Father appeals the termination of his parental rights on the grounds that the trial court erred in denying his motion for replacement counsel because his lawyer had a conflict of interest We affirm.
According to father, his lawyer’s prior adoption of a child made the lawyer sympathetic to DCF and unable to provide zealous representation to father, creating a “personal interest” conflict that mandated her removal. Counsel had not represented DCF in the past and had no current or past relationship to DCF beyond counsel’s adoption five years previously of a child who had been in DCF custody. This created no inherent bias that would prevent counsel from adequately representing father, and the findings shown no actual bias.
Vermont Rule of Professional Conduct 1.7. deals with a lawyer’s obligation to avoid concurrent conflicts of interest, including not representing a client when there is a “significant risk” that the representation is “materially limited . . . by a personal interest of the lawyer.” V.R.Pr.C. 1.7(a)(2). We have held that a judge who was an adoptive parent is not disqualified from adjudicating whether adoptees were entitled to disclosure of adoption information. In re Margaret Susan P., 169 Vt. 252, 733 A.2d 38 (1999). We explained “[personal and family circumstances are [not] appropriate considerations on which to presume bias or partiality.” Id. at 256-57, 733 A.2d at 42.
Similarly, here, the simple fact of counsel’s family circumstances without any showing of a current connection to DCF or this case is insufficient reason to presume counsel’s inability to represent father. Moreover, the record supports the trial court’s findings rejecting father’s suggestion that his lawyer’s lacked any zeal in representing him. The court did not abuse its discretion in denying father replacement counsel on this basis.
Vermont Rule of Professional Conduct 1.7. deals with a lawyer’s obligation to avoid concurrent conflicts of interest, including not representing a client when there is a “significant risk” that the representation is “materially limited . . . by a personal interest of the lawyer.” V.R.Pr.C. 1.7(a)(2). We have held that a judge who was an adoptive parent is not disqualified from adjudicating whether adoptees were entitled to disclosure of adoption information. In re Margaret Susan P., 169 Vt. 252, 733 A.2d 38 (1999). We explained “[personal and family circumstances are [not] appropriate considerations on which to presume bias or partiality.” Id. at 256-57, 733 A.2d at 42.
Similarly, here, the simple fact of counsel’s family circumstances without any showing of a current connection to DCF or this case is insufficient reason to presume counsel’s inability to represent father. Moreover, the record supports the trial court’s findings rejecting father’s suggestion that his lawyer’s lacked any zeal in representing him. The court did not abuse its discretion in denying father replacement counsel on this basis.
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