In re Shenandoah LLC, 2011 VT 68 (Burgess, J.) (Skoglund, J., joined by Justice Dooley dissenting.)
It is well-established that ultimate or conclusory facts and conclusions of law cannot be utilized on a summary-judgment motion. 10 V.S.A. § 6001(14)(A)(iv) presumes parents are “persons,” for jurisdictional purposes “unless the individual establishes that he or she will derive no profit or . . . acquire any other beneficial interest from the partition or division of land by the . . . child”. Appellants' motion for summary judgment provided no information to the court and no actual documentation to support their conclusory statements that they had no “control” over the Trust’s activities and derived no “benefit” from the Trust’s land development activities. We therefore affirm the Environmental Court’s decision that there was no genuine issue of fact as to whether the parents benefited from their children’s trust’s subdivision.
The dissenters agree that the majority that the affidavits contained only “ultimate or conclusory facts and conclusions of law,” but would not affirm summary judgment against the movant, merely because it had not properly supported the motion. The Environmental Court, having found the evidence offered by appellants insufficient for a determination on the material fact in issue, should have simply denied summary judgment. To complicate the matter before the Environmental Court, there was no adversarial party to oppose summary judgment. Instead of requesting further evidence, the court summarily decided the case against the movant, essentially holding that the proffered facts were so lacking as to prove their own negative. Appellants should have been allowed to go forward with their proof.
It is well-established that ultimate or conclusory facts and conclusions of law cannot be utilized on a summary-judgment motion. 10 V.S.A. § 6001(14)(A)(iv) presumes parents are “persons,” for jurisdictional purposes “unless the individual establishes that he or she will derive no profit or . . . acquire any other beneficial interest from the partition or division of land by the . . . child”. Appellants' motion for summary judgment provided no information to the court and no actual documentation to support their conclusory statements that they had no “control” over the Trust’s activities and derived no “benefit” from the Trust’s land development activities. We therefore affirm the Environmental Court’s decision that there was no genuine issue of fact as to whether the parents benefited from their children’s trust’s subdivision.
The dissenters agree that the majority that the affidavits contained only “ultimate or conclusory facts and conclusions of law,” but would not affirm summary judgment against the movant, merely because it had not properly supported the motion. The Environmental Court, having found the evidence offered by appellants insufficient for a determination on the material fact in issue, should have simply denied summary judgment. To complicate the matter before the Environmental Court, there was no adversarial party to oppose summary judgment. Instead of requesting further evidence, the court summarily decided the case against the movant, essentially holding that the proffered facts were so lacking as to prove their own negative. Appellants should have been allowed to go forward with their proof.
No comments:
Post a Comment