or category of cases.” It is a concept easy to confuse with the simple authority to act, and we have, accordingly, been careful to limit the concept in Act 250 and other administrative contexts, where the agency generally exercises limited powers and “virtually any disagreement with its actions can be phrased in jurisdictional terms.” This is not a case where the parties fundamentally “failed to adjudicate the case in the proper statutorily designated administrative tribunal before proceeding to the superior court.” Brace v. Vergennes Auto, Inc., 2009 VT 49, ¶ 16, 186 Vt. 542, 978 A.2d 441 (mem.). Accordingly, we find no reason to exempt respondents’ claim from the general claim-preclusion rules, and affirm the judgment on this basis.


How cited. 

SCOVT allows relitigation of final decision addressing exclusive "jurisdiction" of divisions of Superior Court

Cameron v. Rollo 2014 VT 40 (25-Apr-2014)

CRAWFORD, J. This case presents a single legal issue: whether the family division has exclusive jurisdiction over the distribution of marital property acquired during a marriage that ends in annulment. First the family division ruled that "[s]ince the marriage was void at its beginning, this court does not have jurisdiction to resolve this dispute. Then the civil division held that the civil division and the small claims court lacked jurisdiction over the division of marital property. We granted permission to appeal to review the legal question of which court has jurisdiction to distribute property under the circumstances of this case. We affirm the decision of the civil division in this case that exclusive jurisdiction over the parties’ property division is conferred by statute to the family division.

This idea that a marriage annulled on grounds of bigamy is void from its inception underlies the family division's refusal in this case to divide the parties' property. But the Legislature extended the remedy of property division to the parties to an annulment when it provided for property division in all cases filed under Chapter 11 of Title 15. 15 V.S.A. § 751(a). Chapter 11 of Title 15 encompasses annulment, divorce, and legal separation.

The statutory grant of jurisdiction to the family division is exclusive. There is no "overlapping jurisdiction—matters that belong in family court may not be brought in superior court." Rogers v. Wells, 174 Vt. 492, 494, 808 A.2d 648, 650 (2002) (mem.). Section 31(1) of Title 4, recently enacted as part of the unification of the judiciary, excludes from the civil division cases that are subject to the jurisdiction of the family division. See also 4 V.S.A. § 33(4).

We have not conistently maintained this  boundary between the family and civil division in property disputes. Compare Tudhope v. Riehle, 167 Vt. 174, 178-80, 704 A.2d 765, 767-68 (1997) with Slansky v. Slansky, 150 Vt. 438, 442, 553 A.2d 152, 154 (1988), The boundary, however, is clear when the issue is whether marital property belongs to one spouse or the other.  By holding that the family division has exclusive jurisdiction over the division of marital property, we seek to discourage overlapping cases in both courts.

DOOLEY, J., dissenting. To the majority this case is about subject matter jurisdiction over property disputes in annulment actions, an issue that will rarely, if ever, rise again. In my opinion, this case is really about the preclusive effect of subject matter jurisdiction determinations. The issue the majority chooses to address is legitimate, but the issues it largely ignores are critical and command a different result. Thus, I dissent.

Reducing the case to its essentials, plaintiff alleges that the person to whom he thought he was married  stole his property while he was incarcerated. This is a conversion action with respect to property owned by plaintiff and possessed at one time by defendant but not in either's possession at the time of the annulment. I consider it debatable whether the conversion action is exclusively within the jurisdiction of the family division. See LaPlume v. Lavallee, 2004 VT 78, ¶¶ 8-9, 177 Vt. 526, 858 A.2d 255 (holding that plaintiff's claim for money damages against former partner for retention of property was conversion claim subject to jurisdiction of small claims court).  But we need not, and should not, reach that question

We made a great stride forward in ensuring finality of judgments against lack-of-subject-matter-jurisdiction claims where the question of subject matter jurisdiction has already been litigated by adopting the Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 12 (1982). See Quinn v. Schipper, 2006 VT 51, ¶ 8, 180 Vt. 572, 908 A.2d 413 (mem.). Under § 12  a judgment generally precludes relitigation of subject matter jurisdiction in subsequent litigation. Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 12 (1982)(indicating a party is foreclosed from litigating subject matter jurisdiction in a subsequent lawsuit unless the decision on jurisdiction was "a manifest abuse of authority," the judgment at issue "would substantially infringe the authority of another tribunal," or the rendering court was incapable of making an adequately informed assessment of its own jurisdiction and procedural fairness would require the party seeking to avoid the judgment to have the opportunity to belatedly attack jurisdiction).

None of the exceptions apply. To say that the family division's ruling was "so plainly beyond the court's jurisdiction that its entertaining the action was a manifest abuse of authority" creates an exception to issue preclusion so broad as to eat up the rule and bring us back to the days of raising lack of subject matter jurisdiction over and over. The family division ruling may have been wrong, but it is not a manifest abuse of discretion, a clear usurpation of power, or a ruling without an arguable basis.  Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 12(1).

Court restructuring fails to create a unified superior court. Cracks in the system. After a person turns 18, neither the family nor criminal division had jurisdiction to prosecute felonies committed before the person turned 14.

In re D.K., Juvenile, 

2012 VT 23 (Johnson, J.) (Dooley,  J. concurring) (Skoglund, J., joined by Chief Justice Reiber, dissenting)

The issue in this case is whether the State may prosecute an adult defendant for sexual assaults alleged to have occurred when he was a child between the ages of eleven and thirteen. The prosecution was delayed because the alleged victims did not come forward until defendant was eighteen years of age. The State filed the information in the criminal division. The criminal division transferred the case to the family division. The family division dismissed because defendant had reached age eighteen. We affirm.

Given the applicable law and the circumstances of this case, neither the family nor criminal division had jurisdiction to prosecute adults who committed delinquent acts as children under the age of fourteen. It is impossible to know whether this was a legislative oversight during the judicial restructuring, or an intentional policy decision. We will not create jurisdiction where it did not exist to cover this perceived “gap,” which has since been addressed by the Legislature. Accordingly, the family division acted properly in dismissing the charges.

Dooley, J. concurs fully in the Court’s decision and writes to urge the Legislature to revisit the recent judicial branch restructuring legislation. It is hard to read the decision in this case without concluding that we have invented a case processing machine so complicated that we cannot easily control its operating rules. Restructuring created the opportunity to eliminate this complication. Since the family court and district court were merged into the superior court, it should have become possible to avoid transferring cases between courts and to get to the heart of the matter in one proceeding. Unfortunately, that did not happen because the jurisdictional walls between the components of the new superior court continued and cases must, accordingly, be transferred between divisions of the superior court by the same formal process that existed in the past, even though, as we move to electronic records, the symbolic physical transfer of the case disappears.

Cases continue to fall through the cracks just as they did before. We have perpetuated a system that is ruled by what hat the judge is wearing, and nothing more. If the judge fails to change hats properly, or no hat is available for the action sought, as here, the purposes of the statutory scheme are frustrated.

We can solve this problem by allowing any case to be filed in any division or no division of the superior court, and then treating the filing point as a doorway into a proceeding that will evaluate the circumstances and determine how best to handle it with all relevant options available. In other words, we could have judges wearing no hats with the ability to conduct the proceeding as if he or she was wearing all possible hats.

I urge the Legislature to review the remaining jurisdictional walls between the components of the superior court and remove them not only for cases like this, but in all cases filed in superior court, in order to allow the most expeditious route to a just result.

Skoglund, J. joined by Chief Justice Reiber, agree that the family division lacked jurisdiction and properly dismissed the charges, but would hold that a case could be brought in the criminal division of the superior court, to which the Legislature has granted jurisdiction “to try, render judgment, and pass sentence in prosecutions for felonies and misdemeanors.” 4 V.S.A. § 32(a).

Court has “status” jurisdiction to terminate rights of parent who lacks minimum contacts with Vermont.

In re R.W., 2011 VT 124 (Burgess, J.)

This termination of parental rights case presents novel jurisdictional questions because the parents and children are citizens of Sri Lanka and, although mother and the children have been residents of Vermont for a number of years, father continues to reside in Sri Lanka and has never been to Vermont.  The Department for Children and Families (DCF) petitioned to terminate father’s residual parental rights.  The family division concluded it lacked personal jurisdiction over father.  DCF argues that even though father lacks minimum contacts with Vermont, the court has jurisdiction to adjudicate the status of his children, who were within the court’s jurisdiction.  We reverse the court’s decision as to both parents and remand the cases.

 The critical question in this appeal is whether a child’s relationship to her parents is adjudication exempt from the “‘minimum contacts” test.  “Status cases” are exempt from the United Supreme Court’s jurisprudence that established the minimum contacts test as the basis for jurisdiction for both in personam and in rem case. “[C]cases involving the personal status of the plaintiff, such as divorce actions, could be adjudicated in the plaintiff’s home State even though the defendant could not be served within that State.”  Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 201 (1977) (citing Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 733-35).  The Supreme Court has not defined status jurisdiction or explicitly recognized its application to any type of case other than divorce. In Vermont, we have applied status jurisdiction in divorce actions, but not to other situations, such as custody. 

We conclude that status jurisdiction applies to cases involving termination of parental rights.  Much like the marriage relationship, severance of a parent’s legal relationship to his or her child requires state intervention and is a matter of state concern.  Thus, a child’s home state has jurisdiction to adjudicate the status of a child present there even if the parents lack minimum contacts with the forum.