Saturday, May 10, 2014

Employment. Town not liable for tortious iterference with Town treasurer’s contract.


 Stone v. Irasburg, Town of 2014 VT 43 (25-Apr-2014)

CRAWFORD, J. Plaintiff Linda Stone sued the Town of Irasburg alleging tortious interference with office. The trial court granted the Town summary judgment. Plaintiff appealed. We affirm.

Tortious interference generally refers to interference with performance of an existing contract or a prospective contractual relationship. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 766 (2013). Under this tort, a person is liable if he “intentionally and improperly interferes with the performance of a contract . . . between another and a third person by inducing or otherwise causing the third person not to perform the contract.” Id.

While plaintiff styles her claim as one for “tortious interference with performance of office,” there is no such enumerated tort in our case law, or in the law of other jurisdictions. The closest analogy, although imperfect, is tortious interference in the employment context, which has been recognized in some states. While the elements are described by courts in various ways, under any definition of this tort, the interference with the contract or prospective advantage must come from a third party.

Here, to the extent that we can apply tortious interference with an employment relationship to plaintiff’s allegation of tortious interference with performance of her office, we conclude that plaintiff has failed to meet the elements of that tort. Plaintiff alleges that selectboard members interfered with plaintiff’s performance of her duties as treasurer. Because the selectboard members are agents of the Town and not third parties, plaintiff has failed to allege interference by a third party, and has not pled a prima facie case for tortious interference.

Therefore, the court was correct to grant judgment to the Town on this count.

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Note: Vermont precedent not cited in this opnion says the tort of interference with contract is applicable in limited situations against other employees or officers of the plaintiff's employer who act outside the scope of their employment to further their own interests. Murray v. St. Michael's College, 667 A.2d 294, 164 Vt. 205 (1995) (summary judgment in favor of supervisor appropriate in the absence of any allegation by plaintiff that supervisor acted outside the scope of his employment or in his own personal interest in dealing with plaintiff); Lyon v. Bennington College Corp., 137 Vt. 135, 138-39, 400 A.2d 1010, 1012-13 (1979) (claim against officers of college for inducing college to break its contract with plaintiff presented viable tort claim because the gravamen of the complaint was that the individual defendants acted in their individual capacities, and was not an attempt to impose liability for good faith acts within the scope of corporate duties). See generally Annotation, Liability of Corporate Director, Officer, or Employee for Tortious Interference with Corporation's Contract with Another, 72 A.L.R. 4th 492 (1989) (stating circumstances in which courts have allowed plaintiffs to bring contractual interference suits against other employees of plaintiffs' employer); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 767 (1979) (stating circumstances in which courts have allowed plaintiffs to bring contractual interference suits against other employees of plaintiffs' employer); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 767 (1979) (stating factors for court's consideration in determining whether defendants' actions are "improper" so as to make defendants liable under contractual interference claim); e.g. Shea v. Emmanuel College, 425 Mass. 761, 682 N.E.2d 1348 (1997), (court properly granted summary judgment against terminated college employee's interference of contract action against her former supervisor because employee failed to create genuine issue of material fact as to whether former supervisor had acted with actual malice in arranging for her discharge); Hickman v. Winston County Hosp. Bd., 508 So.2d 237 (Ala.1987), (courts have held that claim of tortious interference with former employee's contract of employment cannot be maintained against officers or employees of a corporation unless those persons were acting outside their scope of employment and were acting with actual malice); Murray v. Bridgeport Hosp., 40 Conn.Supp. 56, 480 A.2d 610 (1984),(although an agent acting legitimately within the scope of agent's authority cannot be held liable for interfering with or inducing principal to breach a contract between principal and a third party, an agent can be held liable for such interference or inducement if agent did not act legitimately within the agent's scope of duty but used the corporate power improperly for personal gain); Holloway v. Skinner, 898 S.W.2d 793 (Tex.1995), (on an interference with contract claim a plaintiff must show that the officer of a corporation defendant acted in a fashion so contrary to the corporation's best interests that the officer's actions could only have been motivated by personal interests).

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