State v. Alcide, 2016 VT 4 ( filed - January 8, 2016)
DOOLEY, J Defendant has filed a motion to dismiss this appeal on the grounds the State untimely filed its notice of appeal. We reject defendant's argument and conclude we do have jurisdiction over this appeal.
Although the trial court's dismissal was entered on July 3, 2014, the State did not file its Vermont Rule of Appellate Procedure 4 notice of appeal with the trial court until September 8. The State argues that the prosecution had filed a motion for permission to appeal the earlier interlocutory suppression ruling under V.R.A.P. 5 on July 10, which was granted by the trial court on August 25 without opposition, and was sufficient to put the defense on notice of the appeal. We agree and will consider this appeal as timely filed.
A mistake in designating a judgment appealed from is "not always fatal, so long as the intent to appeal from a specific ruling can be fairly inferred by probing the notice and the other party was not misled or prejudiced." We "decline to interpret Rule 4" in an unduly narrow fashion, Casella Const., Inc. v. Dep't of Taxes, 2005 VT 18, ¶ 5, 178 Vt. 61, 869 A.2d 157, in recognition of the limited purposes served by a notice of appeal: to inform the "parties and tribunals concerned that the proceedings are not concluded so that they may respond accordingly" and to invoke "appellate jurisdiction by accomplishing the transfer of the case to the reviewing authority while the question sought to be reviewed remains open to appeal." ¶ 11.
Here, Because the Rule 5 motion clearly indicated the State intended to appeal from the trial court's order on suppression and dismissal, and because "imperfections in noticing an appeal should not be fatal where no genuine doubt exists about who is appealing, from what judgment, to what appellate court," Becker v. Montgomery, 532 U.S. 757, 767 (2001), we hold that the State's motion for permission to appeal an interlocutory ruling was sufficient to afford defendant with notice, and consequently sufficient to permit us jurisdiction over this appeal.
A mistake in designating a judgment appealed from is "not always fatal, so long as the intent to appeal from a specific ruling can be fairly inferred by probing the notice and the other party was not misled or prejudiced." We "decline to interpret Rule 4" in an unduly narrow fashion, Casella Const., Inc. v. Dep't of Taxes, 2005 VT 18, ¶ 5, 178 Vt. 61, 869 A.2d 157, in recognition of the limited purposes served by a notice of appeal: to inform the "parties and tribunals concerned that the proceedings are not concluded so that they may respond accordingly" and to invoke "appellate jurisdiction by accomplishing the transfer of the case to the reviewing authority while the question sought to be reviewed remains open to appeal." ¶ 11.
Here, Because the Rule 5 motion clearly indicated the State intended to appeal from the trial court's order on suppression and dismissal, and because "imperfections in noticing an appeal should not be fatal where no genuine doubt exists about who is appealing, from what judgment, to what appellate court," Becker v. Montgomery, 532 U.S. 757, 767 (2001), we hold that the State's motion for permission to appeal an interlocutory ruling was sufficient to afford defendant with notice, and consequently sufficient to permit us jurisdiction over this appeal.
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