Juror misconduct. New trial ordered for Somali Bantu immigrant convicted of sexual assault on a child, because a juror might have been influenced by information about Somali culture he found on the Internet.

State v. Abdi, 2012 VT 4 (Johnson, J.)


Following a jury trial, defendant—a Somali Bantu immigrant to Vermont—was convicted of one count of aggravated sexual assault on a child. He moved for a new trial based, in part, on a claim of jury misconduct resulting from a juror’s acquisition of information on the internet concerning Somali culture, a subject that played a significant role at trial. The trial court held a hearing, questioned the jurors, and issued a written decision denying the motion. The court concluded that although the extraneous information had the capacity to affect the jury’s verdict, it was harmless. We conclude otherwise, and therefore reverse the judgment and remand for a new trial.


We have evolved a “two-part inquiry” in cases of claimed exposure to “extraneous prejudicial information.”  A defendant alleging extraneous influence must first demonstrate that an irregularity occurred and that it had the capacity to affect the jury’s result. Once this is shown, the State must demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that the irregularity did not in fact prejudice the jurors against defendant.


Jurors may testify to the factual circumstances surrounding their exposure to extraneous information, but not to whether the information influenced their verdict.  Rule 606(b) permits a juror to testify on the question whether extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury’s attention, whether any outside influence was improperly brought to bear upon any juror, and whether any juror discussed matters pertaining to the trial with persons other than his fellow jurors. 


Accordingly,  because of Rule 606(b), the inquiry is strictly objective in nature, looking to the totality of the surrounding facts and circumstances to determine whether the extraneous information acquired by the jury had the capacity to influence the verdict, and, if so, whether we may nevertheless confidently conclude that it could not have prejudiced the result.


The the State does not challenge on appeal the trial court’s findings that an irregularity in the form of the unidentified juror’s internet “research” on Somali religion and culture was brought up by the juror during deliberations. The question in this case resolves to whether the trial court correctly concluded that the State had met its heavy burden of proving the information was not prejudicial.


The record demonstrates that Somali Bantu religion and culture lay at the heart of this case, and it is simply impossible to conclude that outside information used by at least one juror—as the trial court found—to “interpret the testimony of the Somali witnesses and to determine the credibility of these witnesses” could have had no impact on the verdict. Whatever the merits of the trial court’s finding that the evidence of guilt “was strong,” it cannot be separated from the fact that the verdict turned exclusively on the jury’s credibility assessment of the testimony at trial. Accordingly, we conclude that the judgment must be reversed, and the matter remanded for a new trial before an impartial jury.