DIvided court reverses order declining to terminate father’s parental rights.

In re N.L., Juvenile, 2019 VT 10 [filed  2/8/2019]

SKOGLUND, J. This case concerns petitions to terminate the parental rights of both mother and father with respect to their child, N.L. The family division of the superior court granted the petition to terminate mother’s parental rights but denied the petition concerning father. Mother appeals the termination of her parental rights, and N.L. appeals the court’s decision not to terminate father’s parental rights. We affirm the termination of mother’s parental rights and reverse the court’s order declining to terminate father’s parental rights. We remand the matter for the limited purpose of directing the family division to grant the petition to terminate father’s parental rights.

The family division’s order terminating mother’s parental rights is affirmed. The family division’s order declining to terminate father’s parental rights is reversed, and the matter is remanded for the court to grant the petition to terminate father’s parental rights.

ROBINSON, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. These cases are hard. Termination of parental rights may sever an established parent-child relationship that is both constitutionally protected and potentially vitally important to child and parent alike. But the failure to terminate when the evidence warrants it risks extending a period of uncertainty, with potential 16 adverse impacts on the very children the laws seek to protect. I believe the best way to manage these difficulties is to rely on the system we have established—one in which a factfinder who can directly observe the witnesses and review the evidence in that context determines the facts and exercises the difficult discretionary judgments, and an appellate court ensures that the factual findings are in fact supported by evidence in the written record and the difficult judgment as to the ultimate question falls within the trial court’s broad discretion, subject to clear standards on review. I believe the majority, however well-intentioned, has departed from this framework by filling in the gaps it perceives in the trial court’s fact-finding with appellate fact findings of its own. For that reason, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s ruling reversing the trial court’s denial of the termination petition as to father.