Mahoney v. Tara, LLC, 2011 VT 3 (mem.)

Plaintiffs appeal from the trial court’s dismissal of their complaint for adverse possession. The question presented is whether the charitable name of a property owner, without more, is sufficient to protect land from an adverse possession claim. Plaintiffs’ claim the trial court erroneously assumed that 12 V.S.A. § 462 provides a complete exemption for all public, charitable, and pious owners, regardless of the actual use of the property. Plaintiffs argue the trial court prematurely dismissed their adverse possession claim without sufficient development of the record as to the actual use of the property. We agree, and reverse and remand.

Plaintiffs claim ownership of a strip of beach located between the parties’ properties. The adjacent lot to the northeast (the Tara Lot) was owned by Vermont Catholic Charities, Inc. (VCC) from 1958 until 2006 when it was sold to defendant. The trial court ruled that VCC’s ownership of the land prevented plaintiffs from fulfilling the necessary fifteen-year period for adverse possession. The court said that the “adverse possession clock is tolled while a pious or charitable owner holds the property.”

Section 462 reads: “Nothing contained in this chapter [relating to the limitation of actions] shall extend to lands given, granted, sequestered or appropriated to a public, pious, or charitable use, or to lands belonging to the state.” 12 V.S.A. § 462. The text of § 462 and our cases support plaintiffs’ argument that the court erred in dismissing the claim based without allowing any discovery and without any showing that VCC’s use qualified for the protection the statute provides. By its plain terms, the focus of the exemption is not on lands held by a public pious or charitable user, as the trial court’s ruling suggests, but rather on “lands given, granted, sequestered or appropriated to a public, pious, or charitable use.” Id. (emphasis added).

Plaintiffs cite to a series of our cases wherein we held § 462 did not bar claims of adverse possession against public or charitable land owners because their use (or lack of use) of the land—as distinct from their identity as public, pious, or charitable entities—was not to a public end. In all of our cases, we have recognized the necessarily fact-intensive nature of the inquiry under § 462. While the name, Vermont Catholic Charities, Inc., certainly suggests it is a pious or charitable organization, the name alone does not reveal whether the use of the property was for a privileged purpose. The trial court’s reliance, with no analysis, on the name of the Tara Lot’s previous owner was error that requires reversal and a remand.