SCOVT affirms exclusion of evidence of medical causation that lead to denial of counterclaim for assault. Lay testimony as to medical causation is inadmissible. Statements in medical records as to the inception or cause of a condition or symptom are inadmissible under V.R.E. 803(4)—unlike the corresponding federal rule— even if pertinent to diagnosis or treatment.

Sweet, v. St. Pierre, 2018 VT 122 [filed 11/2/2018]


CARROLL, J. Defendants cross-appeal, arguing that the court erroneously excluded evidence relevant to their assault claim. We affirm.

Prior to trial, plaintiffs moved to exclude any evidence, such as medical records or testimony, that Roy St. Pierre suffered a stroke or any other medical or psychological injury as a result of the alleged assault. The court granted the motion, ruling that proof that the alleged assault caused Roy St. Pierre's medical condition required expert medical testimony. The court ultimately found that defendants failed to prove that Preston Sweet assaulted Roy St. Pierre by threatening to stab him with a screwdriver. It concluded that the statement was a joke and could not reasonably be found to have caused the psychological and physical injuries alleged by defendants in the absence of expert testimony.

There was no abuse of discretion in excluding the medical records. The medical records were hearsay. V.R.E. 801. Even if they were theoretically admissible under the exception for business records, plaintiffs did not disclose or call any witness who could lay the proper foundation for their admission. See V.R.E. 803(6) (providing that business records must come into evidence through testimony of custodian or other qualified witness).

Furthermore, to the extent that the medical records contained statements about the inception or cause of defendant’s alleged symptoms, such statements would not be admissible under V.R.E. 803(4). Under V.R.E. 803(4)—unlike the corresponding federal rule—statements relating to the inception or cause of a condition or symptom are not admissible even if pertinent to diagnosis or treatment.

The trial court also acted within its discretion in excluding any testimony from lay witnesses that Roy St. Pierre’s stroke or other symptoms were caused by the alleged assault. As the trial court correctly noted, expert testimony is ordinarily required to prove medical causation. Brace v. Vergennes Auto, Inc., 2009 VT 49, ¶ 9, 186 Vt. 542, 978 A.2d 441 (mem.); Wilkins v. Lamoille Cty. Mental Health Servs., Inc., 2005 VT 121, ¶ 16, 179 Vt. 107, 889 A.2d 245

Defendants have not shown that "the facts to be proved are such that any layman of average intelligence would know from his own knowledge and experience that the [alleged assault] was the cause of the injury," rendering expert testimony unnecessary. Egbert v. Book Press, 144 Vt. 367, 369, 477 A.2d 968, 969 (1984) (per curiam). We accordingly see no reason to disturb the evidentiary decision below.

Failure to use turn signal justifies stop. In DUI case SCOVT affirms denial of motion to dismiss that argued failure to signal a turn while in designated turning lane was not illegal.

State v. Kevin W. Cook, 2018 VT 128 [filed 11/30/2018]


EATON, J. Following his conditional guilty plea to driving under the influence, defendant Kevin Cook appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion to dismiss, in which he argued that his failure to signal a turn was not illegal under the circumstances and thus did not provide a reasonable, articulable suspicion for the arresting officer to stop his vehicle. We affirm.

Preparing to turn right onto Main Street, defendant drove into the right-turn-only lane . An officer watched defendant make the right turn from the designated right turn lane without signaling and stopped defendant’s car for that reason. During the traffic stop, the officer smelled alcohol on defendant and conducted field-sobriety tests. Ultimately, defendant was charged with driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI).

Defendant contends that he was not required to use his signal because the only legal path his vehicle could take from a right-turn-only lane was to turn right, as he did.

In relevant part, § 1065 provides that “[a] right or left turn shall not be made without first giving a signal of intention either by hand or by signal in accordance with section 1064.” 23 V.S.A. § 1065(a). Section 1064 explains that “[t]he signals provided for in section 1065 . . . shall be used to indicate an intention to turn, change lanes, or start from a parked position,” id. § 1064(e).

The Vermont Legislature could have enacted turn-signal statutes that specifically exempt the requirement of turn-signal use when turning in the anticipated direction from a turn-only lane. It is not up to us to substitute our judgment for the Legislature’s, even were our judgment to differ.

Because Vermont’s motor-vehicle statutes required defendant to signal before turning, we conclude that the officer here had a reasonable, articulable suspicion of wrongdoing. The motion to dismiss was properly denied.