State v. Sinquell-Gainey, 2022 VT 19 [filed 5/6/2022]
As to a purported centerline violation on the interstate, the trial court credited dash-mounted camera footage, which showed that defendants’ vehicle touched
but did not, in fact, cross the centerline. The statute cited as
the basis for the violation, 23 V.S.A. § 1031, driving to right, does not apply on a multi-lane
roadway restricted to one-way traffic. The court reasoned that even if defendants had crossed the
centerline, defendants would have not violated § 1031
because the statute does not apply “upon a roadway restricted to one-way traffic.” Id. § 1031(a)(4).
The trial court rejected the State’s argument under a totality-of-the- circumstances analysis. The court concluded that the entry into the gas station through an exit-only access, the unprovoked stop at the flashing yellow light, the wide left turn onto the access road, and the brief activation of the high beams did not collectively give rise to reasonable suspicion of driving under the influence.
Our review of a grant of a motion to suppress involves a mixed question of fact and law. When reviewing the decision to grant a suppression motion, we review a trial court’s findings of fact for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo. We look to the totality of the circumstances in judging the reasonableness of a DUI stop where a traffic violation does not form the basis of the stop. This avoids a “divide-and-conquer analysis” that scrutinizes each factor independently and accords no weight to conduct that alone is innocuous. The totality-of-the-circumstances standard allows officers to draw on their own experience and specialized training to make inferences from and deductions about the cumulative information available to them that might well elude an untrained person.
For example, in State v. Pratt, we affirmed a denial of a motion to suppress evidence where a state trooper pulled over a car for drifting back and forth within a lane on Interstate 89 for approximately five miles. 2007 VT 68, ¶ 7. Reasonable suspicion of driving while intoxicated is assessed by examining the totality of the circumstances and consequently may be supported by evidence of erratic driving, whether or not it amounts to a specific traffic violation. Further, we rely on the expertise of the officer in recognizing signs of impaired operation. Id. ¶ 6
We do not disagree with the trial court’s conclusion that the driver’s wide left turn may be “insufficient” on its own to develop reasonable suspicion, but we disagree that this was irrelevant in the context of the other factors the trial court found. Likewise, we disagree that defendants’ entrance through a marked exit into the gas station forty minutes after the bars had closed in the area, the complete stop at the flashing yellow light, the brief activation of the high beams, and the wide left turn, when considered together, did not provide reasonable suspicion of impaired driving. Alone, any one of these events may not give rise to reasonable suspicion. But the occurred in a continuous stream of activity in a relatively short amount of time, all observed by the same police officer.
This is not a close case. The trial court erred when it concluded that the totality of the circumstances did not provide reasonable suspicion that defendants were driving while impaired.
The dissent’s suggestion that all the operator’s driving maneuvers were consistent with cautious driving, post, misunderstands our standard of review. The recognition that law enforcement may draw on their experience and training is precisely the reason why courts must not analyze each factor independently.
The trial court rejected the State’s argument under a totality-of-the- circumstances analysis. The court concluded that the entry into the gas station through an exit-only access, the unprovoked stop at the flashing yellow light, the wide left turn onto the access road, and the brief activation of the high beams did not collectively give rise to reasonable suspicion of driving under the influence.
Our review of a grant of a motion to suppress involves a mixed question of fact and law. When reviewing the decision to grant a suppression motion, we review a trial court’s findings of fact for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo. We look to the totality of the circumstances in judging the reasonableness of a DUI stop where a traffic violation does not form the basis of the stop. This avoids a “divide-and-conquer analysis” that scrutinizes each factor independently and accords no weight to conduct that alone is innocuous. The totality-of-the-circumstances standard allows officers to draw on their own experience and specialized training to make inferences from and deductions about the cumulative information available to them that might well elude an untrained person.
For example, in State v. Pratt, we affirmed a denial of a motion to suppress evidence where a state trooper pulled over a car for drifting back and forth within a lane on Interstate 89 for approximately five miles. 2007 VT 68, ¶ 7. Reasonable suspicion of driving while intoxicated is assessed by examining the totality of the circumstances and consequently may be supported by evidence of erratic driving, whether or not it amounts to a specific traffic violation. Further, we rely on the expertise of the officer in recognizing signs of impaired operation. Id. ¶ 6
We do not disagree with the trial court’s conclusion that the driver’s wide left turn may be “insufficient” on its own to develop reasonable suspicion, but we disagree that this was irrelevant in the context of the other factors the trial court found. Likewise, we disagree that defendants’ entrance through a marked exit into the gas station forty minutes after the bars had closed in the area, the complete stop at the flashing yellow light, the brief activation of the high beams, and the wide left turn, when considered together, did not provide reasonable suspicion of impaired driving. Alone, any one of these events may not give rise to reasonable suspicion. But the occurred in a continuous stream of activity in a relatively short amount of time, all observed by the same police officer.
This is not a close case. The trial court erred when it concluded that the totality of the circumstances did not provide reasonable suspicion that defendants were driving while impaired.
The dissent’s suggestion that all the operator’s driving maneuvers were consistent with cautious driving, post, misunderstands our standard of review. The recognition that law enforcement may draw on their experience and training is precisely the reason why courts must not analyze each factor independently.
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings.
COHEN, J., dissenting. I would affirm the trial court’s decision to grant defendants’ motion to suppress based on lack of reasonable suspicion, and therefore respectfully dissent. None of the alleged infractions individually create reasonable suspicion of a traffic violation, and the totality of the circumstances does not amount to reasonable suspicion of driving under the influence (DUI).
The majority concludes that the following facts supported reasonable suspicion of impaired driving: the bars closed at 1:00 a.m.; within an hour of the bars closing, defendant drove an out-of-state vehicle two to three miles per hour under the speed limit; defendant stopped at a flashing yellow light; defendant failed to put on his turn signal before turning left onto the interstate access road; defendant swung wide on his turn; defendant briefly flashed the car’s high beams before using his turn signal; and defendant’s left wheels touched the highway centerline. In my view, these facts do not, as a whole, create an objectively reasonable suspicion of impaired driving.
In determining the legality of a stop, courts consider from an objective standpoint whether, given all the circumstances, the officer had a reasonable and articulable suspicion of wrongdoing. It is this objective standard that causes the State’s arguments to fail. As Justice Johnson wrote in her dissent in Pratt, “[w]hile otherwise innocent behavior might sometimes appear suspicious to a trained police observer, the standard for a constitutionally permissible stop of a vehicle nevertheless remains that of ordinary common experience.” Pratt, 2007 VT 68, ¶ 10 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
Given the lack of objectively reasonable suspicion of any traffic violation or impaired driving under the totality of the circumstances, I would affirm the trial court’s decision to grant defendants’ motion to suppress. I am authorized to state that Chief Justice Reiber joins this dissent.
COHEN, J., dissenting. I would affirm the trial court’s decision to grant defendants’ motion to suppress based on lack of reasonable suspicion, and therefore respectfully dissent. None of the alleged infractions individually create reasonable suspicion of a traffic violation, and the totality of the circumstances does not amount to reasonable suspicion of driving under the influence (DUI).
The majority concludes that the following facts supported reasonable suspicion of impaired driving: the bars closed at 1:00 a.m.; within an hour of the bars closing, defendant drove an out-of-state vehicle two to three miles per hour under the speed limit; defendant stopped at a flashing yellow light; defendant failed to put on his turn signal before turning left onto the interstate access road; defendant swung wide on his turn; defendant briefly flashed the car’s high beams before using his turn signal; and defendant’s left wheels touched the highway centerline. In my view, these facts do not, as a whole, create an objectively reasonable suspicion of impaired driving.
In determining the legality of a stop, courts consider from an objective standpoint whether, given all the circumstances, the officer had a reasonable and articulable suspicion of wrongdoing. It is this objective standard that causes the State’s arguments to fail. As Justice Johnson wrote in her dissent in Pratt, “[w]hile otherwise innocent behavior might sometimes appear suspicious to a trained police observer, the standard for a constitutionally permissible stop of a vehicle nevertheless remains that of ordinary common experience.” Pratt, 2007 VT 68, ¶ 10 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
Given the lack of objectively reasonable suspicion of any traffic violation or impaired driving under the totality of the circumstances, I would affirm the trial court’s decision to grant defendants’ motion to suppress. I am authorized to state that Chief Justice Reiber joins this dissent.
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