Cameron v. Rollo 2014 VT 40 (25-Apr-2014)
CRAWFORD, J. This case presents a single legal issue: whether the family division has exclusive jurisdiction over the distribution of marital property acquired during a marriage that ends in annulment. First the family division ruled that "[s]ince the marriage was void at its beginning, this court does not have jurisdiction to resolve this dispute. Then the civil division held that the civil division and the small claims court lacked jurisdiction over the division of marital property. We granted permission to appeal to review the legal question of which court has jurisdiction to distribute property under the circumstances of this case. We affirm the decision of the civil division in this case that exclusive jurisdiction over the parties’ property division is conferred by statute to the family division.
This idea that a marriage annulled on grounds of bigamy is void from its inception underlies the family division's refusal in this case to divide the parties' property. But the Legislature extended the remedy of property division to the parties to an annulment when it provided for property division in all cases filed under Chapter 11 of Title 15. 15 V.S.A. § 751(a). Chapter 11 of Title 15 encompasses annulment, divorce, and legal separation.
The statutory grant of jurisdiction to the family division is exclusive. There is no "overlapping jurisdiction—matters that belong in family court may not be brought in superior court." Rogers v. Wells, 174 Vt. 492, 494, 808 A.2d 648, 650 (2002) (mem.). Section 31(1) of Title 4, recently enacted as part of the unification of the judiciary, excludes from the civil division cases that are subject to the jurisdiction of the family division. See also 4 V.S.A. § 33(4).
We have not conistently maintained this boundary between the family and civil division in property disputes. Compare Tudhope v. Riehle, 167 Vt. 174, 178-80, 704 A.2d 765, 767-68 (1997) with Slansky v. Slansky, 150 Vt. 438, 442, 553 A.2d 152, 154 (1988), The boundary, however, is clear when the issue is whether marital property belongs to one spouse or the other. By holding that the family division has exclusive jurisdiction over the division of marital property, we seek to discourage overlapping cases in both courts.
DOOLEY, J., dissenting. To the majority this case is about subject matter jurisdiction over property disputes in annulment actions, an issue that will rarely, if ever, rise again. In my opinion, this case is really about the preclusive effect of subject matter jurisdiction determinations. The issue the majority chooses to address is legitimate, but the issues it largely ignores are critical and command a different result. Thus, I dissent.
Reducing the case to its essentials, plaintiff alleges that the person to whom he thought he was married stole his property while he was incarcerated. This is a conversion action with respect to property owned by plaintiff and possessed at one time by defendant but not in either's possession at the time of the annulment. I consider it debatable whether the conversion action is exclusively within the jurisdiction of the family division. See LaPlume v. Lavallee, 2004 VT 78, ¶¶ 8-9, 177 Vt. 526, 858 A.2d 255 (holding that plaintiff's claim for money damages against former partner for retention of property was conversion claim subject to jurisdiction of small claims court). But we need not, and should not, reach that question
We made a great stride forward in ensuring finality of judgments against lack-of-subject-matter-jurisdiction claims where the question of subject matter jurisdiction has already been litigated by adopting the Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 12 (1982). See Quinn v. Schipper, 2006 VT 51, ¶ 8, 180 Vt. 572, 908 A.2d 413 (mem.). Under § 12 a judgment generally precludes relitigation of subject matter jurisdiction in subsequent litigation. Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 12 (1982)(indicating a party is foreclosed from litigating subject matter jurisdiction in a subsequent lawsuit unless the decision on jurisdiction was "a manifest abuse of authority," the judgment at issue "would substantially infringe the authority of another tribunal," or the rendering court was incapable of making an adequately informed assessment of its own jurisdiction and procedural fairness would require the party seeking to avoid the judgment to have the opportunity to belatedly attack jurisdiction).
CRAWFORD, J. This case presents a single legal issue: whether the family division has exclusive jurisdiction over the distribution of marital property acquired during a marriage that ends in annulment. First the family division ruled that "[s]ince the marriage was void at its beginning, this court does not have jurisdiction to resolve this dispute. Then the civil division held that the civil division and the small claims court lacked jurisdiction over the division of marital property. We granted permission to appeal to review the legal question of which court has jurisdiction to distribute property under the circumstances of this case. We affirm the decision of the civil division in this case that exclusive jurisdiction over the parties’ property division is conferred by statute to the family division.
This idea that a marriage annulled on grounds of bigamy is void from its inception underlies the family division's refusal in this case to divide the parties' property. But the Legislature extended the remedy of property division to the parties to an annulment when it provided for property division in all cases filed under Chapter 11 of Title 15. 15 V.S.A. § 751(a). Chapter 11 of Title 15 encompasses annulment, divorce, and legal separation.
The statutory grant of jurisdiction to the family division is exclusive. There is no "overlapping jurisdiction—matters that belong in family court may not be brought in superior court." Rogers v. Wells, 174 Vt. 492, 494, 808 A.2d 648, 650 (2002) (mem.). Section 31(1) of Title 4, recently enacted as part of the unification of the judiciary, excludes from the civil division cases that are subject to the jurisdiction of the family division. See also 4 V.S.A. § 33(4).
We have not conistently maintained this boundary between the family and civil division in property disputes. Compare Tudhope v. Riehle, 167 Vt. 174, 178-80, 704 A.2d 765, 767-68 (1997) with Slansky v. Slansky, 150 Vt. 438, 442, 553 A.2d 152, 154 (1988), The boundary, however, is clear when the issue is whether marital property belongs to one spouse or the other. By holding that the family division has exclusive jurisdiction over the division of marital property, we seek to discourage overlapping cases in both courts.
DOOLEY, J., dissenting. To the majority this case is about subject matter jurisdiction over property disputes in annulment actions, an issue that will rarely, if ever, rise again. In my opinion, this case is really about the preclusive effect of subject matter jurisdiction determinations. The issue the majority chooses to address is legitimate, but the issues it largely ignores are critical and command a different result. Thus, I dissent.
Reducing the case to its essentials, plaintiff alleges that the person to whom he thought he was married stole his property while he was incarcerated. This is a conversion action with respect to property owned by plaintiff and possessed at one time by defendant but not in either's possession at the time of the annulment. I consider it debatable whether the conversion action is exclusively within the jurisdiction of the family division. See LaPlume v. Lavallee, 2004 VT 78, ¶¶ 8-9, 177 Vt. 526, 858 A.2d 255 (holding that plaintiff's claim for money damages against former partner for retention of property was conversion claim subject to jurisdiction of small claims court). But we need not, and should not, reach that question
We made a great stride forward in ensuring finality of judgments against lack-of-subject-matter-jurisdiction claims where the question of subject matter jurisdiction has already been litigated by adopting the Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 12 (1982). See Quinn v. Schipper, 2006 VT 51, ¶ 8, 180 Vt. 572, 908 A.2d 413 (mem.). Under § 12 a judgment generally precludes relitigation of subject matter jurisdiction in subsequent litigation. Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 12 (1982)(indicating a party is foreclosed from litigating subject matter jurisdiction in a subsequent lawsuit unless the decision on jurisdiction was "a manifest abuse of authority," the judgment at issue "would substantially infringe the authority of another tribunal," or the rendering court was incapable of making an adequately informed assessment of its own jurisdiction and procedural fairness would require the party seeking to avoid the judgment to have the opportunity to belatedly attack jurisdiction).
None of the exceptions apply. To say that the family division's ruling was "so plainly beyond the court's jurisdiction that its entertaining the action was a manifest abuse of authority" creates an exception to issue preclusion so broad as to eat up the rule and bring us back to the days of raising lack of subject matter jurisdiction over and over. The family division ruling may have been wrong, but it is not a manifest abuse of discretion, a clear usurpation of power, or a ruling without an arguable basis. Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 12(1).
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