SCOVT affirms summary judgment that Town has authority to maintain and repair public trails to ensure the public's access, holding this authority is implied from the definition of a trail as a public right-of-way.

 

1.    Public Trails.

       Echeverria v. Town of Tunbridge, 2026 VT 5 [2/20/2026]

SCOVT affirms ruling that town failed to prove “necessity” under the condemnation statute, holding that necessity is “a question of fact which is to be determined exclusively by the trial court,” and that the record supports the finding that the town did not meet its burden to prove necessity.

 

1.    Condemnation. Factual findings.

     Mongeon Bay Properties, LLC v. Town of Colchester, 2026 VT 1 [1/23/2026]

SCOVT affirms dismissal of declaratory judgment action for lack of jurisdiction because the claim seeking determination of applicability of short-term rental ordinance is not ripe.

 

1.    Jurisdiction. Declaratory Judgment; Ripeness. 

       32 Intervale, LLC v. City of Burlington, 2026 VT 9 [4/10/2026]

SCOVT affirms, as supported by the evidence, family division denial of petition to terminate parental rights and separate civil division dismissal of appeal from family division adoption ruling, holding civil division lacked appellate jurisdiction of adoption proceeding that was transferred from probate to family division and consolidated with the preexisting divorce action pursuant to 15A V.S.A. § 3-207

 

1.    Jurisdiction; Appeals from adoptions transferred to  Family Division. 

          In re K.P. , 2026 VT 4 [2/20/2026]

SCOVT affirms interlocutory ruling that probate division has jurisdiction to require reimbursement of an estate for losses resulting from malfeasance of a financial guardian

 

1.    Probate Jurisdiction.

       In re Thomas, 2026 VT 12 [4/24/2026]

SCOVT reverses probate court dismissal of adoption petition for lack of service on parents, holding service by publication is “personal service” within meaning of 15A V.S.A. § 3-403(a), based the former caption of V.R.C.P. 4(d).

    

1.    Procedure. “Personal Service” can include Service by Publication.  

      In re O.R.G., 2026 VT 6 [2/20/2026]

SCOVT reverses trial court denial without reasons of beneficiary’s request to amend complaint to seek removal of trustee, but affirms denial of request for information, holding beneficiary has no right to information about a revocable trust even though the settlor is incapacitated.

 

1.    Procedure. Amending Pleadings. Trusts.   

     In re Trust of Marsha Milot, 2026 VT 7 [3/6/2026] 

    REIBER, C.J. Petitioner Jennifer Milot appeals the denial of her petition to open a trust action to obtain information about the administration and assets of a revocable trust whose settlor, Marsha Milot, is still alive. Petitioner claims the probate division erred by: failing to apply the correct legal standard when deciding to dismiss petitioner's action; failing to consider whether petitioner's information requests were "unreasonable under the circumstances" as required by statute; and concluding that under 14A V.S.A. § 603, co-trustees Valerie Wiederhorn and Curtis Hennigar owed no duty to provide information regarding the trust and co-trustees' administration to petitioner. We conclude that while the trust remains revocable, petitioner is not entitled to the information she seeks under § 813 of the Vermont Trust Code. However, we hold that the probate division erred by failing to consider petitioner's request to amend her complaint to seek removal of co-trustee Wiederhorn, and therefore reverse and remand for it to do so.

V   Vermont Rule of Probate Procedure 15(a) provides that leave to amend a petition "shall be freely given when justice so requires."  Petitioner asked for permission to amend her complaint to seek removal of co-trustee Wiederhorn under 14A V.S.A.§ 706. 14A V.S.A. § 706. Section 706 provides that "[t]he settlor, a cotrustee, or a beneficiary" may seek to have a trustee removed or replaced for "a serious breach of trust," a "lack of cooperation among cotrustees," or other enumerated reasons. The Official Comment to § 706  indicates that if a settlor is incapacitated, a beneficiary has the right to petition for trustee removal under § 706. The probate division dismissed the petition without addressing petitioner's request, effectively denying it. 

      Both Rule 15 and Vermont's common-law tradition "encourage liberality in allowing amendments to pleadings" when doing so will not prejudice the other party. Bevins v. King, 143 Vt. 252, 254, 465 A.2d 282, 283 (1983). While the trial court may deny an amendment if it would prejudice another party or is frivolous or made in bad faith, the court did not consider those factors here. Instead, it simply did not address the request, which was an abuse of discretion. See PeakCM, LLC v. Mountainview Metal Sys., LLC, 2025 VT 50, ¶ 18 (explaining that failure to exercise discretion is abuse of discretion). 

In sum, we hold that petitioner was not entitled to receive trust information under § 813 because the trust remains revocable while settlor is alive. However, we reverse and remand the dismissal order for the probate division to consider petitioner's request to amend her petition. In so holding, we take no position on whether settlor is in fact incapacitated, whether petitioner is a qualified beneficiary, or any other factual questions raised by this appeal. Those matters are for the probate division to resolve in the context of any further proceedings that occur on remand.

Reversed and remanded for the probate division to address petitioner's request to amend her petition to seek removal of co-trustee(s).

SCOVT Note re: "failure to exercise discretion is abuse of discretion" See Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178 (1962) (Marshall, J, ):

Rule 15 (a) declares that leave to amend "shall be freely given when justice so requires"; this mandate is to be heeded . . .  Of course, the grant or denial of an opportunity to amend is within the discretion of the District Court, but outright refusal to grant the leave without any justifying reason appearing for the denial is not an exercise of discretion; it is merely abuse of that discretion and inconsistent with the spirit of the Federal Rules.

371 U.S. at 182.