LeBlanc v. Snelgrove, 2015 VT 112 (filed 8/28/2015)
ROBINSON, J. This case arises from a landowner’s replacement of a boathouse on his property . The case includes claims for declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as damages on account of the landowner’s alleged trespass. Plaintiff neighbors challenge the trial court’s conclusions that the landowner was entitled to build the encroaching structure by virtue of a deeded easement and that they cannot prevail in a claim for trespass on account of consent or estoppel. Because the court improperly addressed the issues of consent and estoppel in derogation of the neighbors’ request for a jury trial, we reverse.
At a pretrial conference the day before the jury trial the court indicated that it would first try the boundary issues as a bench trial before having the parties present their other claims to the jury. Three days before the jury portion of the trial, the court orally issued its findings and conclusions from the bench trial as to the location of the boundary line. The court concluded that equitable estoppel prevents the Plaintiffs from now complaining about the design and location of the retaining walls or from arguing that the boathouse easement did not encompass the right to extend the boathouse and its associated retaining walls when necessary to repair or replace the boathouse. The Plaintiffs filed a timely motion for a new trial arguing that the court’s decision from the bench trial exceeded its permissible scope and deprived them of a jury trial. The court denied the Plaintiffs’ motion, reasoning that the Plaintiffs had sought injunctive relief in their complaint and that all of the issues before the court required application of the law, and were thus mixed questions of fact and law properly decided by the court.
On appeal the Plaintiffs renew their argument that the trial court’s approach deprived them of the right to a jury trial in connection with their claims for unlawful mischief, ejectment, trespass, and conversion, in which they sought legal damages as well as injunctive relief. The Plaintiffs argue that the court erred when it decided these issues in a bench trial since both parties demanded a jury trial on all issues triable by a jury, and neither party stipulated to a bench trial on these issues.
This Court has held that entitlement to a jury trial is dependent upon the relief requested. If the relief requested is equitable, no right to a jury trial exists. If the relief requested is legal, then the right to a jury trial attaches. The right to trial by jury attaches to claims traditionally tried in a court of law. In this case, the Plaintiffs have made a claim for damages based on causes of action for ejectment, unlawful mischief, and trespass. Actions for recovery of possession of real property and for damage to property were historically actions at law. Accordingly, the Plaintiffs were entitled to trial by jury on these legal claims.
The Plaintiffs ‘right to a jury trial also includes a right to trial by jury on the factual issues underlying the defense of equitable estoppel. See, e.g., Mellin v. Flood Brook Union School Dist., 173 Vt. 202, 222-23, 790 A.2d 408, 425-46 (2001) (jury entitled to decide facts underlying equitable-estoppel defense); see also Jamison, Money, Farmer & Co., P.C. v. Standeffer, 678 So. 2d 1061, 1067 (Ala. 1996) (holding that because evidence concerning defense of equitable estoppel was in dispute, issue was properly presented to jury); Ala. Power Co. v. Gielle, 373 So. 2d 851, 853 (Ala. Civ. App. 1979) (holding that question of whether plaintiffs’ predecessor had knowledge of utility pole located on subject property was question for jury in resolving defense of equitable estoppel in action for trespass and ejectment); Hunstein v. Fiksman, 615 S.E.2d 526, 528 (Ga. 2005) (“Estoppel is usually an issue of fact to be decided by the jury.” (quotation omitted)); Creech v. Melnick, 495 S.E.2d 907, 913 (N.C. 1998) (“[W]here the evidence raises a permissible inference that the elements of equitable estoppel are present, but where other inferences may be drawn from contrary evidence, estoppel is a question of fact for the jury, upon proper instructions from the trial court.”).
Where a case involves both legal and equitable claims, the jury verdict must come first, after which the court may issue findings on the equitable claims that must be consistent with the jury verdict. See V.R.C.P. 39(d). Reporter’s Notes—1985 Amendment, V.R.C.P. 39(d); Retrovest Assocs., Inc. v. Bryant, 153 Vt. 493, 495 n.1, 573 A.2d 281, 282 n.1 (1990). The trial court’s approach flipped this process.
The court should have first allowed the jury to decide the factual questions that underlay both the legal and equitable claims. In addressing the parties’ equitable claims for relief, the court should have then ensured that its own findings were consistent with the jury’s. Accordingly, the court was not authorized to determine in the first instance that the retaining wall did not constitute a trespass by virtue of any agreement of the parties. Likewise we cannot uphold the trial court’s determination that there was no trespass to the extent that it rests on the court’s application of the principles of equitable estoppel. Therefore we reverse the court’s determination that no trespass occurred.
The trial court’s rulings on the Plaintiffs’ claims for trespass, ejectment, and unlawful mischief are reversed, and those matters are remanded for a new trial consistent with this opinion.
At a pretrial conference the day before the jury trial the court indicated that it would first try the boundary issues as a bench trial before having the parties present their other claims to the jury. Three days before the jury portion of the trial, the court orally issued its findings and conclusions from the bench trial as to the location of the boundary line. The court concluded that equitable estoppel prevents the Plaintiffs from now complaining about the design and location of the retaining walls or from arguing that the boathouse easement did not encompass the right to extend the boathouse and its associated retaining walls when necessary to repair or replace the boathouse. The Plaintiffs filed a timely motion for a new trial arguing that the court’s decision from the bench trial exceeded its permissible scope and deprived them of a jury trial. The court denied the Plaintiffs’ motion, reasoning that the Plaintiffs had sought injunctive relief in their complaint and that all of the issues before the court required application of the law, and were thus mixed questions of fact and law properly decided by the court.
On appeal the Plaintiffs renew their argument that the trial court’s approach deprived them of the right to a jury trial in connection with their claims for unlawful mischief, ejectment, trespass, and conversion, in which they sought legal damages as well as injunctive relief. The Plaintiffs argue that the court erred when it decided these issues in a bench trial since both parties demanded a jury trial on all issues triable by a jury, and neither party stipulated to a bench trial on these issues.
This Court has held that entitlement to a jury trial is dependent upon the relief requested. If the relief requested is equitable, no right to a jury trial exists. If the relief requested is legal, then the right to a jury trial attaches. The right to trial by jury attaches to claims traditionally tried in a court of law. In this case, the Plaintiffs have made a claim for damages based on causes of action for ejectment, unlawful mischief, and trespass. Actions for recovery of possession of real property and for damage to property were historically actions at law. Accordingly, the Plaintiffs were entitled to trial by jury on these legal claims.
The Plaintiffs ‘right to a jury trial also includes a right to trial by jury on the factual issues underlying the defense of equitable estoppel. See, e.g., Mellin v. Flood Brook Union School Dist., 173 Vt. 202, 222-23, 790 A.2d 408, 425-46 (2001) (jury entitled to decide facts underlying equitable-estoppel defense); see also Jamison, Money, Farmer & Co., P.C. v. Standeffer, 678 So. 2d 1061, 1067 (Ala. 1996) (holding that because evidence concerning defense of equitable estoppel was in dispute, issue was properly presented to jury); Ala. Power Co. v. Gielle, 373 So. 2d 851, 853 (Ala. Civ. App. 1979) (holding that question of whether plaintiffs’ predecessor had knowledge of utility pole located on subject property was question for jury in resolving defense of equitable estoppel in action for trespass and ejectment); Hunstein v. Fiksman, 615 S.E.2d 526, 528 (Ga. 2005) (“Estoppel is usually an issue of fact to be decided by the jury.” (quotation omitted)); Creech v. Melnick, 495 S.E.2d 907, 913 (N.C. 1998) (“[W]here the evidence raises a permissible inference that the elements of equitable estoppel are present, but where other inferences may be drawn from contrary evidence, estoppel is a question of fact for the jury, upon proper instructions from the trial court.”).
Where a case involves both legal and equitable claims, the jury verdict must come first, after which the court may issue findings on the equitable claims that must be consistent with the jury verdict. See V.R.C.P. 39(d). Reporter’s Notes—1985 Amendment, V.R.C.P. 39(d); Retrovest Assocs., Inc. v. Bryant, 153 Vt. 493, 495 n.1, 573 A.2d 281, 282 n.1 (1990). The trial court’s approach flipped this process.
The court should have first allowed the jury to decide the factual questions that underlay both the legal and equitable claims. In addressing the parties’ equitable claims for relief, the court should have then ensured that its own findings were consistent with the jury’s. Accordingly, the court was not authorized to determine in the first instance that the retaining wall did not constitute a trespass by virtue of any agreement of the parties. Likewise we cannot uphold the trial court’s determination that there was no trespass to the extent that it rests on the court’s application of the principles of equitable estoppel. Therefore we reverse the court’s determination that no trespass occurred.
The trial court’s rulings on the Plaintiffs’ claims for trespass, ejectment, and unlawful mischief are reversed, and those matters are remanded for a new trial consistent with this opinion.
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