BURGESS, J. Defendant City of Burlington Retirement System appeals from a superior court judgment reversing the City’s decision to terminate the disability retirement of plaintiff, a former City firefighter. The City contends the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. We affirm.
Plaintiff appealed the decision to the superior court under Vermont Rule of Civil Procedure 75(a), which provides for review of government action not otherwise expressly appealable by statute under Rule 74, “if such review is otherwise available by law.” The City moved for summary judgment, asserting that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, citin a provision in the City’s retirement ordinance to the effect that “[t]he retirement board shall have the final say as to all decisions required to be made pursuant to the provisions of this section.” Burlington Code of Ordinances § 24-23(j) (emphasis added). The court rejected the City’s jurisdictional argument. The court acknowledged our holding in Mason v. Thetford School Board that a statute may preclude judicial review of an administrative decision by providing that the decision “shall be final.” 142 Vt. 495, 498, 457 A.2d 647, 649 (1983). The court relied, however, on our subsequent ruling in Campbell v. Manchester Board of School Directors, which reaffirmed the principle that “an otherwise final decision may be amenable to review by writ of certiorari . . . where the decision was made by one acting in a judicial or quasi-judicial position.” 152 Vt. 643, 644, 565 A.2d 1318, 1318 (1989) (mem.). Because the Board’s decision was quasi-judicial in nature subject to review under the traditional writ of certiorari, the court concluded it was subject to appeal under Rule 75. We agree there was jurisdiction for different reasons.
Our Constitution generally affords “[e]very person within this state . . . a certain remedy, by having recourse to the laws,” Vt. Const. ch. I, art. 4. We thus have cautioned that courts should be “hesitant to interpret arguably ambiguous legislation as foreclosing judicial review of administrative agency decisions.” Vincent v. Vt. State Ret. Bd., 148 Vt. 531, 534 n.2, (1987), We have acknowledged, to be sure, that judicial review of government agency actions may be precluded where a statute or ordinance unequivocally bars review. See, e.g., Handverger v. City of Winooski, 2011 VT 130, ¶¶ 4, 13, 191 Vt. 556, 38 A.3d 1153 (mem.) (upholding dismissal of Rule 75 complaint by former city manager under charter provision specifically providing that city council’s “action . . . in suspending or removing the manager shall not be subject to review by any court or agency”). No such explicit expression of intent to preclude judicial review is evident here. Although “final” may have broader meaning in other contexts, in this context it is reasonable to expect that, had the City actually intended to deprive its employees of the same opportunity for judicial review enjoyed by other public-sector employees in Vermont, it would have expressed that intent in clear and unmistakable terms. We thus hold that the trial court correctly construed the City’s ordinance to mean that the Board’s decision shall constitute final administrative action, and correctly concluded that it had jurisdiction under Rule 75 to review the Board’s decision terminating plaintiff’s disability retirement.
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