Caldwell v.Champlain College Inc., 2025 VT 17 [4/11/2025]
WAPLES, J.
Employee Robert Caldwell contends that the trial court erred in granting
summary judgment on his Fair Employment Practices Act (FEPA) disability
discrimination and promissory-estoppel claims against his former employer
Champlain College because genuine issues of material fact precluded summary
judgment. We affirm.
In opposing Champlain’s motion for summary judgment,
employee did not file his own statement of additional material facts. A separate statement of material facts has
been required by Rule
56 since
at least 1995, and amendments to the rule in 2003 made clear that attorneys
must include “in their Rule
56(c)(2) statements all of the facts that they have
relied on ... [because] facts that are omitted from their statements will not
be considered by the court in ruling on the motion.” Reporter's Notes—2003
Amendment, V.R.C.P.
56;
see also Reporter's Notes—1995 Amendment, V.R.C.P.
56.
The 2022 Amendments also explicitly clarify that “statements of additional
facts ... are to be submitted in a separate statement, with numbered
paragraphs.” Reporter's Notes—2022 Amendment, V.R.C.P.
56.
Employee’s failure to file a statement of additional
material facts means the Court need not consider any facts outside of
Champlain’s statement of undisputed material facts in ruling on the summary
judgment motion. V.R.C.P. 56(c)(5). Unless
otherwise noted, all facts presented in the analysis below are facts that
employee did not dispute in his response to Champlain’s statement of undisputed
material facts.
Without direct evidence of unlawful discrimination,
which employee has not offered, we apply the three-step framework adopted by
the United States Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S.
792 (1973). Hammond, 2023 VT 31, ¶ 25. Assuming
that employee can establish a prima facie case of discrimination, the burden
shifts to Champlain to articulate a “legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for
the challenged conduct.” Hammond, 2023
VT 31, ¶ 25 (quotation omitted). Champlain’s
explanation that employee was being fired “based on [his] fundraising
number.” suffices to meet Champlain’s
burden. Employee thus must show that the “proffered reason was a mere pretext
for discrimination.” Id
Employee offered no evidence to raise even the barest
suggestion that Champlain’s decision to terminate him was not for exactly the
reasons it stated: employee, who was chief fundraiser, failed to meet his
fundraising expectations. Summary
judgment was warranted because employee bore the burden of proof to show that
Champlain’s reason for termination was pretextual, and he failed to make a
showing sufficient to establish the existence of this element essential to his case.
To establish his promissory estoppel claim, employee
must “demonstrate that the termination was in breach of a specific promise made
by the employer that the employer should have reasonably expected to induce
detrimental reliance on the part of the employee, and that the employee did in
fact detrimentally rely on the promise.”
Dillon v.
Champion Jogbra, Inc.175 Vt. 1, 9, (2002). “ ‘Courts have generally required a promise
of a specific and definite nature before holding an employer bound by it.’
” Pettersen v. Monaghan Safar Ducham
PLLC, 2021 VT 16, ¶ 13, 214 Vt. 269, 256 A.3d 604 (quoting Dillon,
175 Vt. at 10, 819 A.2d at 710). A mere
“ ‘expression of intention, hope, desire, or opinion, which shows no real
commitment’ ” does not suffice. Id.
(quoting Nelson v. Town of St. Johnsbury Selectboard, 2015 VT 5, ¶ 56,
198 Vt. 277, 115 A.3d 423). ¶ 27.
Employee cites no evidence at all in support of his promissory estoppel
claim. His brief in opposition to
summary judgment before the trial court similarly cited no evidence. Because employee did not introduce evidence
of any promise, much less one “of a specific and definite nature,” his claim
for promissory estoppel fails.
Affirmed.
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