Mandatory retirement age constitutional

Badgley and Whitney v. Walton and Sleeper, Commissioners (2008-385) (02-Jul-2010) 2010 VT 68 (Dooley, J.)(Johnson, J., dissenting)
Plaintiffs appeal the Superior Court’s dismissal of their claim that the mandatory retirement of public safety officers violates the Common Benefits Clause of Chapter I, Article 7 of the Vermont Constitution. We decide that the mandatory retirement line currently drawn by the Legislature bears a reasonable and just relation to a legitimate state interest, and for that reason, we find no violation of the Common Benefits Clause of Chapter I, Article 7 of the Vermont Constitution. Affirmed.

The Common Benefits Clause of the Vermont Constitution provides, in pertinent part, “[t]hat government is, or ought to be, instituted for the common benefit, protection, and security of the people, nation, or community, and not for the particular emolument or advantage of any single person, family, or set of persons, who are a part only of that community.” Vt. Const. ch. I, art. 7. In Baker, 170 Vt. at 202-11, 744 A.2d at 869-77, we explained the relevant inquiry as follows:

We must ultimately ascertain whether the omission of a part of the community from the benefit, protection and security of the challenged law bears a reasonable and just relation to the governmental purpose. [F]actors to be considered in this determination may include: (1) the significance of the benefits and protections of the challenged law; (2) whether the omission of members of the community from the benefits and protections of the challenged law promotes the government’s stated goals; and (3) whether the classification is significantly underinclusive or overinclusive.
Id. at 212-14, 744 A.2d at 878-79. We accord deference to “legislation having any reasonable relation to a legitimate public purpose.” Id. at 204, 744 A.2d at 871-72.

Plaintiffs’ main arguments involve the third factor: whether the classification is overinclusive or underinclusive. Based on testimony of defendants’ witness, the trial court found that, because of the interdependent nature of police work, even a low percentage of police with unacceptable performance abilities significantly impairs the Department’s ability to perform its mission. If one member of a team cannot perform as required, the entire team cannot perform as required. Given the trial court’s findings and conclusions and the evidence on which they rest, we cannot conclude, that the mandatory retirement law is so overinclusive that it violates the Common Benefits Clause as a matter of law.

In reaching this conclusion, we specifically reject the dissent’s argument that when “substantial evidence from qualified experts is adduced against [the law], . . . the [State] has the burden of meeting it fairly and refuting it.” The dissent’s rule would nullify legislative fact-finding whenever the Court finds that the challenger’s expert witness is more persuasive than that put forward by the State. It would mean that no deference would be given to the Legislature’s policy choice, nor to the Legislature’s own analysis of the factual circumstances that necessarily occurred during the enactment process. \The dissent would wrongly strike down a Vermont statute based solely on the testimony of an expert witness.

Johnson, J., dissenting: This is the 21st century. This is the United States of America. This is Vermont. Nobody should lose their job because they have a birthday and because of no other reason. The mandatory retirement of fit, experienced, and capable state police officers, solely because of their age, is plainly unconstitutional under settled precedent of this Court. The law violates the guiding principle of the Common Benefits Clause to safeguard the rights and liberties of all Vermonters. Today’s decision makes our Common Benefits jurisprudence, not rigorous and principled as it ought to be, but merely idiosyncratic.