MORSE, Justice. Defendant Zane Kroupa appeals from a judgment awarding possession of a dog named Boy (a/k/a Max) to plaintiff Mary Morgan. We affirm.
Defendant adopted a mixed-breed puppy when it was six to eight weeks old and trained it to be a hunting dog. In July 1994, when the dog was five years old, it broke free of its collar, ran away and became lost. About two weeks later, plaintiff found the and brought it home. Plaintiff took care of the dog and fed and sheltered it. In September 1995, a friend of defendant's told him that he had seen the dog at a house only two miles down the road. Defendant drove to the house, the dog jumped in his truck and defendant left with the animal.
Shortly thereafter, plaintiff brought this action in replevin to recover the dog. The trial court, sitting without a jury, ruled in favor of plaintiff and returned Max to her. The court refused to analogize the case to a child custody case, and inquire into what was in the “best interests” of the dog. The court instead ruled that plaintiff had “substantially compl[ied]” with the lost-property statute and was therefore entitled to possession.
Modern courts have recognized that pets generally do not fit neatly within traditional property law principles. No decision has ever applied the lost-property statutes to any kind of “beast” other than a farm animal of considerable value. Ordinary common law or statutory rules governing lost personal property do not provide a useful framework for resolving disputes over lost pets. Instead, courts must fashion and apply rules that recognize their unique status, and protect the interests of both owner and finder, as well as the public.
However strong the emotional attachments between pets and humans, courts simply cannot evaluate the “best interests” of an animal. When confronted with a case of this nature, therefore, courts should factor practical and policy considerations into any decision. Finders of stray pets should be encouraged to make every reasonable effort to find the animal's owner.Owners of lost pets should be enjoined to undertake reasonable efforts to locate their animals..
Indeed, this was essentially the approach taken by the trial court here. Having found that plaintiff diligently attempted to locate the dog's owner and responsibly sheltered and cared for the animal for over a year, the trial court was clearly within its discretion in awarding possession to plaintiff.
Possession of domestic pets may be, and often is, limited by overriding public interests. In this case, as explained above, the public interest in encouraging finders to care for and shelter lost pets necessarily qualifies the owner's right to possession. Where, as here, the finder of a lost domestic animal diligently attempts to locate its owner and provides care, shelter and companionship to the animal for over a year, a trial court does not abuse its discretion in awarding possession to the finder.
GIBSON, Justice, dissenting. Because I believe that Vermont's lost-property statute, 27 V.S.A. §§ 1101–1110, rejected by the Court herein, outlines the rights and responsibilities of both true owners and finders of stray domesticated animals, including dogs, and that, under the provisions of that statute, Boy (a/k/a Max) should be returned to defendant, I respectfully dissent The statute provides a clear, consistent, and just approach to settling disputes between finders and owners of stray domesticated animals, and includes safeguards to protect pet owners from theft. I am authorized to say that Chief Justice Allen joins in this dissent.
Beth Robinson of Langrock Sperry & Wool, Middlebury, for plaintiff-appellee.
all 85 citing documents
SCOVT NOTE. Morgan is cited in:
- Lamare v. North Country Animal League, 170 Vt. 115 (1999) (possessory interest in a lost dog was validily transfered to adoptive owners under dog control ordinance. "Morgan involved a dispute between private parties and was governed by common law principles. This case, in contrast, concerns the rights and responsibilities of a public entity vis a vis the owners of a lost dog and is controlled by state statutes and local ordinances" )
- Goodby v. Vetpharm, 2009 VT 52 (no damages for lost companionship or emotional distress resulting from wrongful death of a cat. In both Morgan and Lamare, . . ., the dogs at issue remained personal property despite their recognized human attachments, and their intangible value in monetary terms was never considered or addressed.")
- Hegarty v. Addison County Humane Society, 2004 VT 33 (Pets are not subject to the law of conversion-- but a horse is. In Morgan, we explicitly distinguished between pets — dogs, cats, and hamsters — and "agricultural animals with substantial economic value.")
- Scheele v. Dustin, 2010 VT 45 (refusing noneconomic damages for the malicious destruction of pet dog, though "We have noted in the past that categorizing a beloved pet as mere property fails to recognize that such an animal's "worth is not primarily financial[;] ... its value derives from the animal's relationship with its human companions.")
- Hament v. Baker, 2014 VT 39 (Family Division has no authority to award visitation or joint custody of pets, but welfare of the animal must be considered in final disposition. "Like most pets,[a dog's] worth is not primarily financial, but emotional; its value derives from the animal's relationship with its human companions.")
- State v. Sheperd, 2017 VT 39 (Robinson J.) (search warrant for dogs was not overbroad in part because animals are living, sentient beings to which the law may provide protections in their own right. Animals "generally do not fit neatly within traditional property law principles," but instead "occup[y] a special place somewhere in between a person and piece of personal property.")
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