Stare decisis: Cat precedent applies to Dogs. Court refuses noneconomic damages for the malicious destruction of pet dog.

Scheele v. Dustin (2009-213) (21-May-2010) 2010 VT 45 (Skoglund, J)

This case asks the Court to decide the proper measure of damages for the loss of a family dog. David Putter, Montpelier, and Heidi Groff for Plaintiffs-Appellants. Plaintiffs appeal from a judgment denying them recovery for emotional damages for the intentional killing of their pet dog, Shadow. Though plaintiffs recovered $155 in economic damages for the destruction of their property, the issue is whether they are entitled to damages for emotional distress or loss of companionship as a result of Shadow’s death. They claim that the real worth of a pet is not merely financial and cannot be measured solely by the replacement value. Thus, they argue, their emotional suffering—the result of defendant’s malicious and intentional acts—warrants noneconomic damages. The Superior Court barred such recovery, holding that Vermont does not recognize noneconomic damages for the malicious destruction of personal property, even when the property is a beloved pet. We affirm.

Last year, in Goodby v. Vetpharm, we addressed a similar case that claims for emotional damages and loss of companionship stemming from alleged negligent or wanton acts resuling in the death of two pet cats. We affirmed the trial court’s denial of the plaintiffs’ request for noneconomic damages, including loss of companionship and emotional distress, on the ground that such damages were unavailable for the destruction of a pet because it is type of personal property. We see no reason to deviate from the sound logic of Goodby. That Goodby, sounded in negligence whereas, here, defendant alleged acted with intent and malice when he shot plaintiffs’ dog is not a distinction that entitles plaintiffs to noneconomic damages for their property loss. Instead, punitive damages are available in instances of an intentional and malicious tort.

The court at (¶ 15) refuses to extend the common law to recognize a new cause of action for the wrongful killing of a pet dog. While this Court has and will “change the common law to meet changing needs of the people of this state,” we also recognize instances where the issue presented “is better left for legislative resolution.” As in Goodby, here "[p]laintiffs fail to demonstrate a compelling reason why, as a matter of public policy, the law should offer broader compensation for the loss of a pet than would be available for the loss of a friend, relative, work animal, heirloom or memento—all of which can be prized beyond measure, but for which this state’s law does not recognize recovery for sentimental loss." 2009 VT 52, ¶ 11

Here we see no principled basis upon which to define categories of applicable harm or recovery. Moreover, when we have chosen in the past to expand the common law, we have recognized that such changes must still fit “within the doctrine of stare decisis.” See Hay v. Med. Ctr. Hosp. of Vt., 145 Vt. 533, 544, 496 A.2d 939, 945 (1985) (quotation omitted). While we do not hew to precedent without regard to the challenges and changing needs of the people of Vermont, we are not persuaded that plaintiffs’ cause requires a major shift in the landscape of the common law, especially coming so close upon the heels of our most recent ruling. Thus, as we stated above, our decision in Goodby and its predecessors continue to guide us today.

In holding with the traditional view that the law recognizes animals as a type of property, we are not blind to the special place they hold in our lives. Indeed, pets occupy a legal realm somewhere between chattel and children. 

Our animal protection statutes today circumscribe minimum standards of care for all animals, now defined as “all living sentient creatures, not human beings,” 13 V.S.A. § 351(1). Thus, under Vermont law, a person would face no criminal charges for ignoring their garden during a hot, dry summer or overloading a bookshelf to the point of collapse. Yet like treatment of a pet or other animal could result in incarceration or thousands of dollars in fines. See 13 V.S.A. § 352(2) & (4); id. § 353 (imposing criminal penalties). Over generations, the Legislature has shaped a complex and comprehensive structure guiding our treatment of animals. This statutory regime lends credence to our position that “[t]he changes plaintiffs request are better presented to the General Assembly,”