Friday, July 27, 2018

SCOVT 2018: Selected Short Topical Summaries © 2018 Allan R. Keyes, Esq., all rights reserved




Appeals. Jurisdiction


John Moyers v. Sheun Lai Poon and Brenda Lee Poon, 2018 VT 27 (after Supreme Court affirms a decision trial court is without subject matter jurisdiction in the absence of an express remand.)

In re Investigation into Programmatic Adjustments to the Standard-Offer Program,2018 VT 52 (dismisses appeal for lack of jurisdiction.)

Caroline S. Lee v. Mark Ogilbee, 2018 VT 96 (reverses in part final divorce order. Approves “Brandeis” brief in appropriate cases to illuminate the social context for a decision, particularly where a decision will have widespread social, economic, or legal considerations)


Beaudoin v. Feldman2018 VT 83 (defendant  preserved his claim for appellate review by complying with V.R.C.P. 50(a) and (b), regardless of whether or not he also objected to the jury instruction on punitive damages.)

Alpine Haven Property Owners' Association, Inc. v. Harry Brewin and Lynette Brewin, 2018 VT 127 (mem.) (denies application for appellate costs as untimely: the time for requesting costs was not tolled by appellant’s motion to reargue)


Arbitration.  

Lesley Adams, William Adams and Adams Construction, VT, LLC v. Russell D. Barr and Barr & Associates, P.C. d/b/a Barr Law Group 2018 VT 12 (affirms denial of motion to vacate arbitration award, because participation in arbitration waived objection to validity of arbitration agreement.)


Attorneys

In re William E. Conner, Esq., 2018 VT 60(mem) (disbarment)


In re Robert Grundstein, 2018 VT 10 (affirms ruling that applicant failed to meet his burden of demonstrating the good moral character necessary for admission to the Vermont bar.)


In re Robert Hamm Moyer, Esq. (Office of Disciplinary Counsel) 2018 VT 29

In re Phyllis McCoy Jacien, Esq., 2018 VT 35 (suspension for failing to file tax return)

Nicola Weaver v. David Weaver, 2018 VT 56 (affirms contempt order re violation of child custody order; questions whether father’s wife is disqualified as attorney under VRPC 3.7 (lawyer cannot be witness) V.RPc 1.8 (lawyer cannot have proprietary interest in case.)


Building Permit.


Chris Khamnei v. Burlington Public Works Commission 2018 VT 19 (affirms superior court affirmance of municipal denial of plumbing permits, holding the statutes require a licensed plumber under the circumstances.)



Civil Procedure.  

Sulaiman J. Jadallah v. Town of Fairfax, Stacy Wells, Gabriel Handy and Sidon Pantry, LLC,
2018 VT 34 (affirms denial of motion to vacate settlement, and grant of summary judgment that claims were time-barred.)

Bonk v. Bonk, 2018 VT 15 (divided Court reverses order modifying parental rights because that issue was not expressly raised by motion and not “tried by express or implied consent of the parties.” V.R.C.P. 15(b).)

Federal National Mortgage Association v. Johnston , 2018 VT 51 (affirms voluntary dismissal by plaintiff, despite “two-dismissal “ rule, because the effect of the dismissal is not ripe until a third action is filed.)

Messier v. Bushman, 2018 VT 93 (reverses "judgment on the pleadings" for failure to serve because the court lacked sufficient evidence to determine whether service was completed)




Sidmond C. Williams & Barbara B. Williams, Co-Trustees v. Town of North Hero, 2018 VT 114 (reverses imposition of a monetary discovery sanction  for lying and obstruction  the disovery process where the sanctioned party was  in compliance with order compelling discovery.)

Common Benefits.


Cheryl J. Brown v. State of Vermont, 2018 VT 1 (affirms grant of summary judgment dismissing constitutional claims, denial of new trial and verdict that Plaintiff had not proven the accident caused any injuries.)

Constitutional Law.

State v. Rebekah S. VanBuren, 2018 VT 95 (divided court grants V.R.A.P.  21 petition for extraordinary relief and concludes revenge porn statute is constitutional on its face.)


State v. Dupuis, 2018 VT 86 (divided Court) (Chapter I, Article 11 of the Vermont Constitution does not permit warrantless search to enforce fish and game regulations, even though “no trespass” postings did not comport with Vermont’s hunting posting statute.)

State v. Rajda2018 VT 72 (Divided Court rules the admission of evidence of a refusal to submit to a blood test in the context of a DUI criminal proceeding does not violate the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.)


State v. Ronald Dupuis, 2018 VT 86 (divided Court affirms suppression under Chapter I, Article 11 of the Vermont Constitution, of fruits of warrantless “open fields” search, despite argument that purpose of search was to enforce fish and game regulations and defendant’s “no trespass” postings did not comport with Vermont’s hunting posting statute.)

State v. Rebekah S. VanBuren, 2018 VT 95 (divided court grants V.R.A.P.  21 petition for extraordinary relief and concludes revenge porn statute is constitutional on its face.)



Consumer Protection


Messier v. Bushman, 2018 VT 93 (affirms dismissal of CPA claims by accident victim against other driver’s liability insurer because victim was not a “consumer” with respect to the insurance policy)

Criminal Law

In re Michael L. Carpenter, 2018 VT 91 (divided Court affirms dismissal of 2d PCR petition)

State v. Hugerth, 2018 VT 89 (mem.) (affirms denial of bail based on 6 year-old’s interview statement)

Kirk Wool v. Andrew Pallito, Commissioner / Bernard Carter v. Lisa Menard, Commissioner’ 2018 VT 63 (affirms summary judgment dismissing claim of ex post facto increase in sentence}

State v. Emily K. St. Peter, 2018 VT 65 (affirms animal cruelty conviction and denial of motion to suppress, because various statutory time limits for veterinary exams were intended to protect animials not defendants)

Mark Clark v. Lisa Menard, Commissioner, 2018 VT 68 (DOC programming decisions are unreviewable.)

Kirk Wool v. Andrew Pallito, Commissioner / Bernard Carter v. Lisa Menard, Commissioner, 2018 VT 63(affirms summary judgment that no ex post facto sentencing violation was proved)

State v. Mitchell Bowen, 2018 VT 87 (reverses conviction for sexual assault because plea colloquy did not comply with Rule 11.)


State v. Walker P. Edelman, 2018 VT 100 (reverses denial of motion to suppress breath test and remand sfor an evidentiary hearing; challenge to voluntariness is not precluded by Vermont’s implied consent law.)

State v. Stuart Lizotte, Jr. 2018 VT 92 (affirms denial of suppression motion claiming Fourth amendment violation  by AOL search of emails for suspected child pornography)

In re Kenneth Barber, Jr., In re Theodore C. Smith, Jr.,In re Danielle M. Rousseau, In re John Burke 2018 VT 78 (affirms cases under  Rule 11(f) where direct review was concluded at the time Bridger was decided.)



Environmental/land use Law

In re Laberge Shooting Range (Firing Range Neighborhood Group, LLC, Appellant), 2018 VT 84 (divided Court affirms E-court jurisdictional ruling that ACT 250 does apply to a family dairy farm that allows the community to target practice on its fields free of charge. ) 


Evidence.

Donald L. Sweet, Jr. and Preston L. Sweet v. Roy A. St. Pierre and Catherine St. Pierre d/b/a Woodlands Farms, 2018 VT 122 (affirms defendant’s judgment under the Prompt Pay Act and exclusion of medical evidence leading to  denial of counterclaim for assault; remands for award of attorney’s fees. The medical records were hearsay. V.R.E. 801 . To the extent that the medical records contained statements about the inception or cause of defendant’s alleged symptoms, such statements of inception or causation are not be admissible under V.R.E. 803(4) even if pertinent to diagnosis or treatment. Also affirms the exclusion of lay testimony that assault was cause of stroke).

Family Law.

Sandra L. Penland (Warren) v. John W. Warren, Jr., 2018 VT 70 (reverses denial of joint motion to modify final property division order; such relief is authorized in limited circumstances under Rule 60.)

Mar-Rae X. Terino v. Thomas F. Bleeks, 2018 VT 77 (reverses in part denial of request to include in divorce decree a mechanism to revisit parent-child contact when the child reached school age.)


Foreclosure sales.


HSBC Bank USA N.A. (Jeffrey C. Riley, Appellant) v. Scott A. McAllister and Eddy Mulder 2018 VT 9 (affirms denial of second highest bidder’s motion to confirm foreclosure sale after court invalidated high bid by bank and ordered new auction.)


People's United Bank, NA v.Alana Provencale, Inc., , 2018 VT 46 (REVERSES order compelling buyer at foreclosure sale to complete the purchase.)


Indemnification. Tort Claims Act.


Katherine Heffernan v. State, 2018 VT 47 (affirms dismissal of indemnification action claiming State is liable for employee’s conduct, because statute ran. Indemnification obligation does not apply to willful misconduct or assault and battery.)


Judgments. Issue Preclusion.

Daiello v. Town of Vernon 2018 VT 17 (reverses summary judgment for defendant based on finding in earlier case, holding issue preclusion does not apply to a finding that was untested on appellate review.)


Jurisdiction. Family.


Taranjit Kaur Maghu v. Prabhjot Singh / Prabhjot Singh v. Taranjit Kaur Maghu, 2018 VT 2 (affirms a final order and decree for the no-fault divorce and denial of motion to dismiss; trial court had jurisdiction to dissolve the party’s marriage, because nonimmigration visa status is not an impediment to establishing Vermont residency for purposes of filing a divorce action.)


Late Appeals.

In re Grievance of Edward Von Turkovich, 2018 VT 57 (affirms denial of motion to enlarge the time to file a notice of appeal; Board did not abuse its discretion in holding that attorney’s failure to notify the Board of his new address was not excusable neglect.)


In re Mahar, 2018 VT 20 (reverses E-Court order dismissing zoning appeal as untimely, and remands to decide whether the exception under V.R.A.P. 4(c) applies because party did not receive notice of judgment.)


In re Mathez Act 250 LU Permit (Sung-Hee Chung, Appellant, 2018 VT 55 (affirms summary judgment to applicant though neighbor did not receive notice of the permit. Limits on existing remedies for lack of notice cannot be evaded by issuing a second notice.)

 In re Laberge Shooting Range (Firing Range Neighborhood Group, LLC, Appellant)2018 VT 84 (Though erroneous advice from counsel alone does not usually satisfy the excusable neglect standard, environmental court was well within its discretion by allowing late appeal based also on advice given by the Coordinator and the ambiguous language printed on the reconsideration decision.)



Mandamus. 



Kirk Wool v. Lisa Menard, Commissioner, Vermont Department of Corrections, 2018 VT 23 (mandamus relief available to inmate challenging official breach of duty to provide low cost phone service.)

Robert A. Skiff, Jr. et al. v. South Burlington School District, 2018 VT 117 (on interlocutory appeal reverses denial of motion to dismiss  -- holding District not on petition required to hold a district wide vote on the  name of athletic teams)




Medical malpractice. Certificate of merit..


Quinlan v. Five-Town Health Alliance, Inc., 2018 VT 53 (affirms dismissal of first action for failure to file certificate of merit and dismissal of second action because statute of limitations not tolled by 12 VSA § 558.)


Professional Regulation


In re Gregory J. Bombardier 2018 VT 11 (affirms OPR decision that engineer engaged in unprofessional conduct.)


Public Employment. 

Adam Hubacz v. The Village of Waterbury, 2018 VT 37 (addresses grounds for termination of a police officer pursuant to 24 V.S.A. § 1931)




Public Labor Relations


Board of School Directors of Washington Supervisory Union v. Cabot Teachers' Assn. and Twinfield Education Assn., 2018 VT 24


Negotiations Committee of Caledonia Central Supervisory Union v. Caledonia Central Education Assn., 2018 VT 18



Public Utility. Solar CPG


In re Petition of Stowe Cady Hill Solar, LLC2018 VT 3 (REVERSES dismissal of application for CPG for solar project; the application meets the completeness requirement as that requirement has been applied in the Commission’s prior decisions.)

In re Petition of LK Holdings, LLC, 2018 VT 109 (affirms dismissal of application for a certificate of public good because applicant failed to provide notice to adjoining landowners)

Punitive Damages.

Beaudoin v. Feldman, 2018 VT 83 (Not every claim of bad faith, conversion, or breach of fiduciary duty warrants a punitive-damages award. The  wrongful, intentional misconduct in this case -- a dispute between businessmen – fell short of the type of truly reprehensible or egregiously awful behavior necessary to support punitive damages)

Beaudoin v. Feldman, 2018 VT 83, ¶ 19 (divided Court affirms judgment on a verdict for conversion of proceeds of sale, breach of  fiduciary duty, and unjust enrichment, but reverses punitive damages.  Not every claim of bad faith, conversion, or breach of fiduciary duty warrants a punitive-damages award. The dispute must result in behavior that is truly reprehensible or egregiously awful. The evidence in this case did not rise to that level.  

Kneebinding, Inc., John Springer-Miller, Tina Springer-Miller and ACL Investments, LLC v. Richard Howell, 2018 VT 101 (affirms among others award of damages for defamation and  judgment on  claim of tortious interference with contract;  reverses the court’s termination of the permanent injunction and  refusal to impose the $7000 stipulated fine for Howell’s violations of the injunction) (ALSO  affirms denial of punitive damages for lack of incidence of  wealth:: “the court’s decision not to impose punitive damages in the absence of evidence about Howell’s finances is consistent with our law. . . . “We have stated that, in assessing punitive damages, the fact-finder must take into account the character and the standing of the party, the malice or wantonness of the party’s conduct, and the party’s financial status.” Faced with no evidence of the latter factor, the trial court reasonably declined to impose punitive damages”) Court does not discuss precedent that  proof of a defendant's actual means or wealth is not essential to the recovery of punitive damages. Shahi v. Madden, 2008 VT 25, 183 Vt. 320949 A.2d 1022In re Estate of Peters171 Vt. 381765 A.2d 468 (2000).


Statute of Frauds

Stonewall of Woodstock Corp. and Accordion, LLC v. Stardust 11TS, LLC and Oliver Block, LLC, 2018 VT 79 (affirms summary judgment for alleged seller who did not sign purchase and sale agreement and  who did not authorize his attorney to sign)

Statute of Limitations.
Clark v. DiStefano, 2018 VT 82 (affirms summary judgment on statute of limitations grounds, holding under 12 V.S.A. § 464, that the UCC statute applies despite longer period in Title 12 for witnessed promissory notes.)

Torts.  


Gross v. Turner, 2018 VT 80 (neither landlord nor guest of tenant/dog-owner had "reason to know” that the dog posed an unreasonable risk and therefore owed no duty to passerby injured when pit bull escaped )

The phrase “reason to know” does not imply a duty to investigate: Restatement (Second) of Torts § 12, cmt. a. Landlords are not obligated to conduct background checks on tenants’ pets. A dog’s breed alone is not sufficient to put its owners or others on notice that it poses an unreasonable risk of harm.

Kuligoski v.Rapoza
, 2018 VT 14 (divided Court affirms summary judgment dismissing claim that out-of-state grandparents were liable for grandson’s assault of worker who was repairing furnace at their rental property, holding as a matter of law that there was no control and therefore no employer-employee relationship between grandparents and father that warranted imposing liability on grandparents for father’s negligent supervision of grandson.)

Keith & Jackie Lorman, Charles & Melissa Gallagher, and Daniel & Alicia Daly v. City of Rutland 2018 VT 64(affirms summary judgment dismissing claims, including takings claims against municipality arising from sewage backups that were “intermittent, limited, and transient.”)

Eric Gross and Adrianne Gross v. Elizabeth Turner and Antonio Flores , 2018 VT 80 (affirms summary judgment that neither landlord nor social guest of tenant/dog owner owed a duty to passerby injured when dog escaped.)

2018 VT 125 (affirms summary judgment that defendant was not liable for death of child who was murdered by stepfather, holding defendant acted reasonably and prudently in his role as a DCF reviewer, and never undertook DCF’s obligation to investigate all potential sources of the child’s injuries.)

Where a plaintiff seeks to use a safety statute as the standard of care under the prima facie negligence rule, there must be an existing duty recognized by the common law. To be an “undertaking” the defendant must have undertaken to do the specific task he or she is accused of performing negligently.There was insufficient  evidence of  a specific undertaking by defendant to broadly investigate the cause of the child’s previous injuries.)



Trusts and Estates
Patricia Hayes v. Allison Hayes, Brian Hayes and LPL Financial, LLC, 2018 VT 102 (affirms IRA beneficiary designation)

Estate of Emil Kuhling by Richard W. Kuhling v. Taylor Glaze,2018 VT 75 (Reverses  award to the Estate and remands to the trial court to enter judgment,  concluding  that there was no breach of any fiduciary duty by decedent’s niece regarding the sale of a house, because settlor consented to self-dealing)

Bonnie L. Avery v. Estate of Allen D. Avery, 2018 VT 59 (affirms ruling that children’s share of the personalty should contribute to estate’s administrative expenses only if spouse’s share of the personalty is insufficient)

Estate of Emil Kuhling by Richard W. Kuhling v. Taylor Glaze,2018 VT 75 (Reverses  award to the Estate and remands to the trial court to enter judgment,  concluding  that there was no breach of any fiduciary duty by decedent’s niece regarding the sale of a house, because settlor consented to self-dealing)


Patricia Hayes v. Allison Hayes, Brian Hayes and LPL Financial, LLC, 2018 VT 102 (affirms IRA beneficiary designation)

Unemployment. 

Lionel Beasley v. Department of Labor (Champlain College, Inc., Employer), 2018 VT 104 (affirms denial of unemployment benefits because under § 1343(c)(1), benefits are unavailable to adjunct professors “during the period between two successive academic years or terms . . . if there is a contract or reasonable assurance that such individual will perform services in any such capacity for any educational institution in the second of such academic years or terms.”)

Jason Lillie v. Department of Labor, 2018 VT 66(worker not eligible for unemployment because he did not earn wages while receiving workers compensation l disability )




Workers Compensation


Catherine Lyons v. Chittenden Central Supervisory Union, 2018 VT 26 (divided Court holds student teacher qualifies for Workers compensation benefits.)


Joanne Perrault v. Chittenden County Transportation Authority,2018 VT 58 (affirms summary judgment denying Workers compensation benefits , because claimant did not receive wages)

Ira Martel v. Connor Contracting, Inc., Jason Clark, and Stephen Connor, 2018 VT 107(splintered Court disagrees on whether to apply substantial-certainty standard or  stricter specific-intent test, affirms summary judgment dismissing on exclusivity grounds tort claims against employer and against  fellow employees acting within scope of a nondelegable corporate duty; disabling safety equipment does not support inference of specific intent to injure). 

SCOVT affirms grant of summary judgment dismissing constitutional claims, denial of new trial and verdict that Plaintiff had not proven the accident caused any injuries. No common benefit interest in criminal prosecution of third party.

Cheryl J. Brown v. State of Vermont, 2018 VT 1 [filed1/12/2018]

EATON, J. Cheryl Brown appeals from a jury verdict finding the State responsible for a motor vehicle accident, but also finding Brown had not proven any resulting injuries and thus was not entitled to any damages. Brown alleges several errors in pre-trial and trial rulings, as well as in the failure to grant her a new trial. We affirm

Before trial, the court granted the State’s motion for partial summary judgment, dismissing Brown’s constitutional claims. The Court dismissed the due process and equal protection claims under the United States Constitution on the basis that Brown had only sued the State, and not Denis personally, and that the State was not a “person” for claims arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Because Brown’s suit was against the State, and because, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a state is not a “person,” as is required to maintain the claim, summary judgment for the State was proper on her equal protection and due process claims.

The court further ruled that Brown lacked standing to assert any claim based on the State’s failure to prosecute Denis. The court also dismissed the Common Benefits Clause claim because Brown lacked any cognizable interest in the prosecution or discipline of Denis and because her ability to file suit against the State as a result of the accident showed her due process rights were not impeded.

The Common Benefits Clause of the Vermont Constitution and the federal Equal Protection Clause differ markedly in language, historical origin, purpose, and development. The purpose of the Common Benefits Clause is to ensure that protections conferred by the State are for “the common benefit of the community” and not just a part of the community. Any potential constitutional tort claim based on a violation of Article 7.3 “must show the denial of a common benefit” due to “disparate and arbitrary treatment when compared to others similarly situated.” Id.

There is no deprivation of a common benefit because Brown has no legally cognizable interest in the prosecution of Denis, or any criminal or disciplinary consequences that may ensue. Summary judgment for the State was proper on Brown’s Common Benefits claim.







SCOVT reverses denial of joint motion to modify final property division order; such relief is authorized in limited circumstances under Rule 60

Sandra L. Penland (Warren) v. John W. Warren, Jr., 2018 VT 70 

REIBER, C.J. Husband appeals the trial court’s denial of husband and wife’s joint motion to modify their final divorce order. The issue in this case is whether the trial court has jurisdiction under Vermont Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6) to modify a property-division order based on the agreement of the parties after the divorce order has become absolute. We hold the court does have jurisdiction, and accordingly we reverse and remand.

The court declined to exercise its discretion because  it found, as a matter of law, that it lacked jurisdiction to modify the property division. Whether the court has authority to exercise its discretion is a legal issue that we review de novo.

Under Rule 60(b), “the court may relieve a party . . . from a final judgment, order, or proceeding” for several enumerated reasons, such as mistake, V.R.C.P. 60(b)(1), and fraud, V.R.C.P. 60(b)(3). Rule 60(b)(6) authorizes relief for “any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.” The subsection is available only where the other criteria under Rule 60(b) do not apply.

Rule 60(b)(6) is available and appropriately used to provide relief from a final property-division order where “extraordinary circumstances” justify relief “to prevent hardship or injustice.” Wilson v. Wilson, 2011 VT 133, ¶ 5, 191 Vt. 560, 38 A.3d 50 (mem.) (quotations omitted). This opportunity for relief applies to final property divisions in divorce orders as it does to other final orders and judgments. See id. ¶¶ 5-6 (affirming that court can modify divorce order under Rule 60(b)(6) only if there are “unusual circumstances” that “would warrant relief from a judgment generally” (quotations omitted))

In considering whether such circumstances exist here, the court should note that the parties have agreed to a stipulated modification. This is not a situation where one or both parties seek to continue litigation past its end. See Richwagen, 153 Vt. at 4, 568 A.2d at 421 (stating “the grounds for relief authorized under Rule 60(b)(6) are broad” but limited by need for “certainty and finality of judgments so that litigation can reach an end”). Rather, this situation is an attempt to respond in a mutually beneficial way to emerging circumstances. Although the court has discretion to decline to accept a stipulated modification, it is more likely that modification under Rule 60(b)(6) is appropriate where the parties have stipulated to an agreement.



SCOVT affirms denial of motion to vacate arbitration award, because participation in arbitration waived objection to validity of arbitration agreement.

Adams v. Barr, 2018 VT 12 [filed February 2, 2018]

ROBINSON, J. The critical question in this case is whether a party who participates extensively and without objection in an arbitration proceeding for nearly seven months prior to the actual arbitration hearing waives an objection to the validity of the arbitration agreement. Lesley Adams, William Adams, and Adams Construction VT, LLC (collectively Adams Construction) appeal the trial court’s denial of their application to vacate an arbitration award in favor of Russell Barr and the Barr Law Group (collectively Barr Law Group) and against Adams Construction. Because we conclude that Adams Construction waived its challenge to the validity of the arbitration agreement, we affirm

SCOVT dismisses appeal seeking advisory opinion.

In re Investigation into Programmatic Adjustments to the Standard-Offer Program,2018 VT 52 [filed 5/11/2018

REIBER, C.J. Appellant Renewable Energy Vermont (REV) asks this Court to reverse and remand an order of the Vermont Public Utility Commission1 that altered technology allocations in the standard-offer program for renewable energy projects. We conclude that REV seeks an advisory opinion and therefore dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

“It is the tradition of constitutional common law that the establishment of legal doctrine derives from the decision of actual disputes, not from the giving of solicited legal advice in anticipation of issues.” Wood v. Wood, 135 Vt. 119, 121, 370 A.2d 191, 192 (1977). In other words, “ ‘courts are not instituted to render advisory opinions.’ ” Baker v. Town of Goshen, 169 Vt. 145, 151, 730 A.2d 592, 596 (1999) (quoting In 8 re Constitutionality of House Bill 88, 115 Vt. at 529, 64 A.2d at 172). The issues raised by REV are premature, and we therefore lack jurisdiction to consider them. See id. at 152, 730 A.2d at 597 (dismissing appeal that sought impermissible advisory opinion).

After Supreme Court affirms a decision trial court is without subject matter jurisdiction in the absence of an express remand.

John Moyers v. Sheun Lai Poon and Brenda Lee Poon, 2018 VT 27 [filed 3/9/2018]

EATON, J. Following a decision from a three-justice panel of this Court issued on June 26, 2017, * involving these parties and this litigation and affirming a final judgment order, the civil division attempted to conduct further hearings as if the matter had been remanded. The Poons challenged continuation of the litigation by the trial court, asserting that, in the absence of an express remand from the Supreme Court in the June 26th decision, the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to conduct further hearings. The trial court denied the motion and the Poons were granted permission by the Supreme Court to appeal the denial on an interlocutory basis. We reverse.

In the June 26th decision, this court affirmed the trial court’s decision in all respects except for the grant of injunctive relief, which was stricken. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.”). In the absence of a finding that the Poons had trespassed, we held there was no entitlement to an injunction. Id. at *5-6. The court did not remand the case to the trial court for determination of trespass. Id.

We have long recognized that unless a remand is ordered when the final judgment or decree is entered in the Supreme Court, the lower court is without jurisdiction to consider the case further. Turner v. Bragg, 114 Vt. 334, 336, 44 A.2d 548, 549 (1945). If Moyers felt a remand was necessary to consider the trespass claim, his remedy was to file for reargument seeking a remand to the trial court. He did not do so. To proceed as he did, by filing a motion in the trial court where there had been no remand, ignores the finality of Supreme Court decisions “It is the rule that a mandate or an order of remand is necessary to reinvest the lower court with jurisdiction to proceed with the case.” Sanders v. Loyd, 364 S.W.2d 369, 371 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1960). ¶ 10. trial court is without jurisdiction to consider the instant case further and the motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction should have been granted. The judgment rendered June 26th by this Court, which did not include a remand, was final.

SCOVT affirms summary judgment to applicant though neighbor did not receive notice of the permit. Limits on existing remedies for lack of notice cannot be evaded by issuing a second notice.

In re Mathez Act 250 LU Permit (Sung-Hee Chung, Appellant) 2018 VT 55 [filed 5/25/2018]

REIBER, C.J. Sung-Hee Chung (neighbor) appeals the Environmental Division’s grant of summary judgment to Lori and Richard Mathez (applicants). The appeal concerns whether the District Commission exceeded its authority by issuing a second notice for a final Act 250 permit when, due to applicants’ failure, neighbor did not receive notice of the permit before it became final, and neighbor failed to timely appeal. We affirm.

The issue is whether the Commission has the authority to issue a second notice of a permit after it has become final and which no one challenged or appealed. Without deciding whether a District Commission ever at any time has authority to issue a second notice of a permit, we conclude that the Commission did not have that authority here.

The Commission does not have open-ended authority to change a permit or grant an aggrieved party unlimited opportunity to appeal.

Rule 31, which grants the Commission authority to alter a permit, authorizes the Commission to act on its own motion only within thirty days of when the permit issued, and only with respect to “manifest error, mistakes, and typographical errors and omissions.” Act 250 Rules, Rule 31(A)(4).

As for an appeal, an aggrieved person must file a notice of appeal within thirty days of when the permit issued. V.R.A.P. 4(a)(1). Otherwise, the person cannot appeal unless the court grants an extension of time to appeal, V.R.A.P. 4(d), or the court reopens the time to appeal, V.R.A.P. 4(c).

An extension of time must be requested within thirty days of the initial period of appeal, and the appellant must show “excusable neglect or good cause.” V.R.A.P. 4(d)(1). To reopen an appeal, the appellant must file within ninety days of the decision appealed or within fourteen days of receiving notice, whichever is earlier, and she or he must show lack of required notice and no prejudice to any party. V.R.A.P. 4(c); see, e.g., In re 7 Mahar Conditional Use Permit, 2018 VT 20, ¶¶ 19-22.,

No one employed any of these opportunities here. Having failed to appeal through an authorized procedure, neighbor cannot now appeal the permit through this alternative second-notice process.

As we explained in Mahar, to protect and balance competing interests, procedural rules set deadlines and specific exemptions to those deadlines. See V.R.A.P § 4(c) and (d). “To ensure fairness, the procedural rules provide avenues to extend or reopen the appeal period for various reasons, including when individuals do not receive proper notice of the judgment they seek to appeal.” Mahar, 2018 VT 20, ¶ 16. In this case the existing procedural rules already set the balance between finality and fairness.

The District Commission is limited by the applicable statutes and rules and cannot create an alternative mechanism for review. The compelling fact of neighbor’s lack of notice is not in itself enough to allow a final permit to be reopened.

SCOVT affirms denial of motion to enlarge the time to file a notice of appeal; Board did not abuse its discretion in holding that attorney’s failure to notify the Board of his new address was not excusable neglect.

In re Grievance of Edward Von Turkovich, 2018 VT 57 [filed 5/25/2018]

REIBER, C.J. Grievant Edward von Turkovich appeals the decision of the Vermont Labor Relations Board denying his motion to enlarge the time for him to file a notice of appeal. We affirm.

After filing a grievance with the Board on behalf of employee and opposing the employer’s motion to dismiss, employee’s attorney moved his office, notifying the Post Office of his new address —but not the Board, required by Board rules. The Board sent its decision dismissing the grievance to the attorney, return-receipt-requested. The Post Office sent it back to the Board with the attorney’s new address. By the time the attorney got the decision, more than 30 days had passed since the dismissal.

Because the attorney failed to update his mailing address with the Board in a timely manner, grievant did not receive notice of the Board’s order within the thirty-day appeals window. Applying the Pioneer test articulated by the United States Supreme Court, we agree with the Board that the factors of delay, prejudice, and good faith weigh in favor of grievant. But our primary focus must be the reason for the delay. The delayed notice was within attorney’s control and is analogous to a breakdown in internal office procedures, which we repeatedly have found is not excusable neglect.

SCOVT affirms summary judgment dismissing claims, including takings claims against municipality arising from sewage backups that were “intermittent, limited, and transient.”

Lorman v. City of Rutland, 2018 VT 64 [filed 6/29/2018]

REIBER, C.J. Plaintiffs sought relief from the City of Rutland after suffering sewage backups in their homes. The trial court granted summary judgment to the City, concluding that plaintiffs failed to adequately support their negligence, nuisance, trespass, and constitutional takings claims. Plaintiffs appeal, arguing that they produced sufficient evidence to survive summary judgment. We affirm the court’s decision

Plaintiffs suggest that a taking has occurred, citing Winn v. Vill. of Rutland, 52 Vt. 481, 494-95  (1880) (stating that village authorities had no “right to make the lands of the plaintiff a place of deposit for the sewage of the village, creating there a cesspool and nuisance, and endangering the lives of the plaintiff and his family, without first making compensation therefor,” and “[s]uch use of the plaintiff’s lands amounts to a taking of his land within the purview of the constitutional requirement that compensation shall be made”)

The City is not immune from takings claims. For a property loss to be compensable as a taking, the government must “intend[] to invade a protected property interest or the asserted invasion [must be] the direct, natural, or probable result of an authorized activity and not the incidental or consequential injury inflicted by the action.” Ondovchik Family 21 Ltd. P’ship, 2010 VT 35, ¶ 16

Although temporary, repeated incursions can sometimes rise to the level of a taking, the incursions must “amount to the taking of an easement. When the intrusion is limited and transient in nature and occurs for legitimate governmental reasons, it does not amount to a taking. Ondovchik, 2010 VT 35, ¶ 18 To the extent that we suggested otherwise in Winn v. Vill. of Rutland, 52 Vt. 481, 491-93 (1880), that suggestion is no longer good law

The undisputed facts here show that the sewage backups on plaintiffs’ property have been intermittent, limited, and transient. The Gallaghers have had one backup since 2007 and the Lormans have had two. The Dalys have had five backups between 1983 and 2014 with the closest backups occurring four years apart. While no backup is insignificant, the backups occurred intermittently over a long period of time, and we conclude that this does not suffice to show a taking under the law. Based on the undisputed facts, the City was entitled to summary judgment on this claim.

Divided Court rules the admission of evidence of a refusal to submit to a blood test in the context of a DUI criminal proceeding does not violate the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.

State v. Rajda, 2018 VT 72 [filed July 20, 2018]

REIBER, C.J. In the above consolidated cases, the State appeals the trial court’s interlocutory orders granting defendants’ motions in limine seeking to suppress evidence of their refusal to submit to blood tests to determine if they were operating a motor vehicle under the influence of drugs (DUI). The trial court granted the motions in limine based on Birchfield v. North Dakota, ___ U.S. ___, 136 S. Ct. 2160 (2016). The State challenges the trial court’s interpretation of Birchfield, arguing that the U.S. Supreme Court indicated therein that evidence of a refusal to take a warrantless blood test in the context of a DUI arrest and prosecution could be admitted at trial as evidence of guilt. Defendants respond that the constitutional issue has been effectively mooted by a post-Birchfield amendment to Vermont’s implied consent law and that, in any event, the trial court correctly construed Birchfield and other related federal law to prohibit the admission of evidence of a refusal to consent to a warrantless blood test.

We conclude that the amendment to the implied consent law did not moot the constitutional issue before us. We further conclude that Fourth Amendment does not prohibit admitting in a criminal DUI proceeding evidence of a defendant’s refusal to submit to a warrantless blood test requested pursuant to Vermont’s implied consent law. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s decisions granting defendants’ motions in limine and remand the cases for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.


ROBINSON J., dissenting. I would dismiss these appeals as moot.. I am authorized to state that Judge Davenport joins this dissent.