Adverse ruling is not grounds for disqualifying a judge.

Ainsworth v. Chandler, 2014 VT 107 (29-Aug-2014)

REIBER, C.J. Defendant has filed a litany of motions to disqualify judges, court personnel, and attorneys, all of which have been denied as lacking in merit. Defendant claims on appeal that his motions to disqualify the trial judge in this case were wrongly denied. We affirm.

Defendant filed numerous motions to disqualify the trial judge throughout the course of litigation. Defendant based his complaints against the trial judge on the fact that she said on one occasion that she had not read defendant’s case file; his disagreement with her rulings and handling of the case; and an alleged financial conflict with her prior law firm. On appeal, defendant argues that the trial judge harbors prejudice against him due to his interactions with her at her prior law firm, during defendant’s prior cases, and during the instant case.

The Code of Judicial Conduct provides that a judge “shall disqualify himself or herself in a proceeding in which the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” A.O. Canon 3E(1). Judges are “accorded a presumption of honesty and integrity, with [the] burden on the moving party to show otherwise in the circumstances of the case.” Ball v. Melsur Corp., 161 Vt. 35, 39, 633 A.2d 705, 709 (1993) (quotation omitted). We will not disturb a decision regarding disqualification unless “there has been an abuse of discretion, that is, if the record reveals no reasonable basis for the decision.” Id. at 40, 633 A.2d at 710.

Here, there is no basis to disturb the denial of defendant’s motions. Defendant has offered no evidence to lend factual support to any of his allegations of prejudice. The fact that the trial judge has previously ruled against him does not, in itself, constitute evidence of bias. See Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994) (“[J]udicial rulings alone almost never constitute a valid basis for a bias or partiality motion. . . . Almost invariably, they are proper grounds for appeal, not for recusal.”); Luce v. Cushing, 2004 VT 117, ¶ 23, 177 Vt. 600, 868 A.2d 672 (holding that “adverse rulings, no matter how erroneous or numerous” are not sufficient to establish prejudice (quotation omitted).