Clarke v. Abate, 2013 VT 52 (09-Aug-2013)
REIBER, C.J. In this civil action alleging sexual assault and battery and intentional or reckless infliction of emotional distress by a medical doctor during the course of his treatment of a high school female athlete, plaintiff appeals the superior court’s grant of summary judgment to defendant based on the six-year statute of limitations applicable to childhood sexual abuse. The court’s determination that the limitations period had run as a matter of law before plaintiff filed her lawsuit relied primarily on plaintiff’s statements to police and her deposition testimony concerning her awareness of defendant’s wrongful conduct at the time of the alleged assaults. We conclude that the court erred by determining the limitations accrual date as a matter of law rather than allowing the jury to weigh inferences from the factual record regarding plaintiff’s state of mind and knowledge during the relevant period of time. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment and remand the matter for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
The applicable statute of limitations, 12 V.S.A. § 522(a), states a civil action for recovery of damages for injury suffered as a result of childhood sexual abuse shall be commenced within six years of the act alleged to have caused the injury or condition, or six years of the time the victim discovered that the injury or condition was caused by that act, whichever period expires later.
Plaintiff's treatment with defendant ended in August 2002 Plaintiff filed suit on June 4, 2009. The trial court granted summary judgment relying primarily on statements made by plaintiff to police in 2007 and her 2011 deposition testimony concerning her awareness of defendant's conduct at the time of the alleged assaults. The court concluded as a matter of law that plaintiff's cause of action began to accrue when she reached the age of majority because her own statements indicate that she knew or should have known of the assaultive nature of defendant's conduct at the time it occurred.
A court may determine the accrual-date issue only "when there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for the nonmoving party on that issue." Although plaintiff in a statement to investigators, indicated she "definitely" felt something was wrong during the examinations, she also made statements indicating that she was not sure if her concerns were valid and did not receive affirmation of the validity of those concerns from family members. Given plaintiff's at-times equivocating and conflicting statements to the authorities concerning her knowledge and awareness of any wrongful conduct on defendant's part, it was the jury's prerogative to make any inferences from those statements and determine at what point plaintiff knew or should have known that defendant's conduct was assaultive rather than medical in nature.
Given the imbalances of the roles between plaintiff and defendant, as well as the ambiguities and inconsistencies in the statements relied upon by the trial court with respect to the extent of plaintiff's knowledge and understanding of whether the purported treatment was in fact childhood sexual abuse, the trial court erred in dismissing plaintiff's suit as a matter of law.
The applicable statute of limitations, 12 V.S.A. § 522(a), states a civil action for recovery of damages for injury suffered as a result of childhood sexual abuse shall be commenced within six years of the act alleged to have caused the injury or condition, or six years of the time the victim discovered that the injury or condition was caused by that act, whichever period expires later.
Plaintiff's treatment with defendant ended in August 2002 Plaintiff filed suit on June 4, 2009. The trial court granted summary judgment relying primarily on statements made by plaintiff to police in 2007 and her 2011 deposition testimony concerning her awareness of defendant's conduct at the time of the alleged assaults. The court concluded as a matter of law that plaintiff's cause of action began to accrue when she reached the age of majority because her own statements indicate that she knew or should have known of the assaultive nature of defendant's conduct at the time it occurred.
A court may determine the accrual-date issue only "when there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for the nonmoving party on that issue." Although plaintiff in a statement to investigators, indicated she "definitely" felt something was wrong during the examinations, she also made statements indicating that she was not sure if her concerns were valid and did not receive affirmation of the validity of those concerns from family members. Given plaintiff's at-times equivocating and conflicting statements to the authorities concerning her knowledge and awareness of any wrongful conduct on defendant's part, it was the jury's prerogative to make any inferences from those statements and determine at what point plaintiff knew or should have known that defendant's conduct was assaultive rather than medical in nature.
Given the imbalances of the roles between plaintiff and defendant, as well as the ambiguities and inconsistencies in the statements relied upon by the trial court with respect to the extent of plaintiff's knowledge and understanding of whether the purported treatment was in fact childhood sexual abuse, the trial court erred in dismissing plaintiff's suit as a matter of law.
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