Procedural due process, under both the Vermont and United States Constitutions, does not require notice of the listers’ tax grievance decision to be mailed to counsel in addition to taxpayer.

 Salisbury AD 1, LLCv. Town of Salisbury, 2025 VT 43 [8/8/2025]

 REIBER, C.J.   This case arises out of a tax grievance before the Town of Salisbury listers.  The Town of Salisbury appeals the trial court’s denial of its motion for summary judgment and the granting of taxpayer’s motion for summary judgment including mandamus relief pursuant to Vermont Rule of Civil Procedure 75.  In so ordering, the trial court determined that the Town failed to satisfy due process by not mailing notice of the listers’ grievance decision to both taxpayer and taxpayer’s counsel.  In the circumstances of this case, procedural due process does not require notice to be mailed to counsel in addition to taxpayer.  We reverse.

Under the due-process test set forth in Mullane, Flowers, and Hogaboom, “[t]he reasonableness and hence the constitutional validity of [the] chosen method may be defended on the ground that it is in itself reasonably certain to inform those affected.”  Mullane, 339 U.S. at 315.

The Town argues that taxpayer’s due-process right was not violated because taxpayer received actual notice of the listers’ determination by means of certified mail with return receipt. 

 

Taxpayer argues that it was entitled to summary judgment based on application of our holding in Perry v. Department of Employment & Training, 147 Vt. 621, 624,  (1987) that in the unemployment-benefits context that, notice of a referee’s decision must be sent both to the claimant and to the claimant’s attorney of record . The Town replies that Perry’s due-process directive is limited to the context of unemployment-benefits claims. Taxpayer counters that Perry was decided “under broad, generally applicable constitutional principles,” and, therefore, applies equally to a property-tax-grievance adjudication.

 

In Perry wee based our reasoning on the Colorado Supreme Court’s holding in Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Department of Labor & Employment, 520 P.2d 586 (Colo. 1974)  that when a litigant employs an attorney to represent their interests before an adjudicatory body “ ‘all notices required to be given in relation to the matters in controversy, including notice of the decision and entry thereof, should be given to the attorney of record’ ” to prevent “ ‘fundamental unfairness.’ ”  Perry, 147 Vt. at 624, 523 But Perry’s  analysis and holding are expressly limited to unemployment-benefits claims.  We agree with the Town that Perry is limited to its facts and does not announce a general principle of due-process requirements. Perry does not control in this instance because it is limited to its specific facts and the context of unemployment-benefit claims. 

 

In the context of a tax grievance before the Town of Salisbury listers, taxpayer’s actual receipt of notice of the listers’ decision satisfied procedural due process.  Due process, under both the Vermont and United States Constitutions, does not require notice to counsel. 

 

Reversed with instruction to enter summary judgment for the Town of Salisbury.