SKOGLUND, J. In this case, K.A.-- a twelve-year-old, middle-school boy -- committed inappropriate acts outside his school, and was adjudged delinquent under a statute prohibiting lewd acts. We reverse because K.A.'s acts do not constitute a crime under the statute under which he was charged.
The trial court entered an adjudication of delinquency on a charge of an attempted lewd act under 13 V.S.A. § 2632(a)(8), finding that the evidence showed that K.A. attempted to engage in a lewd act by trying to put his hands down S.K.'s pants against her will.
Section 2632(a)(8) is located in a subchapter governing prostitution and provides that "[a] person shall not: . . . [e]ngage in prostitution, lewdness or assignation." The legislative history and organization of Chapter 59 lead inescapably to the conclusion that Subchapter 2 specifically governs the procurement or solicitation of a person for the purpose of prostitution. It follows that § 2632(a)(8) prohibits only procuring or soliciting a person for lewd acts relating to prostitution.
Because the legislative history and text of the statute demonstrate that § 2632 was intended to proscribe "lewd" acts relating to prostitution, it was plain error to charge the unwelcome touching on the playground as an act of prostitution. The charge against K.A. fails for insufficient evidence that his actions were an attempt to engage in a lewd act of prostitution.
K.A. did not commit a delinquent act of prostitution. The judgment of delinquency is reversed.
Because the legislative history and text of the statute demonstrate that § 2632 was intended to proscribe "lewd" acts relating to prostitution, it was plain error to charge the unwelcome touching on the playground as an act of prostitution. The charge against K.A. fails for insufficient evidence that his actions were an attempt to engage in a lewd act of prostitution.
K.A. did not commit a delinquent act of prostitution. The judgment of delinquency is reversed.
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