Rule 60(b)(5) does not apply to require relief from judgment which has been “effectively overruled” by newer precedent.

 

  In re Benoit Conversion Application , 2022 VT 39 (filed 8/19/2022)

 

COHEN, J. The Benoits seek to set aside a 2008 judgment under Vermont Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(5). They contend that the decision was effectively overruled by a later case involving different parties. The Environmental Division denied their request and we affirm its decision.

In the 2008 Hayford decision the environmental court ordered the Hayfords and the Benoits to stop using the rear building as a residential unit and imposed fines. On appeal this Court found it unnecessary to address argument that the enforcement action should be barred by the fifteen-year statute of limitations in 24 V.S.A. § 4454(a) because the Court agreed with the environmental court there had been a fresh violation in 1998.

Eleven years later, in, in re 204 N. Ave., 2019 VT 52, ¶ 3, 210 Vt. 572, 218 A.3d 24., the Court held that the statute of limitations in § 4454(a) does not allow a municipality “to pursue use violations as long as they continue.” Id. ¶ 7.

Based on in re 204 N. Ave., the Benoits moved to set aside the Hayford decision. The Environmental Division denied the parties’ request, finding no grounds to set aside the decision under Rule 60(b)(5).
The court concluded that Hayford was decided and affirmed on grounds independent of the holding in 204 North Avenue.

On appeal, the Benoits argue that they are entitled to relief under Rule 60(b)(5) because 204 North Avenue “effectively overruled” Hayford. They assert the Court rejected the notion that use violations are analyzed as continuing or recurring violations. They contend the asserted holding of 204 North Avenue should be retroactively applied and Hayford should be set aside.

The trial court has discretion in ruling on a Rule 60(b) motion and its decision is not subject to appellate review unless it clearly and affirmatively appears from the record that such discretion was withheld or otherwise abused.)). The Benoits fail to show an abuse of discretion here

First, we reject the argument that 204 North Avenue “effectively overruled” Hayford. Our decision in Hayford did not rest on a “continuing use” theory. We expressly declined to reach that alternate rationale offered by the trial court and affirmed the trial court’s decision on a separate and independent ground. Hayford, 2008 VT 36, ¶ 11.

Even assuming arguendo that Hayford was “effectively overruled,” that would not entitle the Benoits to relief under Rule 60(b)(5). That rule provides relief from a judgment where “the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application.” V.R.C.P. 60(b)(5).

Rule 60 (b)(5) “does not apply merely because a case relied on as precedent by the court in rendering the present judgment has since been reversed.” 11 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure Civil § 2863 (3d ed. 2022); see also Reporter’s Notes, V.R.C.P. 60 (indicating that V.R.C.P. 60 is “substantially identical to Federal Rule 60”); Reporter’s Notes, V.R.C.P.1 (“Federal cases interpreting the Federal Rules are an authoritative source for the interpretation of identical provisions of the Vermont Rules.”).

This approach promotes the finality of judgments, which is “fundamental to our judicial system.” Comfort v. Lynn Sch. Comm., 560 F.3d 22, 26 (1st Cir. 2009); For that reason, courts recognize that “a case cannot be re-opened simply because some new development makes it appear, in retrospect, that a judgment on the merits long since settled was brought about by judicial error.” Id. (citing Hoult 7 v. Hoult, 57 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1995) (explaining that incorrectly decided point of law, without more, cannot provide ground for relief from final judgment) (citing cases).

Mindful of these principles, the language at issue here in Rule 60(b)(5) “is limited to cases in which the present judgment is based on the prior judgment in the sense of claim or issue preclusion.” 11 Wright & Miller, supra, § 2863 “The mere emergence of controlling precedent in some other case that shows the incorrectness of the prior judgment” does not suffice. Comfort, 560 F.3d at 27;

Even assuming arguendo that Hayford rested on a “continuing use” theory, the rejection of that theory in a later, unrelated case would not entitle the Benoits to the relief they seek. “In the absence of . . . a direct connection [between the two cases], ‘a change in applicable law does not provide sufficient basis for relief.’ ” Comfort, 560 F.3d at 27 (quoting Lubben, 453 F.2d at 650).

The Benoits do not squarely argue that they are entitled to relief under the third prong of Rule 60(b)(5), which states that relief from judgment may be appropriate “where it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application.”. Even if the Benoits did raise this argument on appeal, we would reject it. The trial court plainly found that there was no clear showing of a grievous wrong here that would warrant setting aside the 2008 judgment. In other words, there was no equitable basis for doing so, particularly as the continuing-use theory was not reached in Hayford.

There is no basis to disturb this discretionary determination on appeal. The court did not err in denying the Benoits’ request for relief from judgment.

Affirmed.

SCOVT NOTE. For a case confirming that Rule 60(b)(5) specifically contemplates relief only from "prospective application" of a judgment because of intervening change in law see Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 238–39 (1997) (ongoing injunctive relief based on a decision that been “effectively overruled’ was inequitable under Rule 60(b)(5)). In Aguilar the Court noted that “ Intervening developments in the law by themselves rarely constitute the extraordinary circumstances required for relief under Rule 60(b)(6), the only remaining avenue for relief on this basis from judgments lacking any prospective component.”