REIBER, C.J. The questions presented by this pro se appeal by decedent's daughters are 1) whether, in distributing the proceeds of a wrongful-death settlement to the decedent’s spouse and children, the trial court was bound by the provisions of an earlier settlement distribution, and, 2) if not, whether the court erred in curtailing an evidentiary hearing to divide the settlement in proportion to the pecuniary injuries suffered. We hold that that the trial court correctly concluded that it was not bound by the prior order, but erred in limiting the evidentiary hearing. Accordingly, we reverse and remand.
At the time of his death, decedent had had six daughters and had been married for about eight months to his wife Maria who was pregnant with the couple's first child Roger. Maria was appointed to serve as the administrator of the estate, and petitioned the superior court under 14 V.S.A. § 1492(c) to distribute settlement proceeds that totaled about $135,000.
The statute provides "[s]uch distribution, whether of the proceeds of a settlement or of an action, shall be in proportion to the pecuniary injuries suffered, the proportions to be determined . . . in such manner as the superior court . . . shall deem proper and after a hearing at such at such time as the court or judge may direct, upon application made by such personal representative or by the wife, husband or any next of kin." 14 V.S.A. § 1492(c).
Following an evidentiary hearing, the court issued a written ruling in awarding $100,000 to Maria and Roger, $25,000 to a minor daugher, Melissan, with the "primary goal of conserving as much as possible of this asset for Melissan's college or other educational expenses", and $2,500 each to the remaining adult daughters, noting that none of the daughters could have realistically expected any significant financial assistance from decedent.
Five years later, Maria again petitioned the court for a distribution of additional settlement proceeds of about $205,000. The petition stated that the beneficiaries had agreed to receive the same proportion of the new settlement that they had received under the first. The court approved the stipulated distribution.
Another five years later Maria filed a third petition for distribution of an additional $204,000 settlement. She proposed to distribute the money using the same percentage formula as the second distribution, with one exception for Melissan, who had come of age.
The matter was contested. The court ruled that it was not bound by the prior distributions in the current proceeding and set the matter for a new hearing in order to determine the division of the proceeds from the settlement. After taking some testimony the court adjourn the hearing and later issued a written ruling explaining that it had concluded further evidence was unnecessary.
The trial court was correct, therefore, in concluding that a fair apportionment of the third settlement should be measured, in part, by the parties' current circumstances. This was reflected in its decision to reduce Melissan's percentage based on the fact that she was no longer a minor.
We conclude however that the trial court erred in failing to apply this principle consistently to the other beneficiaries or the proceeding as a whole when it ultimately ruled that further evidence was unnecessary.and t that it would not "revisit[ ]" the 2004 finding that the daughters could not have reasonably expected much financial assistance from their father, Although the finding that decedent—while he was alive—had never been able to provide a great deal for his daughters in material terms certainly remained true, it did not compel the conclusion that 1.88% of the third settlement was all they could ever reasonably expect, or all that decedent would ever want them to have, upon his death.
We conclude, accordingly, that the trial court erred in restricting the daughters’ introduction of additional evidence relevant to the distribution of the third settlement in proportion to the injuries from their loss, and therefore reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with the views expressed herein.
ROBINSON, J., dissenting. Under Vermont’s statute governing wrongful death actions, damages are determined “with reference to the pecuniary injuries” of the surviving spouse and next of kin, and are distributed among them in proportion to their respective injuries. 12 14 V.S.A. § 1492(b). The determination of the wrongful-death-act beneficiaries’ pecuniary injuries is ultimately one of fact. For that reason, when a court adjudicates the amount of the damages awardable to the personal representative of the beneficiaries on account of a wrongful death, or the relative proportion of those damages to be allocated to each of the respective statutory beneficiaries, that determination is an adjudicated fact that has preclusive effect in subsequent actions when the criteria for collateral estoppel are satisfied.
Another five years later Maria filed a third petition for distribution of an additional $204,000 settlement. She proposed to distribute the money using the same percentage formula as the second distribution, with one exception for Melissan, who had come of age.
The matter was contested. The court ruled that it was not bound by the prior distributions in the current proceeding and set the matter for a new hearing in order to determine the division of the proceeds from the settlement. After taking some testimony the court adjourn the hearing and later issued a written ruling explaining that it had concluded further evidence was unnecessary.
The court awarded 1.88% of the settlement funds to each of decedent's daughters, and the balance of 88.72%, to Maria on behalf of herself and Roger.
On appeal, daughters contend the trial court was collaterally estopped from reducing Melissan's share of the third settlement.
On appeal, daughters contend the trial court was collaterally estopped from reducing Melissan's share of the third settlement.
This argument is unpersuasive. Successive distributions—even in the same case—may reflect entirely different "equities" and "expectations" depending upon the ages of the beneficiaries at the time, their economic circumstances and needs, previous awards received, and the amount available for distribution. \ Each of the three distribution petitions at roughly five-year intervals presented, by definition, a separate issue for the court to determine a fair and equitable distribution of each settlement in light of the circumstances then presented.
The trial court was correct, therefore, in concluding that a fair apportionment of the third settlement should be measured, in part, by the parties' current circumstances. This was reflected in its decision to reduce Melissan's percentage based on the fact that she was no longer a minor.
We conclude however that the trial court erred in failing to apply this principle consistently to the other beneficiaries or the proceeding as a whole when it ultimately ruled that further evidence was unnecessary.and t that it would not "revisit[ ]" the 2004 finding that the daughters could not have reasonably expected much financial assistance from their father, Although the finding that decedent—while he was alive—had never been able to provide a great deal for his daughters in material terms certainly remained true, it did not compel the conclusion that 1.88% of the third settlement was all they could ever reasonably expect, or all that decedent would ever want them to have, upon his death.
We conclude, accordingly, that the trial court erred in restricting the daughters’ introduction of additional evidence relevant to the distribution of the third settlement in proportion to the injuries from their loss, and therefore reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with the views expressed herein.
ROBINSON, J., dissenting. Under Vermont’s statute governing wrongful death actions, damages are determined “with reference to the pecuniary injuries” of the surviving spouse and next of kin, and are distributed among them in proportion to their respective injuries. 12 14 V.S.A. § 1492(b). The determination of the wrongful-death-act beneficiaries’ pecuniary injuries is ultimately one of fact. For that reason, when a court adjudicates the amount of the damages awardable to the personal representative of the beneficiaries on account of a wrongful death, or the relative proportion of those damages to be allocated to each of the respective statutory beneficiaries, that determination is an adjudicated fact that has preclusive effect in subsequent actions when the criteria for collateral estoppel are satisfied.
In this case, those criteria are satisfied, and the earlier order adjudicating the relative proportion of the statutory beneficiaries’ pecuniary damages has preclusive effect in subsequent proceedings in which the relative proportion of the statutory beneficiaries’ pecuniary damages is at issue.
In asserting that the wrongful death statute requires a “fair and equitable distribution,” , of each wrongful death settlement in light of the circumstances then presented, the majority adopts a framework that is at odds with the wrongful death statute and our cases, and embraces a holding that creates significant practical problems.
For these reasons, I dissent. The plain language of the wrongful death statute, and our case law applying that statute, make it clear that the damages that can be awarded in a wrongful death case are determined with reference to the pecuniary injuries of the surviving spouse and next of kin, that the proceeds of a wrongful death action are distributed among statutory beneficiaries in proportion to their respective injuries, and that the factors driving the calculation of wrongful death damages and the distribution of wrongful death proceeds are one and the same.
I would treat the proportional distribution reflected in the 2004 order as preclusive, and would distribute the current proceeds in the same proportion.
No comments:
Post a Comment