Tuesday, July 16, 2019
SCOVT declines VRAP 5 appeal from denial of pretrial motion to suppress where conditional pleas is available.
State v. Lyford, 2016 VT 118 (mem.) (overruled by State v. Wesley Haynes, Tristan Harris and Dennis Magoon,2019 VT 44)
The criminal division of the superior court granted defendant's motion for permission to file an interlocutory appeal, pursuant to Vermont Rule of Appellate Procedure 5(b), from the court's decision denying defendant's pretrial motion to suppress and dismiss, which alleged an illegal canine search. For the reasons explained below, we dismiss the appeal as improvidently granted. See V.R.A.P. 5(b)(8) ("On its own or the appellee's motion, the Supreme Court may at any time dismiss the appeal as improvidently granted.").
Since 1989, a defendant, with the approval of the trial court and the State, may enter a conditional guilty plea while reserving the right to appeal "the adverse determination of any specified pretrial motion." V.R.Cr.P. 11(a)(2); id. Reporter's Notes-1989 Amendment. Generally, this Court does not accept interlocutory appeals of decisions denying motions to suppress in criminal cases unless a conditional plea is not available or practicable under the circumstances and the criteria in Rule 5(b) have been met.
This is consistent with our general rule that "an appeal will not lie to review the denial of a pretrial motion to suppress evidence on the claim of illegal search and seizure." State v. Blondin, 128 Vt. 613, 615-16, 270 A.2d 165, 166 (1970) (citing 13 V.S.A. §§ 7401, 7403 in support of "the general rule that an appeal should not be permitted in criminal causes until a final verdict, adverse to the appellant, has been rendered in the trial court," and noting that 12 V.S.A. § 2386 "affords limited variance to the general rule by granting discretionary authority" to the superior court "to permit an appeal before final judgment for the determination of questions of law"); see also ABA Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice, Criminal Appeals, Standard 21-1.3(b)-(c) (stating that defendants generally should not be permitted to take interlocutory appeals in criminal cases and that conditional plea procedure should be established to allow review after final judgment of decisions on contested pretrial motions such as motions to suppress evidence).
Although we recognize that on occasion this Court has accepted interlocutory appeals from decisions denying motions to suppress, in this case defendant has not indicated that a conditional plea is unavailable or impracticable under the circumstances, and the trial court has not made any findings indicating that the criteria set forth in V.R.A.P. 5(b) have been met. Accordingly, we decline to accept the appeal.
Appeal dismissed as improvidently granted.
SCOVT reverses Secretary’s reversal of Human Services Board’s reversal of Department’s denial of petitioner’s request for developmental disability services , because the Board’s factual findings that had support in the record .
SKOGLUND, J. The fundamental issue in
this case is whether petitioner should be found eligible for developmental
disability services. The Department of Disabilities, Aging and Independent
Living (DAIL) denied petitioner’s request for services, finding him ineligible.
The Human Services Board reversed DAIL’s decision. The Secretary of the Agency
of Human Services reversed the Board’s decision and reinstated DAIL’s decision.
This appeal followed.
Before us is the question of whether a
standard error of measurement is properly applied to IQ scores used to qualify
persons for developmental disability services. The SEM for an IQ
test is plus or minus five points. If the SEM is taken into account, then
scores at or below 75 would qualify under the regulations as “a full scale
score of 70 or below”
We conclude that the plain language of
the applicable regulations incorporates the standard error of measurement of
plus or minus five points for an IQ test and, therefore, petitioner’s IQ score
of 75 combined with the other evidence in the case qualified him for services.
The Secretary is limited in
reviewing the Board’s factual findings and may “reverse or modify factual
findings in a board decision only if ‘the board’s findings of fact lack any
support in the record.’” The Secretary rejected the Board’s finding
that the 2007 score was the most reasonable and appropriate basis to determine
petitioner’s eligibility, concluding that there was “no
clinical basis in the record” for the finding. Because the Board’s
assessment that petitioner’s 2007 score was the most accurate reflection of his
level of functioning is supported by the record, the Secretary lacked authority
to reverse or modify it.
We conclude that the Secretary lacked
authority to reverse the Board’s factual findings and erred in interpreting the
regulations. Therefore, we reverse the Secretary’s decision and remand for
reinstatement of the Board’s decision
Reversed and
remanded.
SCOVT vacates and dismisses charge of disorderly conduct.
Impeachment of defendant who talks is not an impermissible comment on silence.
SCOVT dismisses parental rights appeal for lack of a final judgment.
SCOVT reverses denial of access to criminal court record and remands for joinder of additional parties and for further proceedings.
A defendant in a criminal action may seek interlocutory review under VRAP 5 without showing that a conditional guilty plea is not practicable or available before seeking such interlocutory review (overruling State v. Lyford, 2016 VT 118.),
SCOVT NOTE.ON OVERRULING RECENT PRECEDENT
The Court has recognized the importance of the doctrine of stare decisis, and has noted that, although the Court is not "slavish adherents" to this doctrine, it does not "lightly overturn recent precedent," especially where the precedent could be changed easily by legislation at any time. O'Connor v. City of Rutland, 172 Vt. 570, 570, 772 A.2d 551, 552 (2001) (mem.)
State v. Haynes overrules a three-year-old case. But this is not a record. See Whippie v. O'Connor, 2011 VT 97 (mem.)(cotenant who excludes his cotenants from possession and enjoyment of the jointly owned property is entitled to contribution for necessary maintenance costs such as mortgage, taxes and insurance during the period of ouster, overruling Massey v. Hrostek, 2009 VT 70, as based on an incorrect statement of prior law); Town of Lyndon v. Burnett's Contracting Co., 138 Vt. 102, (1980) (order being appealed need not be specified in the notice of appeal, overruling In re Town of St. Johnsbury Town School District, 137 Vt. 557 (1979) as overlooking V.R.A.P 3(a) (an appeal from a judgment preserves all claims of error in the record)).
SCOVT reinstates jury verdict for plaintiff repair shop, construing collision coverage as promise to pay the amount of money needed to repair an insured vehicle to preaccident condition, regardless of the amount the insurer deemed sufficient to do the repairs.
Wednesday, July 10, 2019
SCOVT NOTE ON THE LAW OF PETS
©2009- 2023 Allan R Keyes, Esq., all rights reserved
The finder of a lost dog, by caring for it and sheltering it for over a year, became its rightful owner. Morgan v. Kroupa, 167 Vt. 99 [filed September 5, 1997], noting that courts simply cannot evaluate the “best interests” of an animal.
Town, under dog control ordinance, validly transferred possessory interest in a lost dog to adoptive owners, even though the true owner was known. Lamar v. North Country Animal League, 170 Vt. 115 [filed November 12, 1999], noting that although plaintiffs' action for repossession of the dog and for damages based upon alleged constitutional violations lacks merit, this is not to say that a future case seeking recovery for the emotional distress or other damages resulting from the negligent handling of an impounded animal would be unsuccessful.
Pets are not subject to the law of conversion-- but a horse is. Hegarty v. Addison County Humane Society, 2004 VT 33 [filed April 2, 2004], noting that, in the context of a conversion claim, the property interest in pets is of such a highly qualified nature that it may be limited by overriding public interests.
No damages may be awarded for lost companionship or emotional distress resulting from the wrongful death of a cat. Goodby v. Vetpharm, 2009 VT 52. [filed May 8, 2009] noting that there may be a more appropriate measure of damages for the tangible loss of pets due to the negligence of others based on the particular pet’s value to its owner, beyond simply its value to a stranger in the market.
Cat precedent applies to dogs. Court refuses noneconomic damages for the malicious destruction of pet dog. Scheele v. Dustin, 2010 VT 45 [filed May 21, 2010] noting that pets occupy a legal realm somewhere between chattel and children.
Family Division has no authority to award visitation or joint custody. Welfare of the animal must be considered in final disposition. Hament v. Baker, 2014 VT 39 [filed April 25, 2014] noting that, in contrast to a child, a pet is not subject to a custody award following a determination of its best interests; but that, in awarding the dog to one of the parties the family division may consider the welfare of the animal and the emotional connection between the animal and each spouse.
Liability for dog bite is based on negligence. Martin v. Christman, 2014 VT 55 [filed 13-Jun-2014], reaffirmiing the Court's longstanding rejection of strict liability in dog bite cases, and noting that, with the exception of ultra-hazardous activities such as blasting and keeping dangerous animals, there is no liability without a breach of a duty of care based on the defendant’s conduct.
Landowner had no duty to passing motorist to prevent escape of horse not in his control. Deveneau v. Wielt, 2016 VT 21 [filed March 4, 2016].
Search warrant for dogs was not overbroad in part because the law may provide protection to dogs in their own right “as living, sentient beings.” State v. Sheperd, 2017 VT 39 [filed June 2, 2017].
Although tenant was entitled to an emotional assistance animal, reasonable accommodations did not extend to the specific animal found to be a threat to others. Gill Terrace Retirement Apartments, Inc. v. Johnson, 2017 VT 88 [filed October 6,2017].
Neither landlord nor guest of tenant/dog-owner owed a duty to passerby injured when pit bull escaped because they had no "reason to know" that the dog in question posed an unreasonable risk. Gross v. Turner, 2018 VT 80 [filed August 10, 2018], noting that landlords are not obligated to conduct background checks on tenants’ pets and that a dog’s breed alone is not sufficient to put its owners or others on notice that it poses an unreasonable risk of harm.
Tuesday, July 9, 2019
Pets are not subject to the law of conversion-- but a horse is.
Search warrant for dogs was not overbroad in part because animals are living, sentient beings to which the law may provide protections in their own right
Various laws limit peoples' ownership rights over animals, requiring them to provide a minimum level of care to animals in their possession and prohibiting them from treating animals the same way they might treat true, nonsentient property. See, e.g., 13 V.S.A. §§ 352, 352a (criminalizing cruelty to animals); id. § 386 (prohibiting confinement of animals in motor vehicles when conditions are dangerous, and allowing state agents to remove animals from a vehicle to prevent harm). This special treatment of animals reflects a recognition that animals are living, sentient beings to which the law may provide protections in their own right. Hament, 2014 VT 39, ¶ 8, 196 Vt. 339, 97 A.3d 461.
Monday, July 8, 2019
SCOVT affirms summary judgment that dog control ordinance validly transferred possessory interest in a lost dog to adoptive owners.
MORSE, J. Plaintiffs Chasidy Lamare and Charles Arnold appeal a summary judgment of the Lamoille Superior Court in favor of defendants North Country Animal League, Darcie Fitzgerald, and John and Jane Doe. Plaintiffs raise numerous claims challenging the court's ruling that their possessory interest in a lost dog had been transferred to defendants under the Town of Wolcott's dog control ordinance. We affirm.
Plaintiffs were the co-owners of a five and one-half year old female German Shepard named Billy who was found at large by a couple who brought her to the Lamoille Kennel on June 3, 1997,which in turn gave her up for adoption on July 8, even though on July 7, plaintiffs arrived at the League and identified their dog.
This case, in contrast to Morgan, concerns the rights and responsibilities of a public entity vis a vis the owners of a lost dog and is controlled by state statutes and local ordinances.
In this case we are bound to conclude that the town's actions fully complied with its animal control ordinance and that its ordinance provided ample notice to plaintiffs consistent with state law and due process requirements.
We conclude that the provision of the ordinance authorizing the town to sell or otherwise dispose of the animal in a humane fashion constituted a necessary and essential power under the enabling statute, and therefore did not exceed the town's authority
We also conclude that the qualified right to possession of dogs and the strong public interest in assuring their permanent placement in a suitable environment, amply supports the town's decision to provide for the sale or transfer of impounded dogs if unclaimed after seven days.
Morgan recognized that a dog is an inherently social creature whose “value derives from the animal's relationship with its human companions.” Thus, while municipal shelters or pounds may provide temporary safety for the public and security for the animal, long term residence in such facilities is decidedly not in the public's or the animal's interest.
We note in this regard the several studies cited in the amicus curiae brief of The United States Humane Society which demonstrate that long term confinement is severely detrimental to the health of dogs and a considerable expense to the impounding agency.
The owner of a lost dog may be expected to make reasonable efforts to locate an animal by contacting humane societies and other agencies and checking other public locations where notices may be posted. Only in the limited circumstances where the owner of a lost dog has not complied with the license requirements, and has failed to take the reasonable steps of inquiring with the local pound or checking notices in the town office and other public places, is it possible that an owner will fail to receive notice within the seven-day notice period. The fact that plaintiffs in this case did not take these reasonable steps does not render the ordinance unconstitutional.
We conclude, in sum, that the town's posting of descriptive notices in the town clerk's office, post office, and village store—in conformity with the ordinance—did not deprive plaintiffs of their constitutional right to due process.
The actions of the League in this case was, to say the least, insensitive in its dealings with plaintiffs. Although plaintiffs' action for repossession of the dog and for damages based upon alleged constitutional violations lacks merit, this is not to say that a future case seeking recovery for the emotional distress or other damages resulting from the negligent handling of an impounded animal—a claim not alleged here—would be unsuccessful.
Beth Robinson of Langrock Sperry & Wool, for Amici Curiae the Humane Society of the United States.
SCOVT Note. The Court's suggestion that an action would lie for "the emotional distress or other damages resulting from the negligent handling of an impounded animal" was premature. See Scheele v. Dustin , 2010 VT 45 (affirming judgment denying recovery for emotional damages for the intentional killing of a pet dog); Goodby v. Vetpharm, 2009 VT 52 (denying recovery for lost companionship and emotional distress resulting form death of pets.)
Divided Court affirms ruling that finder of lost dog, by caring for it and sheltering it for over a year, became its rightful owner.
MORSE, Justice. Defendant Zane Kroupa appeals from a judgment awarding possession of a dog named Boy (a/k/a Max) to plaintiff Mary Morgan. We affirm.
Defendant adopted a mixed-breed puppy when it was six to eight weeks old and trained it to be a hunting dog. In July 1994, when the dog was five years old, it broke free of its collar, ran away and became lost. About two weeks later, plaintiff found the and brought it home. Plaintiff took care of the dog and fed and sheltered it. In September 1995, a friend of defendant's told him that he had seen the dog at a house only two miles down the road. Defendant drove to the house, the dog jumped in his truck and defendant left with the animal.
Shortly thereafter, plaintiff brought this action in replevin to recover the dog. The trial court, sitting without a jury, ruled in favor of plaintiff and returned Max to her. The court refused to analogize the case to a child custody case, and inquire into what was in the “best interests” of the dog. The court instead ruled that plaintiff had “substantially compl[ied]” with the lost-property statute and was therefore entitled to possession.
Modern courts have recognized that pets generally do not fit neatly within traditional property law principles. No decision has ever applied the lost-property statutes to any kind of “beast” other than a farm animal of considerable value. Ordinary common law or statutory rules governing lost personal property do not provide a useful framework for resolving disputes over lost pets. Instead, courts must fashion and apply rules that recognize their unique status, and protect the interests of both owner and finder, as well as the public.
However strong the emotional attachments between pets and humans, courts simply cannot evaluate the “best interests” of an animal. When confronted with a case of this nature, therefore, courts should factor practical and policy considerations into any decision. Finders of stray pets should be encouraged to make every reasonable effort to find the animal's owner.Owners of lost pets should be enjoined to undertake reasonable efforts to locate their animals..
Indeed, this was essentially the approach taken by the trial court here. Having found that plaintiff diligently attempted to locate the dog's owner and responsibly sheltered and cared for the animal for over a year, the trial court was clearly within its discretion in awarding possession to plaintiff.
Possession of domestic pets may be, and often is, limited by overriding public interests. In this case, as explained above, the public interest in encouraging finders to care for and shelter lost pets necessarily qualifies the owner's right to possession. Where, as here, the finder of a lost domestic animal diligently attempts to locate its owner and provides care, shelter and companionship to the animal for over a year, a trial court does not abuse its discretion in awarding possession to the finder.
GIBSON, Justice, dissenting. Because I believe that Vermont's lost-property statute, 27 V.S.A. §§ 1101–1110, rejected by the Court herein, outlines the rights and responsibilities of both true owners and finders of stray domesticated animals, including dogs, and that, under the provisions of that statute, Boy (a/k/a Max) should be returned to defendant, I respectfully dissent The statute provides a clear, consistent, and just approach to settling disputes between finders and owners of stray domesticated animals, and includes safeguards to protect pet owners from theft. I am authorized to say that Chief Justice Allen joins in this dissent.
Beth Robinson of Langrock Sperry & Wool, Middlebury, for plaintiff-appellee.
all 85 citing documents
SCOVT NOTE. Morgan is cited in:
- Lamare v. North Country Animal League, 170 Vt. 115 (1999) (possessory interest in a lost dog was validily transfered to adoptive owners under dog control ordinance. "Morgan involved a dispute between private parties and was governed by common law principles. This case, in contrast, concerns the rights and responsibilities of a public entity vis a vis the owners of a lost dog and is controlled by state statutes and local ordinances" )
- Goodby v. Vetpharm, 2009 VT 52 (no damages for lost companionship or emotional distress resulting from wrongful death of a cat. In both Morgan and Lamare, . . ., the dogs at issue remained personal property despite their recognized human attachments, and their intangible value in monetary terms was never considered or addressed.")
- Hegarty v. Addison County Humane Society, 2004 VT 33 (Pets are not subject to the law of conversion-- but a horse is. In Morgan, we explicitly distinguished between pets — dogs, cats, and hamsters — and "agricultural animals with substantial economic value.")
- Scheele v. Dustin, 2010 VT 45 (refusing noneconomic damages for the malicious destruction of pet dog, though "We have noted in the past that categorizing a beloved pet as mere property fails to recognize that such an animal's "worth is not primarily financial[;] ... its value derives from the animal's relationship with its human companions.")
- Hament v. Baker, 2014 VT 39 (Family Division has no authority to award visitation or joint custody of pets, but welfare of the animal must be considered in final disposition. "Like most pets,[a dog's] worth is not primarily financial, but emotional; its value derives from the animal's relationship with its human companions.")
- State v. Sheperd, 2017 VT 39 (Robinson J.) (search warrant for dogs was not overbroad in part because animals are living, sentient beings to which the law may provide protections in their own right. Animals "generally do not fit neatly within traditional property law principles," but instead "occup[y] a special place somewhere in between a person and piece of personal property.")