SCOVT affirms denial of plaintiff’s motion for new trial in medical malpractice case, holding the court acted within its discretion in ruling the verdict was not against the weight of the evidence.

 

Watrous v. Porter Medical Center, 2025 VT 47 

COHEN, J.   Plaintiff Arthur G. Watrous, the administrator of the Estate of Arthur H. Watrous, appeals the denial of his motion for a new trial after a jury found for defendant Porter Medical Center on plaintiff’s claims of negligence and wrongful death by special verdict verdict form that asked, “Did [plaintiff] prove the standard of care?”  Plaintiff argues the trial court abused its discretion in denying him a new trial because the jury’s conclusion that plaintiff failed to prove the standard of care was against the weight of the evidence.  We affirm.

The sole issue in this case is whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying plaintiff’s motion for a new trial.

In denying plaintiff’s motion the court reasoned that the jury heard conflicting evidence regarding the components of a standard of care and there was no undisputed evidence regarding the specific standard of care applicable to decedent’s circumstances.

A trial court may only exercise its discretion to set aside the verdict if “the verdict is shown to be clearly wrong and unjust because the jury disregarded the reasonable and substantial evidence, or found against it, because of passion, prejudice, or some misconception of the matter.”  Pirdair v. Med. Ctr. Hosp. of Vt., 173 Vt. 411, 416, 2002) We give the trial court’s “all presumptive support similar to that owed the jury verdict.”  Id. We will hold a trial court abused its discretion only when “such discretion was exercised on grounds or for reasons clearly untenable or to an extent clearly unreasonable.”  Weeks v. Burnor, 132 Vt. 603, 606 (1974).  

 

The parties presented conflicting evidence as to the proper standard of care. We agree with the trial court that the evidence of the applicable standard of care was not so clear that the jury erred in concluding that plaintiff had failed to establish that element.  The court acted within its discretion in denying a new trial given the state of the record. 

 

Affirmed.

How cited

____

SCOVT NOTE. Cases reversing the denial of a motion for new trial based on the weight of the evidence of liability.

No Vermont medical malpractice case reverses the denial of plaintiff’s motion for new trial based on the weight of the evidence. The  Court in both  Chater v. Central Vermont Hospital, 155 Vt. 230 (1990) and Pirdair v. Medical Center. Hospital, 173 Vt 411 (2002) affirmed the denial of a plaintiff’s motion. In Lockwood v. Lord, 163 Vt. 210, (1994) the Court reversed the grant of plaintiff’s motion.

The standard of review from denial of the motion is strict. In substance, the reviewing court must affirm unless the moving party shows it is clearly entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Otherwise, there is a presumption in favor of the jury verdict. It has been decades since the Court in any type of case has affirmed the grant of a weight-of-the-evidence motion to a party with the burden of proof. Weeks v. Burnor, 132 Vt. 603, 609 (1974); Grow v. Wolcott, 123 Vt. 490 (1963)(divided court).[i] Apparently the only Vermont cases of any type that proport to reverse the denial of a plaintiff’s motion, as requested in Watrous v. Porter Medical Center, are AI hallucinations.

An important caveat is that the trial court must exercise discretion. It can be reversible error to deny a plaintiff’s motion for new trial “as a matter of law” where the motion calls for the exercise of discretion. Russell v. Pilger, 113 Vt. 537, 543–44 (1944) (“We have repeatedly held that when the trial court is properly called upon to exercise its discretion it must do so and to withhold it is error . . . It is error to rule, as the trial court did in this instance, as a matter of law upon a question which requires discretionary action.”); accord, Krupp v. State Highway Bd., 125 Vt. 25, 29 (1965)

---

·         [i]  The Court has affirmed the grant of new trial to a plaintiff based on the insufficiency of evidence of a defense.  Blondin v. Milton Town School District, 2021 VT 2, ¶ 31 (affirming grant of  new trial  to plaintiff because it was error to instruct on comparative negligence.); McKenna v. May, 134 Vt. 145 (1976) (affirming grant of  new trial to plaintiff where by defendant’s own testimony he used more than necessary force in ejecting the plaintiff from his home).

 

Reconsideration. Denial of Rule 59 motion to amend judgment reversed on question of law intrinsic to, but not raised before judgment.

In re SP Land Co., LLC, 2011Vt 104 (Johnson, J.) (Reiber, C.J., dissenting.)

 Mountainside Properties, LLC, an adjoining property owner, appeals the Environmental Court’s denial of its motion to alter and amend a grant of summary judgment in favor of co-applicants.  We reverse.

The goal of Rule 59(e) is to “make clear that the [trial] court possesses the power to rectify its own mistakes in the period immediately following the entry of judgment.” 

Rule 59(e) “gives the court broad power to alter or amend a judgment.”  Reporter’s Notes, V.R.C.P. 59.  We have stated that Rule 59(e), is “invoked ‘to support reconsideration of matters properly encompassed in a decision on the merits.’ ”   Under this rule, “the court may reconsider issues previously before it, and generally may examine the correctness of the judgment itself.”  That is, Rule 59(e) “codified the trial court’s inherent power to open and correct, modify, or vacate its judgments.”   See 11 C. Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 2810.1, at 124-25 (2d ed. 1995) (describing correction of manifest error of law upon which judgment is based as one of four basic grounds upon which Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) motion may be granted).  The trial court enjoys considerable discretion in deciding whether to grant such a motion to amend or alter.  11 Wright, supra, §2810.1, at 124. Indeed, we have held that the court’s power on a Rule 59(e) motion even extends to issues not raised in the motion. Once a Rule 59(e) motion is filed, the trial court has the power to make an appropriate modification or amendment, including issues not raised in the Rule 59(e) motion.

Whether or not the Rule 34 issue was expressed for the first time in Mountainside’s Rule 59(e) motion, it was a question of law intrinsic to the Environmental Court’s summary judgment ruling and therefore well within the court’s discretion to reconsider this question of law on the merits upon on Mountainside’s Rule 59(e) motion. 

Reiber, C.J., dissents because the issue the majority decides was not raised below in a timely and proper manner and therefore should not be reviewable on appeal. The question it addresses—whether an administrative amendment under Rule 34 requires an underlying Act 250 permit—was not raised with the trial court before the entry of judgment but only later in a Rule 59(e) motion to alter or amend.  

Denial of Rule 59(e) motion to amend judgment reversed. Rule 59 is available to reconsider and correct manifest, intrinsic error of law, whether or not expressed for the first time in the Rule 59(e) motion.

In re SPLand Co., LLC,  2011 VT 104 (Johnson, J.) (Reiber, C.J., dissenting.)


This appeal arises out of a dispute over an administrative amendment to the master development plan for Killington Resort Village. An adjoining property owner appeals the Environmental Court’s denial of its motion to alter and amend a grant of summary judgment in favor of applicants. Adjoiner argues that the Environmental Court erred because as a matter of law administrative amendments under Rule 34(D) require an underlying Act 250 land use permit. We agree and therefore reverse the denial of the motion to reconsider.


Applicant argues that Rule 59 does not permit reconsideration of the summary judgment ruling, especially on issues raised for the first time. The goal of Rule 59(e) is to “make clear that the [trial] court possesses the power to rectify its own mistakes in the period immediately following the entry of judgment.” Whether or not the Rule 34 issue was expressed for the first time in the Rule 59(e) motion, it was a question of law intrinsic to the Environmental Court’s summary judgment ruling and therefore well within the court’s discretion to reconsider on Rule 59(e) motion.


Rule 59(e) “gives the court broad power to alter or amend a judgment.” Reporter’s Notes, V.R.C.P. 59. We have stated that Rule 59(e), is “invoked ‘to support reconsideration of matters properly encompassed in a decision on the merits.’ ” Under this rule, “the court may reconsider issues previously before it, and generally may examine the correctness of the judgment itself.” Rule 59(e) “codified the trial court’s inherent power to open and correct, modify, or vacate its judgments.” See 11 C. Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 2810.1, at 124-25 (2d ed. 1995) (describing correction of manifest error of law upon which judgment is based as one of four basic grounds upon which Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) motion may be granted).


The trial court enjoys considerable discretion in deciding whether to grant such a motion to amend or alter. 11 Wright, supra, §2810.1, at 124. Indeed, we have held that the court’s power on a Rule 59(e) motion even extends to issues not raised in the motion. Once a Rule 59(e) motion is filed, the trial court has the power to make an appropriate modification or amendment, including issues not raised in the Rule 59(e) motion. This approach srikes “an appropriate balance between reconsideration and finality.”


Here, the Environmental Court was asked to reconsider an issue of legal interpretation “properly encompassed in a decision on the merits,” which in no way offended the interests of finality. The issue of whether a Rule 34(D) administrative amendment may be used to authorize a fifteen-lot subdivision absent positive findings on all Act 250 criteria is at the core of this case. It was thus well within the Environmental Court’s discretion to fully reconsider this question of law on the merits upon Rule 59(e) motion.


Because the Environmental Court fully considered on the merits the applicability of Rule 34(D), neither our preservation rule nor Rule 59(e) prevents us from considering it here.


Reiber, C.J., dissents because the issue the majority decides was not raised below in a timely and proper manner and therefore should not be reviewable on appeal. The question it addresses—whether an administrative amendment under Rule 34 requires an underlying Act 250 permit—was not raised with the trial court before the entry of judgment but only later in a Rule 59(e) motion to alter or amend.


As the majority acknowledges, it is well settled that a "Rule 59(e) motion may not be used . . . to raise arguments . . . that could have been raised prior to the entry of judgment." N. Sec. Ins. Co. v. Mitec Elecs., Ltd., 2008 VT 96, ¶ 44 (quoting 11 C. Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 28101.1, at 127-28 (2d ed. 1995)) Rule 59(e) "does not provide a vehicle for a party to undo its own procedural failures, and it certainly does not allow a party to introduce new evidence or advance arguments that could and should have been presented to the [trial] court prior to the judgment." Adjoiner plainly waived the issue the majority decides by failing to raise it either explicitly or implicitly throughout the lengthy litigation process that preceded the trial court's entry of judgment. Accordingly, on this basis I would affirm the judgment.