Westcott v. Mack Molding, Co. , 2024 VT 85 [12/20/2024]
WAPLES, J.
Employee Paul Westcott surreptitiously recorded conversations at work
and employer Mack Molding Co., Inc. fired him for lying about it. Employee sued employer. The trial court concluded at summary judgment
that employee’s recording activities were not protected by Vermont’s Fair
Employment Practices Act (FEPA) or Worker’s Compensation Act (WCA). The trial court further concluded that
employee could not sustain his breach-of-contract or promissory-estoppel
claims. We affirm.
FEPA and WCA Retaliation Claims
Employee does not dispute that employer terminated him
for lying. However, he contends that
lying in support of a protected activity is itself protected activity.
Assuming arguendo that being fired for lying about a
protected activity would make the firing improper, we first consider whether
his covert recording of workplace conversations is protected by the FEPA or the
WCA, which incorporates by reference the provisions against retaliation under
the FEPA. 21 V.S.A. § 710(f)
The FEPA
provides, in relevant part: “An employer . . . shall not discharge . . . any
employee because the employee: . . . (b)
has lodged a complaint or has testified, assisted, or participated in any
manner with the Attorney General, a State’s Attorney, the Department of Labor,
or the Human Rights Commission in an investigation of prohibited acts or
practices; (c) is known by the employer
to be about to . . . testify, assist, or participate in any manner in an
investigation of prohibited acts or practices.}21 VSA § 495(a)(8).
Employee points us to a dictionary definition of the
word “investigation” and argues that employee’s actions fall into it. Employer instead argues that “investigation”
means an investigation by the “Attorney General, a State’s Attorney, the
Department of Labor, or the Human Rights Commission,” as specified in 21 VSA §
495(a)(8)(B).
We think employer’s interpretation is correct. The
Legislature intended the “investigation” referred to in subdivision (c) to mean
the sort of investigation it defines immediately beforehand. Because employee does not contend that his actions
were in any way related to a government investigation as described in
subdivision (b), his covert recording does not fall within the scope of the
FEPA’s participation clause.
Similarly, employee’s actions do not fall within the
scope of the WCA’s protections against retaliation. 21 V.S.A. § 710(d).
Breach of Contract
Employee
contends that employer breached a contract with him, created by the employee
handbook
Within the disciplinary process section, the handbook
expressly provides that employees “should not assume that any or all of the
steps outlined below will be followed in every situation” and that the stated
“process does not create a binding obligation to follow these steps in every
situation.”
The situation
created by the handbook here is not like that of Dillon v.
Champion Jogbra, Inc., 175
Vt. 1, ¶ 15, where despite an “at will” disclaimer, the disciplinary policy
“require[d] management” to follow certain steps in the process -- a “promise
for . . . specific treatment in a specific situation” because here the handbook
stated that “the Company expressly reserves the right to terminate the
employment relationship at will” and the handbook did not make any promises
modifying that status.
Promissory Estoppel
Employee argues that he “had a legitimate expectation
that he would be permitted to return to work” after his period of short-term
disability because of statements made by, the human resources directo in a
letter explaining his disability benefits, providing: “[i]f you . . . recover
after you have used 12 weeks of FMLA but before the maximum benefit (time away
from work) of twenty-six (26) weeks is exhausted, you will still be considered”
an employee and will “be reinstated to the first available position for which
you are qualified.”
To sustain a promissory estoppel claim, employee must
“[1] demonstrate that the termination was in breach of a specific promise made
by the employer, [2] that the employer should have reasonably expected to
induce detrimental reliance on the part of the employee, and [3] that the
employee did in fact detrimentally rely on the promise.” Dillon v.
Champion Jogbra, Inc.,
175 Vt. 1, ¶ 19 (2002).
Even if we viewed this statement as a promise, employee’s termination was not “in breach of a specific promise made by the employer”. Employee was merely promised that he would be able to return to “the first available position” not that the employer would refrain from terminating his employment for any other reasons.
Affirmed.
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