SCOVT affirms summary judgment that dog control ordinance validly transferred possessory interest in a lost dog to adoptive owners.

Lamare v. North Country Animal League, 170 Vt. 115 [Filed November 12, 1999]


MORSE, J. Plaintiffs Chasidy Lamare and Charles Arnold appeal a summary judgment of the Lamoille Superior Court in favor of defendants North Country Animal League, Darcie Fitzgerald, and John and Jane Doe. Plaintiffs raise numerous claims challenging the court's ruling that their possessory interest in a lost dog had been transferred to defendants under the Town of Wolcott's dog control ordinance. We affirm.

Plaintiffs were the co-owners of a five and one-half year old female German Shepard named Billy who was found at large by a couple who brought her to the Lamoille Kennel on June 3, 1997,which in turn gave her up for adoption on July 8, even though on July 7, plaintiffs arrived at the League and identified their dog.

This case, in contrast to Morgan, concerns the rights and responsibilities of a public entity vis a vis the owners of a lost dog and is controlled by state statutes and local ordinances.

In this case we are bound to conclude that the town's actions fully complied with its animal control ordinance and that its ordinance provided ample notice to plaintiffs consistent with state law and due process requirements.

We conclude that the provision of the ordinance authorizing the town to sell or otherwise dispose of the animal in a humane fashion constituted a necessary and essential power under the enabling statute, and therefore did not exceed the town's authority

We also conclude that the qualified right to possession of dogs and the strong public interest in assuring their permanent placement in a suitable environment, amply supports the town's decision to provide for the sale or transfer of impounded dogs if unclaimed after seven days.

Morgan recognized that a dog is an inherently social creature whose “value derives from the animal's relationship with its human companions.” Thus, while municipal shelters or pounds may provide temporary safety for the public and security for the animal, long term residence in such facilities is decidedly not in the public's or the animal's interest.

We note in this regard the several studies cited in the amicus curiae brief of The United States Humane Society which demonstrate that long term confinement is severely detrimental to the health of dogs and a considerable expense to the impounding agency.

The owner of a lost dog may be expected to make reasonable efforts to locate an animal by contacting humane societies and other agencies and checking other public locations where notices may be posted. Only in the limited circumstances where the owner of a lost dog has not complied with the license requirements, and has failed to take the reasonable steps of inquiring with the local pound or checking notices in the town office and other public places, is it possible that an owner will fail to receive notice within the seven-day notice period. The fact that plaintiffs in this case did not take these reasonable steps does not render the ordinance unconstitutional.

We conclude, in sum, that the town's posting of descriptive notices in the town clerk's office, post office, and village store—in conformity with the ordinance—did not deprive plaintiffs of their constitutional right to due process.

The actions of the League in this case was, to say the least, insensitive in its dealings with plaintiffs. Although plaintiffs' action for repossession of the dog and for damages based upon alleged constitutional violations lacks merit, this is not to say that a future case seeking recovery for the emotional distress or other damages resulting from the negligent handling of an impounded animal—a claim not alleged here—would be unsuccessful.

Beth Robinson of Langrock Sperry & Wool, for Amici Curiae the Humane Society of the United States.

How cited

SCOVT Note. The Court's suggestion that an action would lie for "the emotional distress or other damages resulting from the negligent handling of an impounded animal" was premature. See Scheele v. Dustin , 2010 VT 45 (affirming judgment denying recovery for emotional damages for the intentional killing of a pet dog); Goodby v. Vetpharm, 2009 VT 52 (denying recovery for lost companionship and emotional distress resulting form death of pets.)

Divided Court affirms ruling that finder of lost dog, by caring for it and sheltering it for over a year, became its rightful owner.

Morgan v. Kroupa, 167 Vt. 99 [filed September 5, 1997]

MORSE, Justice. Defendant Zane Kroupa appeals from a judgment awarding possession of a dog named Boy (a/k/a Max) to plaintiff Mary Morgan. We affirm.

Defendant adopted a mixed-breed puppy when it was six to eight weeks old and trained it to be a hunting dog. In July 1994, when the dog was five years old, it broke free of its collar, ran away and became lost. About two weeks later, plaintiff found the and brought it home. Plaintiff took care of the dog and fed and sheltered it.  In September 1995, a friend of defendant's told him that he had seen the dog at a house only two miles down the road. Defendant drove to the house, the dog jumped in his truck and defendant left with the animal.

Shortly thereafter, plaintiff brought this action in replevin to recover the dog. The trial court, sitting without a jury, ruled in favor of plaintiff and returned Max to her. The court refused  to analogize the case to a child custody case, and inquire into what was in the “best interests” of the dog. The court instead ruled that plaintiff had “substantially compl[ied]” with the lost-property statute and was therefore entitled to possession.

Modern courts have recognized that pets generally do not fit neatly within traditional property law principles. No decision has ever applied the lost-property statutes to any kind of “beast” other than a farm animal of considerable value. Ordinary common law or statutory rules governing lost personal property do not provide a useful framework for resolving disputes over lost pets. Instead, courts must fashion and apply rules that recognize their unique status, and protect the interests of both owner and finder, as well as the public.

However strong the emotional attachments between pets and humans, courts simply cannot evaluate the “best interests” of an animal. When confronted with a case of this nature, therefore, courts should factor practical and policy considerations into any decision. Finders of stray pets should be encouraged to make every reasonable effort to find the animal's owner.Owners of lost pets should be enjoined to undertake reasonable efforts to locate their animals..

Indeed, this was essentially the approach taken by the trial court here. Having found that plaintiff diligently attempted to locate the dog's owner and responsibly sheltered and cared for the animal for over a year, the trial court was clearly within its discretion in awarding possession to plaintiff.

Possession of domestic pets may be, and often is, limited by overriding public interests. In this case, as explained above, the public interest in encouraging finders to care for and shelter lost pets necessarily qualifies the owner's right to possession. Where, as here, the finder of a lost domestic animal diligently attempts to locate its owner and provides care, shelter and companionship to the animal for over a year, a trial court does not abuse its discretion in awarding possession to the finder.

GIBSON, Justice, dissenting. Because I believe that Vermont's lost-property statute, 27 V.S.A. §§ 1101–1110, rejected by the Court herein, outlines the rights and responsibilities of both true owners and finders of stray domesticated animals, including dogs, and that, under the provisions of that statute, Boy (a/k/a Max) should be returned to defendant, I respectfully dissent The statute provides a clear, consistent, and just approach to settling disputes between finders and owners of stray domesticated animals, and  includes safeguards to protect pet owners from theft. I am authorized to say that Chief Justice Allen joins in this dissent.


Beth Robinson of Langrock Sperry & Wool, Middlebury, for plaintiff-appellee.

all 85 citing documents 

SCOVT NOTE. Morgan is cited in:

• Lamare v. North Country Animal League, 170 Vt. 115 (1999) (possessory interest in a lost dog was validily transfered to adoptive owners under dog control ordinance. "Morgan involved a dispute between private parties and was governed by common law principles. This case, in contrast, concerns the rights and responsibilities of a public entity vis a vis the owners of a lost dog and is controlled by state statutes and local ordinances" )

• Goodby v. Vetpharm, 2009 VT 52 (no damages for lost companionship or emotional distress resulting from wrongful death of a cat. In both Morgan and Lamare, . . ., the dogs at issue remained personal property despite their recognized human attachments, and their intangible value in monetary terms was never considered or addressed.")

• Hegarty v. Addison County Humane Society, 2004 VT 33 (Pets are not subject to the law of conversion-- but a horse is. In Morgan, we explicitly distinguished between pets — dogs, cats, and hamsters — and "agricultural animals with substantial economic value.")

• Scheele v. Dustin, 2010 VT 45 (refusing noneconomic damages for the malicious destruction of pet dog, though "We have noted in the past that categorizing a beloved pet as mere property fails to recognize that such an animal's "worth is not primarily financial[;] ... its value derives from the animal's relationship with its human companions.")

• Hament v. Baker, 2014 VT 39 (Family Division has no authority to award visitation or joint custody of pets, but welfare of the animal must be considered in final disposition. "Like most pets,[a dog's] worth is not primarily financial, but emotional; its value derives from the animal's relationship with its human companions.")

• State v. Sheperd, 2017 VT 39 (Robinson J.) (search warrant for dogs was not overbroad in part because animals are living, sentient beings to which the law may provide protections in their own right. Animals "generally do not fit neatly within traditional property law principles," but instead "occup[y] a special place somewhere in between a person and piece of personal property.")

"Indeed, pets occupy a legal realm somewhere between chattel and children." Schelle, 2010 VT 45 ¶ 17

Divided Court reverses dismissal on grounds of lack of personal jurisdiction of breach of warranty action against out-of-state horse sellers whose sole contact with state was national advertising.

Dall v. Kaylor, 163 Vt. 274 (1995) 

MORSE, Justice. Plaintiff Dall appeals the trial court's dismissal of her claim for lack of personal jurisdiction. Dall, a Vermont resident, brought suit in Rutland Superior Court against Maryland defendants for breach of warranty arising from the purchase of a Hanoverian horse. Defendant Baron, a Maryland resident and owner of the horse, hired defendants Kaylor and Westphalian Pride Farm to sell it. Defendant Kaylor, d/b/a Westphalian Pride Farm, is a horse breeder and trainer in Maryland. Defendant Westphalian Pride Farm holds itself out as a breeder and developer of “world-class” Hanoverian horses. The horse sustained injuries during its trip to Vermont. A veterinarian's treatment of these injuries led to the discovery that the horse suffered from congenital and chronic bone disease in his rear legs. The sole issue is whether defendants' contacts with Vermont were sufficient to confer personal jurisdiction in Vermont. The trial court granted defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. We reverse.

Defendants here were in the business of selling horses; they held themselves out as “breeder[s] and developers of world class registered Hanoverians.” Defendants initiated the resulting business transaction by advertising, more than one hundred times, in a national market that included Vermont.

It is hardly unfair for Defendants argue that they did not affirmatively seek to do business with any Vermont resident by placing classified advertisements in a nationally circulated publication defendants to defend themselves in jurisdictions where they choose to advertise their products. We hold that assertion of personal jurisdiction over defendants will not offend “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.”

ALLEN, Chief Justice, dissenting. The constitutional touchstone for personal jurisdiction is “whether the defendant purposefully established ‘minimum contacts' in *the forum State.”

I fail to see how the placement of an advertisement in a national publication, without more, is an act purposefully directed at Vermont.   The frequency of an activity does not, alter the nature of that conduct or convert it into conduct deemed to be directed at the citizens or state of Vermont. Defendants either availed themselves of the “benefits and protections” of Vermont's laws, or they did not. It should make no difference whether defendants advertised once or a hundred times. 

This exercise of jurisdiction exceeds the limits imposed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

I am authorized to say that Justice Dooley joins in this dissent

Beth Robinson of Langrock Sperry & Wool, Middlebury, for plaintiff-appellant