SCOVT affirms denial of post-conviction relief on the basis that plaintiff failed to prove ineffective assistance of counsel; trial court’s error in applying claim preclusion to bar claim was harmless

 Post-Conviction Relief. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

In re Bruyette, 2026 VT 18 [5/22/2026]

WAPLES, J.   Petitioner Joseph Bruyette sought post-conviction relief (PCR) on the ground of ineffective assistance of sentencing counsel.  The civil division denied the PCR petition on the merits and, in the alternative, held that the petition was barred by the doctrine of claim preclusion.  Petitioner appealed, arguing the court erroneously denied his claim on the merits, excluded admissible evidence at the final hearing, and applied the doctrine of claim preclusion in the context of a PCR proceeding.  We conclude that the court improperly applied claim preclusion but that the error does not require reversal because petitioner failed to prove his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.  We therefore affirm.  Petitioner failed to fulfill his heavy burden in overcoming the “strong presumption” that Attorney Kershaw’s conduct “fell within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.”  In re Grega, 2003 VT 77, ¶ 7. ¶ 2 We further conclude petitioner failed to demonstrate a reasonable probability that, but for Attorney Kershaw’s alleged errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.  Williams, 2014 VT 67, ¶ 29.  We agree with petitioner that the court erred in applying claim preclusion here.  As we have explained, the civil doctrine of claim preclusion does not apply to PCR cases.  In re Laws, 2007 VT 54, ¶ 14, 182 Vt. 66, 928 A.2d 1210 (explaining that while claim preclusion ordinarily precludes litigant “from raising a claim that was or could have been fully litigated in a prior judicial proceeding,” claim preclusion “has traditionally not been applied to habeas corpus relief”); see In re Chandler, 2013 VT 10, ¶ 16 n.4, 193 Vt. 246, 67 A.3d 261 However, he doctrine of successive petitions, like claim preclusion, “applies to ‘relitigation of claims actually raised and decided on the merits in an earlier PCR.’ ”    Vermont’s PCR statute, 13 V.S.A. § 7134, provides: “The court is not required to entertain a second or successive [PCR] for similar relief on behalf of the same prisoner.”  This suggests that the court has discretion in deciding whether to entertain a second or successive PCR.Because the State alleged that petitioner’s ineffective-assistance claim was litigated and decided in Bruyette 2019, the PCR court should have assessed the State’s motion under the doctrine of successive petitions rather than claim preclusion.  However, because we affirm the court’s decision that petitioner failed to demonstrate ineffective assistance of sentencing counsel, the error is not a basis for reversal.  Affirmed.