Pierce v. Vaughan, 2012 VT 5 (mem.)
This case raises the question of whether a court may grant a motion for relief from a default judgment for mistake or inadvertence beyond the one-year limitations period of Vermont Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), where the parties reached an agreement after the default judgment had entered. Because the agreement was -- as plaintiffs’ attorney admitted -- specifically designed to allow defendants to make a motion to set aside the default judgment, the trial court considered the present case to involve equitable considerations not covered by the one year limit for clause (1), (2), or (3). However, the default judgment was entered due to mistake or inadvertence, and the subsequent agreement did not relieve the moving party of the burden to seek timely relief from the judgment. Therefore, we conclude that the trial court’s grant of relief was in error.
Here, defendants rely on Rule 60(b)(6), which is an omnibus clause providing that “the court may relieve a party . . . from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for . . . any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.” Rule 60(b)(6) is not to be used as a substitute for one of the first five subsections of V.R.C.P. 60(b). Motions seeking relief under clauses (1), (2), and (3) require that the motion be filed “not more than one year after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken.” V.R.C.P. 60(b). If clause (6) were permitted to encompass grounds for relief that fall under clause (1), (2), or (3), then it would supply a backdoor to circumvent the one-year time limit.
In this case, defendants’ basis for relief from the judgment was that they had attempted to respond to the claims brought against them, but the default was entered due to the failure to file this response with the court. This most naturally falls within clause (1), which covers “mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.”V.R.C.P. 60(b). Plaintiff’s later agreement that defendants were not precluded “from being able to raise whatever defenses they may have to plaintiffs[’] claims in any other actions between the parties” was not an agreement to relieve defendants of the default judgment against them; nor was it an agreement to excuse the limitations period for seeking relief from that judgment. Consequently, we find no support for the trial court’s decision to grant defendant’s motion under Rule 60(b)(6).
Here, defendants rely on Rule 60(b)(6), which is an omnibus clause providing that “the court may relieve a party . . . from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for . . . any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.” Rule 60(b)(6) is not to be used as a substitute for one of the first five subsections of V.R.C.P. 60(b). Motions seeking relief under clauses (1), (2), and (3) require that the motion be filed “not more than one year after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken.” V.R.C.P. 60(b). If clause (6) were permitted to encompass grounds for relief that fall under clause (1), (2), or (3), then it would supply a backdoor to circumvent the one-year time limit.
In this case, defendants’ basis for relief from the judgment was that they had attempted to respond to the claims brought against them, but the default was entered due to the failure to file this response with the court. This most naturally falls within clause (1), which covers “mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.”V.R.C.P. 60(b). Plaintiff’s later agreement that defendants were not precluded “from being able to raise whatever defenses they may have to plaintiffs[’] claims in any other actions between the parties” was not an agreement to relieve defendants of the default judgment against them; nor was it an agreement to excuse the limitations period for seeking relief from that judgment. Consequently, we find no support for the trial court’s decision to grant defendant’s motion under Rule 60(b)(6).
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