Blanchard v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 2011 VT 85 (mem. )
Plaintiff Paul Blanchard appeals the superior court’s order granting summary judgment to defendants with respect to his toxic tort personal injury action. We affirm.
Plaintiff cannot survive Goodyear’s motion for summary judgment on his toxic tort claim unless he is able to point to evidence suggesting a probability, rather than a mere possibility, that (1) he was exposed to the specified chemical at a level that could have caused his physical condition (general causation); and (2) the exposure to that chemical did in fact result in the condition (specific causation).
Plaintiff proffered evidence indicating that, as a teenager some thirty-five years earlier, he frequently played on a field adjoining the Goodyear plant. A gully that ran across the field may have contained water contaminated by petroleum products containing benzene. Benzene has been associated with non-Hodgkins lymphoma, a general category of cancer under which plaintiff’s subtype falls. Plaintiff’s lymphoma was not caused by an immunodeficiency disorder, a known cause of that type of lymphoma.
Assuming that we accept all of this evidence as true, it falls well short of what plaintiff would be required to show in order to prevail in a jury trial. As we recently explained in Estate of George v. Vermont League of Cities and Towns, epidemiological studies assess the existence and strength of associations between a suspected agent and a disease or condition and thus focus on general causation—whether the agent is capable of causing the disease—rather than specific causation—whether the agent actually caused the disease or condition in a particular individual. 2010 VT 1, ¶ 18. Proof of an association between occupational exposure to benzene and non-Hodgen’s lymphomas is insufficient to support a jury finding of specific causation. The vast majority of cases concerning his type of lymphoma are of unknown origin. Therefore evidence excluding one known cause of plaintiff’s lymphoma does not permit a jury to find more-probable-than-not specific causation.
In the end, plaintiff’s suspicion that his cancer was caused by exposure to benzene on the Goodyear ballfield when he was a teenager is purely speculative.
Plaintiff cannot survive Goodyear’s motion for summary judgment on his toxic tort claim unless he is able to point to evidence suggesting a probability, rather than a mere possibility, that (1) he was exposed to the specified chemical at a level that could have caused his physical condition (general causation); and (2) the exposure to that chemical did in fact result in the condition (specific causation).
Plaintiff proffered evidence indicating that, as a teenager some thirty-five years earlier, he frequently played on a field adjoining the Goodyear plant. A gully that ran across the field may have contained water contaminated by petroleum products containing benzene. Benzene has been associated with non-Hodgkins lymphoma, a general category of cancer under which plaintiff’s subtype falls. Plaintiff’s lymphoma was not caused by an immunodeficiency disorder, a known cause of that type of lymphoma.
Assuming that we accept all of this evidence as true, it falls well short of what plaintiff would be required to show in order to prevail in a jury trial. As we recently explained in Estate of George v. Vermont League of Cities and Towns, epidemiological studies assess the existence and strength of associations between a suspected agent and a disease or condition and thus focus on general causation—whether the agent is capable of causing the disease—rather than specific causation—whether the agent actually caused the disease or condition in a particular individual. 2010 VT 1, ¶ 18. Proof of an association between occupational exposure to benzene and non-Hodgen’s lymphomas is insufficient to support a jury finding of specific causation. The vast majority of cases concerning his type of lymphoma are of unknown origin. Therefore evidence excluding one known cause of plaintiff’s lymphoma does not permit a jury to find more-probable-than-not specific causation.
In the end, plaintiff’s suspicion that his cancer was caused by exposure to benzene on the Goodyear ballfield when he was a teenager is purely speculative.
No comments:
Post a Comment